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Abstract: Social dilemmas occur when the pursuit of self-interest by individuals in a group leads to less than optimal collective
outcomes for everyone in the group. A critical assumption in the human sciences is that people's choices in such dilemmas are
individualistic, selfish, and rational. Hence, cooperation in the support of group welfare will only occur if there are selfish incentives
that convert the social dilemma into a nondilemma. In recent years, inclusive fitness theories have lent weight to such traditional
views of rational selfishness on Darwinian grounds. To show that cooperation is based on selfish incentives, however, one must
provide evidence that people do not cooperate without such incentives. In a series of experimental social dilemmas, subjects were
instructed to make single, anonymous choices about whether or not to contribute money for a shared "bonus' that would be provided
only if enough other people in the group also contributed their money. Noncontributors cited selfish reasons for their choices;
contributors did not. If people are allowed to engage in discussion, they will contribute resources at high rates, frequently on
irrational grounds, to promote group welfare. These findings are consistent with previous research on ingroup biasing effects that
cannot be explained by "economic man" or "selfish gene" theories. An alternative explanation is that sociality was a primary factor
shaping the evolution of Homo sapiens. The cognitive and affective mechanisms underlying such choices evolved under selection
pressures on small groups for developing and maintaining group membership and for predicting and controlling the behavior of other
group members. This sociality hypothesis organizes previously inexplicable and disparate phenomena in a Darwinian framework and
makes novel predictions about human choice.
Keywords: altruism; game theory; group behavior; human evolution; prisoner's dilemma; rational choice; selfishness; social
cognition; social dilemmas; sociality; sociobiology
Group living has been a central characteristic of the
human species throughout human evolution (Foley
1987); there is no archaeological evidence of a transition
from isolation to group life. Yet psychologists, an-
thropologists, and evolutionists have rarely considered
what psychological characteristics might have evolved as
adaptations to living in small groups. Instead, most theo-
rists assume that human nature is basically selfish and
individualistic, an assumption that applies just as well to
animals that have evolved in isolation as to those that have
evolved in groups. In recent years, "selfish gene" theo-
ries (e.g., Dawkins 1976) have provided the ultimate
justification for this centuries-old notion of "economic
man" (Myers 1983) by arguing - somewhat tautologically
- that human behavior evolved to maximize fitness in
local environments. A variety of "egoistic incentive"
theories have accordingly been proposed to account for
the minimal amount of cooperation necessary for group
living in terms of the individual selfish payoffs it affords;
for example, Axelrod (1984) proposes that cooperation
evolves as the result of the payoffs to the cooperating
individual when cooperation is reciprocated ("reciprocal
altruism"), whereas Alexander (1987) proposes that coop-
eration evolves as the result of payoffs that accrue to the
genes of the cooperating individual when the benefici-
aries of the cooperation are genetically related ("kin
altruism").
These egoistic incentive1 (El) notions are really un-
tested metatheories; they seem to be based on cultural
beliefs about "human nature" rather than on reasoned
argument. In this target article, we present experimental
evidence that (1) human cooperation can be controlled by
manipulating variables totally unrelated to self-interest
and that (2) satisfying self-interest is not necessary to
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elicit this cooperation. These results cannot be explained
by El theories. Instead, we suggest that the cognitive and
affective mechanisms underlying the cooperation ob-
served in these studies may have evolved from selection
pressures exerted under small-group living conditions for
developing and maintaining group membership. Accord-
ing to this "sociality hypothesis," human nature is basical-
ly social rather than selfish.2
1. Social dilemmas and egoistic incentive
theories
In a later section, experiments are described in which
people are faced with choices between individual self-
ishness and social cooperation. These experiments con-
front people with "social dilemmas" - situations that
maximize the conflict between private incentives and
group welfare. We use a simple example, the funding of
public broadcasting, to introduce the basic concepts and
structural features of social dilemmas. (The Appendix
includes a glossary for readers unfamiliar with the tech-
nical terms of game theory.)
For almost all potential contributors, the success or
failure of public broadcasting is determined by what
others contribute, usually in private; there are neither
tangible social rewards (payoffs) for contributing nor
sanctions for not contributing (the absence of a sanction is
also a payoff). We can "free ride" on the contributions of
others by making no contribution and still enjoy the
broadcast; if we fear that the contributions of others will
not be enough to maintain this public good, we can avoid
"throwing away" our own money by withholding it. In
fact, no matter how many others contribute, our potential
contribution has greater utility for us if it is spent on
private consumption rather than on public broadcasting;
hence not contributing is a dominating strategy. But if all
listeners withhold all contributions, the demise of public
broadcasting follows, a deficient equilibrium for all who
enjoy it. The payoff for each individual is higher for not
contributing than for contributing, but if each individual
follows the dominating strategy, the outcome is one that
no individual desires. Choosing the dominating strategy
by withholding one's contribution is known as defection;
accepting a lower individual payoff to sustain public
broadcasting is called cooperation.
Fossil fuel shortages, overpopulation, "brown-outs,"
air pollution, and the depletion of fresh water supplies all
represent social dilemmas because each individual's
payoffs for choosing defection are higher than those for
choosing cooperation, no matter what others choose;
however, all individuals receive lower payoffs under
universal defection than under universal cooperation.
Cooperation can be difficult to obtain in social dilemmas
because individual decisions typically have a low impact
on the collective outcome, especially when the group is
large. Also, gains associated with self-interest accrue to
the individual whereas the costs - inconveniences, de-
clines in the quality of life, or depletion of resources - are
shared by all. Sociobiology's "central problem" (Wilson
1975) can also be framed as a social dilemma: How can
cooperation evolve when the genetic payoffs for defection
are higher than for cooperation?
Stated in game theoretic terms3 (see Appendix and
Glossary), a social dilemma is a structure in which domi-
nating strategies converge on a deficient equilibrium
(Dawes 1980). The outcome of choosing the dominating
strategies is "deficient" because some other outcome is
preferred by the choosers; it is an "equilibrium" because
no group member receives a higher payoff for picking
some other option if indeed others choose their dominat-
ing strategies. People are assumed to be (1) rational
decision makers (i.e., they are capable of assessing and
acting upon their perceived interests and preferences),
and (2) selfish maximizers (i.e., only their own costs and
benefits enter their decision calculations). Rational
choice involves determining and comparing (1) the vari-
ous outcomes that could result from each alternative
course of action and (2) the probability that each outcome
will subsequently occur - and then choosing on the basis
of personal values (called utilities). Selfishness is defined
as not taking the consequences for the group into account
in this calculation. (Shubik [1964] describes the formal
assumptions of "economic man" theories, and Schwartz
[1986] describes how they are involved in everyday life.)
According to El theory, people will always choose the
selfish strategy in social dilemmas. The only way to avoid
the resulting deficient equilibrium, then, is to embed the
dilemma in a larger context involving utilities that make
the dominating strategies no longer dominating. These
utilities assessed by economic man can be external, such
as avoiding sanction or obtaining a direct payment, or
internal, such as a positive psychological payoff for "doing
the right thing" or "having a clear conscience," irrespec-
tive of consequence. Some authors have proposed that
these measures of utility can also be more indirect; for
example, it would be to the benefit of the current cooper-
ator to have others observe the cooperative act and
reciprocate with future acts of their own (Alexander 1987;
Campbell 1986).
Social dilemmas are not "trust dilemmas," in which
people receive higher individual rewards for choosing a
socially beneficial alternative only if others do (as occurs
in some business partnerships, for example). The conflict
between individual payoffs and group payoffs is maximal
in social dilemmas because individuals always receive
higher rewards for choosing the (dominating) option lead-
ing to the deficient equilibrium that no one desires. It
should also be noted that social dilemmas are defined in
terms of available choice options and payoffs - not in
terms of what people actually choose. It is always possible
to hypothesize arbitrary egoistic payoffs post hoc when-
ever an individual is observed to choose what does not
appear to be the dominating strategy, or one can simply
claim that some such payoffs must exist. It is also possible
to maintain that an apparently nonegoistic incentive that
motivates behavior must by definition be "selfish," or
that choosing a dominated option is impossible, again by
definition, because the very fact that it was chosen means
the apparently dominating option cannot be dominating.
This last argument is known as revealed preference (see
Glossary) -the term is a double entendre - because the
observer claims "revealed" knowledge of an internal
cause of behavior (i.e., self-interest) and because behav-
ior "reveals" the actor's utilities (i.e., the matter of self-
interest and its subjective value to the actor). (The diffi-
culties of revealed preference are discussed in section
1.4.)
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The economic-man prediction for behavior in social
dilemmas is that people will neither contribute their own
resources nor will they practice restraint in the use of
freely available ones. Everyday observation, however,
quickly reveals that some people do cooperate in social
dilemmas, at least some of the time. El explanations for
cooperative behavior differ only superficially: Theorists
who accept the selfish incentive paradigm must transform
the social dilemma into a nondilemma. If an inducement
or penalty is imposed or developed, the utility of the
dominated cooperative behavior is thereby changed so
that the consequence of the cooperative choice becomes
individually beneficial. Because the cooperative choice is
beneficial for the group, these sanctions would explain
how selfish behavior is compatible with beneficial group
outcomes.
Responses to social dilemmas are ideal for studying El
theories because hypotheses about the necessity of incen-
tive changes are testable. A hypothesized incentive for
cooperation would be falsified, for example, if coopera-
tion did not decline when the putative incentive was
removed. Similarly, a pattern of findings that was incon-
sistent with El theory over a number of experiments
would be grounds for doubting its usefulness as a general
explanation for human cooperation even if a post hoc El
explanation could be separately generated for each ex-
periment. It is important to test El theories not only
because they are ubiquitous, but because they can have
important, and sometimes draconian, implications for
social organization (see below). We will now briefly de-
scribe incentive changes that have been suggested by
prominent El theorists to account for cooperation.
1.1. Coercion. Thomas Hobbes's (1651/1958) classical
justification for absolute government (Leviathan) is based
on his analysis of the social dilemma structure of life in its
absence. When the self-seeking propensity of mankind is
constrained only by others' capacity to defend them-
selves, where the "covenants without a sword are but
words, and of no strength to secure a man at all," the
result is the "warre of all against all" (a dominating
strategy). This war is the worst outcome for everyone (a
deficient equilibrium from which individuals cannot re-
move themselves). It can (and should) be averted by a
government strong enough to make peaceable action the
dominant strategy. By coercing people to cooperate,
Leviathan changes the incentive structure to make coop-
eration compatible with egoistic incentives. Hobbes pro-
vides not only an evolutionary and ethical justification for
strong, coercive state power, but a psychological one as
well. People, at least vaguely aware of their own impulses
to defect and the resulting individual loss that the collec-
tive expression of these impulses would mean, will accept
the existence of this power - even when it is used to the
selfish advantage of those wielding it.
More recently, Hardin (1968) has rekindled interest in
coercion as a strategy for inducing cooperation. He has
suggested that exploiting the environment, polluting it,
and having children are all dominating strategies, partic-
ularly in developing countries. Modern technology and
population growth have made these strategies converge
on deficient equilibria: pollution, overexploitation of the
environment, and overpopulation. Hardin uses the anal-
ogy of overgrazing a common pasture: All herdsmen have
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a dominating strategy to add cattle because their share of
the destruction produced by an additional animal costs
them less than the profit they accrue from the animal. Yet
if all herdsmen choose this strategy, the common re-
source is destroyed. Hardin's proposal is "mutual coer-
cion mutually agreed upon." Although the process (mutu-
al consent) differs from Leviathan, the result is the same;
cooperation becomes compatible with egoistic incentives
- provided, of course, that the sanctions enforcing it
make the probable payoff of behaving uncooperatively
negative.
1.2. Reciprocity. Before Hardin's paper Anatol Rapoport
(Rapoport & Chammah 1965) conducted experiments on
prisoner's dilemma games (see Appendix) as analogues of
the nuclear arms race. These games have the same
structure as social dilemmas except that the game has two
players (i.e., defection is dominant, but the strategy leads
to an outcome neither player desires). Rapoport consid-
ered the arms race to be a prototypical prisoner's dilem-
ma because both sides appear to have a dominating
strategy to arm even though both would prefer disarma-
ment and prosperity rather than the resulting escalation
of arms production and concentration of resources in the
military sector simply to achieve stalemate. Creating
prisoner's dilemmas through payoffs in laboratory situa-
tions allowed Rapoport and others to investigate how
success in avoiding the deficient equilibrium across re-
peated plays varied with players' overall choice strategy,
forms of communication, personality characteristics, and
even their gender.
As early as 1967, Amnon Rapoport demonstrated math-
ematically that the defecting choice in a prisoner's dilem-
ma may no longer dominate when that choice is embed-
ded in a metagame created by repeated (iterated) plays in
which reciprocity - or even its possibility - can make
cooperation nondominated on particular plays. In iter-
ated dilemmas, players are faced with a very complicated
problem of behavioral control in which they try to shape
the other players' behavior to yield cooperation, while
simultaneously being rewarded or punished themselves.
Players may reward cooperative choices by subsequently
cooperating and respond to defection with defection (a
strategy called "tit-for-tat"). This is analogous to the
situation faced by a parent who must decide whether or
not to forego a pleasant interaction with a child in the
hope of changing future behavior by punishing a past
transgression. Like coercion, reciprocity is hypothesized
to "work" by making cooperation a selfish choice.
Empirical results suggest that cooperation can result
from egoistic incentives because reciprocity exists; indi-
viduals making a choice have at least an implicit under-
standing of this reciprocity and its potential benefits. The
strongest and most replicable finding is that subjects who
use a tit-for-tat strategy in two-person prisoner's dilem-
mas attain the best overall outcomes across trials. This
strategy consists of cooperating on the first play and then
simply matching the opponent's prior choice on suc-
cessive plays. Thus, cooperation is rewarded with cooper-
ation and defection is punished with defection.4 Axelrod
(1984) replicated these results with two computer tourna-
ments in which various experts in cooperation and con-
flict submitted overall ("metagame") strategies as com-
puter programs for playing iterated prisoners' dilemmas
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against one another. In both tournaments, tit-for-tat
garnered the most points.
An interesting elimination of a dilemma through reci-
procity was achieved at the height of the nineteenth-
century American "cult of domesticity." Catherine
Beecher (1847/1972) observed that, "in order that each
individual may pursue and secure the highest degree of
happiness within his reach, unimpeded by the selfishness
of others, a system of laws must be established, which
sustain certain relations and dependencies in social and
civil life" (pp. 171—72). Beecher defended a system in-
volving the "duties of subordination," which women
would undertake. Because the sexes were equal, how-
ever, women would undertake their duties only when
men's regard for women's best interest demanded it. In
compensation for their subordination, women would be
treated, by custom and courtesy, as superiors. The as-
sumption that women were better suited to voluntary
subordination was founded partially on the belief that
women were more capable than men of acting in the
absence of egoistic incentives; providence has provided
them with a selfless and superior moral nature.5
1.3. Conscience. One of the goals of socialization is to take
a child "brought into the world with apparently no other
thought than its own gratification" (Rushton 1980, p. viii)
and teach it concern for others. Campbell (1975) proposes
that abstract cultural ideals such as fairness, equity,
sharing, and so forth, are instilled in individuals as "con-
science": general rules and customs that guide interac-
tions with others. The Freudian version is the superego.
Innate selfishness is opposed by internal rewards and
punishments that have a higher utility than external ones.
In our view, it makes no difference whether a choice
payoffis external (such as avoiding a sanction or obtaining
rewards through reciprocity in the future) or internal (as
in having a clear conscience, heightened self-esteem, or
the avoidance of guilt). An individual whose decision can
be traced to a positive psychological payoffis acting on the
basis of egoistic incentive.
1.4. Inclusive fitness maximization. According to so-
ciobiologists, "altruism" includes not only genetically-
based self-sacrifice of genes (the usual biological usage),
but also any expenditure of resources, energy, and time
that may benefit another organism (Barash 1977). Hence,
they try to explain social behavior with the same princi-
ples that govern genetic self-sacrifice. According to Alex-
ander (1979), all human behavior, whether categorized as
"selfish individualism" or "group altruism," can be ex-
plained in terms of striving to maximize the survival by
reproduction of one's own genes or copies of one's genes
possessed by relatives: That is, the ultimate goal of
behavior is to maximize inclusive fitness. (Note that
"survival by reproduction" confounds the survival of the
individual organism and the reproduction of the genes,
thereby collapsing genetic and individual levels of analy-
ses.) Thus, the solution to sociobiology's "central prob-
lem" is to transform the dilemma of altruism into a
nondilemma by hypothesizing egoistic incentives for
"selfish" genes as an explanation for cooperation. In-
stances of apparent cooperation among unrelated indi-
viduals are best interpreted as the aggregate outcome of
individuals pursuing their own (gene-prompted) self-
interest (Alexander 1974; Trivers 1971; 1985; Williams
1966).
The sociobiology of choice rests on the revealed prefer-
ence approach (described in section 1 and Appendix),
which also transforms dilemmas into nondilemmas. Even
apparently altruistic choices are assumed to reveal under-
lying utilities to the genes, with people choosing only
what maximizes genetic fitness (Chagnon & Irons 1979).
The corollary to El theory, that people are rational, may
also be given an explicit genetic justification. Alexander
(1979), for example, states that "the 'rational self-interest'
of'utilitarian' explanations of human behavior is really the
combination of the genes and chromosomes in perpetuat-
ing themselves" (p. 70). This approach is circular, but it
does imply the testable claim that humans routinely make
rationally self-interested decisions. If choices reveal "un-
derlying" utilities, then they must be consistent, tran-
sitive, and independent of the way they are elicited. In
reality, however, inconsistencies, intransitivities, and
systematic "preference reversals" occur that depend, for
example, on whether one's choice is based on comparing
commodities directly or on using a system of common
currency (see Grether & Plott 1979; Lichtenstein &
Slovic 1971).6 Another example of inconsistency is the
following: The finding that people seek sure gains and
avoid sure losses leads to predictable preference reversals
when the same problem is framed in different ways - a
credit card surcharge versus a cash discount, or, more
important, lives lost (e.g., 400 of 600) versus lives saved
(e.g., 200 of 600; Tversky & Kahneman 1981). As with
economic man theories, genetic reductionist accounts
can neither accommodate nor dismiss such systematic
deviations from rationality.
Although cultural evolutionists also assign a key role to
egoistic incentives, they can avoid the shortcomings of
revealed preference and the "adaptationist program" by
positing intervening selective processes. Boyd and
Richerson (1985) explicitly use the social dilemma frame-
work to explore the conflict between self-interest and
cooperation. In their view, a theory of cooperation must
explain how a tendency to acquire self-sacrificial beliefs
could evolve and why altruistic behavior is directed
toward some individuals and not others. They propose
"conformist transmission" of cultural beliefs and behavior
as an explanation. According to Boyd and Richerson,
people use a simple rule to judge what behaviors or
beliefs to imitate: The more frequent a trait, the greater
the value of imitating it. In general, the advantage of
conformist transmission is that it provides an easily used
"rule of thumb" that increases the probability of acquir-
ing values, goals, beliefs, and behavior favored in the
local population. "Excessive cooperation" from the ge-
netic point of view may simply be a byproduct of an
otherwise adaptive strategy for judging what behavior
and cultural values to imitate.
1.5. Summary. El theories are variants of a metatheory
that assumes, but does not demonstrate, that the only
way to "resolve" a social dilemma is to embed it in a larger
context in which it is no longer a dilemma. Cooperation is
explained as a byproduct of the individualistic pursuit of
some goal other than collective success. Goals may be
variously identified in the social and behavioral sciences,
but as in folk psychology, the organizing principle is that
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people try to maximize their chances of obtaining out-
comes of purely personal value (Kitcher 1985). Cultural
materialism explains the exotic customs of nonindustrial
cultures as the "unknowing" cost/benefit calculations of
production and reproduction (Harris 1979); psycho-
analysis views mental life as being organized around
unconscious pleasures and pains (Freud 1900/1965), and
political economics posits government for the self-in-
terest of politicians (Downs 1957); psychology stands
accused of sanctioning selfishness (Wallach & Wallach
1983), and sociobiology offers the ultimate causal explana-
tion for self-interest - the genes (Alexander 1987). All
these theories explain social interaction in terms of incen-
tives that are present in society, but that would be just as
highly valued by an isolated nonsocial animal as by a social
one.
Experimental studies and computer simulations (such
as those described above) have generally supported El
theories by showing that such incentives "work"; how-
ever, these variables are manipulated without testing
what happens in their absence. Most empirical investiga-
tions are of two-person games played repeatedly with the
same other player (or presumed player - often in reality a
computer program). A cooperative subject may therefore
expect to gain more points or money "in the long run"
than an uncooperative one, provided that cooperation is
reciprocated. (A true dilemma, in contrast, is defined by a
dominating strategy of defection, not just one that ap-
pears to be dominating because of a short-sighted failure
to realize that cooperation yields a higher payoff in a
broader context.) Given the existence of reciprocal al-
truism in most cultures - a fact we do not deny - a player
who cooperates in iterated play, especially in a tit-for-tat
manner, will garner higher payoffs in the long run than a
player who defects; however, the existence of these
payoffs does not imply that the factor responsible for such
cooperation is the expectation of receiving them. (In our
culture, airplane crashes yield monetary payoffs to the
survivors and the relatives of those killed with even
greater certainty than cooperation yields reciprocity -
which implies nothing about the factors responsible for
such crashes.) What must be demonstrated is a lack of
cooperation when the game is not repeated. Moreover,
when people are identifiable, their expectation of re-
ciprocal altruism in other contexts may generalize to yield
cooperation even when the game is not iterated; conse-
quently, the only two-person games relevant to our
concerns are those played once in total anonymity.
Such games have been studied (Rapoport et al. 1976),
but other factors have made their interpretation unclear.
First, subjects are typically told to make as many points as
they can; thus they are instructed to seek personal benefit,
which at best confronts potentially cooperative players
with a choice between cooperating with the other player or
with the experimenter. Worse yet, the experimenter may
offer a monetary prize to the player or players who "earn"
the most points, thereby making the pursuit of joint gain a
logical impossibility. Finally, to avoid the "inefficiency" of
paying subjects for making a single choice in just one game
(Rapoport et al. 1976, p. 90), subjects are often asked to
play many different games, though not repeating a particu-
lar one. As Rapoport later points out, however, "when the
subject's task is to make a long series of choices, and where
the structure of the decision problem varies from one
[problem] to the next, the subject may adopt an 'across the
board' strategy" (1983, p. 377) - thereby making an
understanding of the playing of a particular game
impossible.
Deutsch's (1961a; 1961b) and Wrightsman's (1966) are
the only studies we have been able to find in which
subjects make an anonymous single choice without ancil-
lary instructions from the experimenter about what to
maximize in order to succeed at the task. The Deutsch
studies used imaginary monetary payoffs and the
Wrightsman study used real money in some conditions
and imaginary money in others. Both these investigators,
however, studied the role of personality and attitudinal
variables in a single social context rather than the effects
of different contexts, which is the emphasis of the experi-
ments reported here.
2. Cooperation in the absence of egoistic
incentives
In this section, we report a series of experiments testing
the assumption that people will not promote group wel-
fare in the absence of egoistic incentives. All the experi-
ments were monetary public-goods dilemmas in which
subjects were given a sum of money and chose anony-
mously to keep it or contribute it. The general research
strategy was to eliminate El explanations for cooperation
by using a "subtractive procedure." Some incentives
(e.g., the opportunity to make deals to redistribute the
money) were obviated by the experimental design; others
were tested directly in the experiments. It is important to
note that these laboratory games are not simulations of
naturally occurring social dilemmas; they are social
dilemmas.
The experiments test the basic El prediction that
public goods will be underprovided relative to demand, if
they are provided at all. Consider the following il-
lustrative "game" for example: Nine strangers are each
given $5. If five or more contribute their money, all nine
will receive a $10 bonus whether or not they contributed.
If enough members contribute, the net payoff for the
contributor would be $10, for a noncontributor $15. If too
few contributed, a contributor would lose the contribu-
tion, receiving nothing at all, whereas a noncontributor
would retain the $5. The game theoretic strategy is to
retain the money, but if this strategy is selected by all the
members of the group, it leads to a deficient equilibrium:
All receive $5 when all could have received $10 by
contributing. This game illustrates the kind of decision
confronted by people in all of the experiments to be
described. Subjects who participate in groups are given
money and then required to make a choice between
retaining the money or contributing it to a "public
good."7
The general paradigm was the same for all the experi-
ments, which were conducted in Oregon, Utah, and
Arizona over a period of 10 years. More than 1,000 people
participated. Subjects were students and townspeople
recruited through advertisements in campus and local
newspapers.8 Subjects were scheduled at their conve-
nience to participate in specific groups, which were
randomly allocated to experimental conditions. Friends
or relatives were prevented from participating in the
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same groups (although ultimately the experimenters had
to rely on the subjects' honesty in complying with this).
When they arrived for the experiment and were seated,
subjects were given a promissory note for the same
amount of money (usually $4 to $6) that they later had to
decide to retain or give to the group. The specific conse-
quences of "giving" or "keeping" the money were ex-
plained in some detail, including a "payoff matrix" that
specified the monetary consequences for each person
who gave or kept as a function of the total number of
people in the group who gave. The word "contribute" was
avoided; the words used were consistently "give" and
"keep." All the experiments involved a single decision to
keep or give to the group the full amount of the money in
the promissory note. The experimenter read instructions
to participants, explained the payoffmatrix and answered
questions; subjects were subsequently given a short quiz
to test their understanding of the instructions and the
payoff matrix. (Any failures in this test led to more
explanation. The choices were not made until the experi-
menters were satisfied that all subjects understood the
payoff structures.) The experimenter repeatedly empha-
sized that all decisions were to be made anonymously. If
the decision was to "keep," subjects would get the
amount of money on the note at the end of the experiment
plus the bonus, if the public good was provided. If
subjects chose to "give," the payoffmatrix specified the
payoffs they and the others in the experiment would
receive. (The specific consequences, of course, depended
on the experiment and condition.)
Subjects were not allowed to talk among themselves
except in experiments involving one or more "discussion"
conditions. Subjects made their decisions secretly by
marking a box on the decision form that could not be seen
by other subjects. After the experiment was completed,
subjects were released one at a time to the "payroom"
where they completed a questionnaire, were told the
group outcome, and were paid. Only one subject was
ever in the payroom at a time. This procedure was
explained to all subjects before they made a decision to
give or keep.
To summarize: Subjects were strangers (to the best of
the experimenters' knowledge), they made a single deci-
sion, their choices were anonymous, and interaction
among group members was prevented before and after
the session. The prohibition on interaction and the provi-
sions for anonymity were designed to prevent: (a) reci-
procity (during the experiment by allowing more than
one decision, or after the experiment by splitting the
money); (b) coercion (e.g., interpersonal abuse or sanc-
tions); or (c) reputational concerns (which might, for
example, lead a subject to hypothesize that giving or
keeping would affect others observing this decision to
respond in the future - perhaps outside the experiment -
to the selfish benefit or detriment of the subject). Thus,
the paradigmatic design specifically excluded the "clas-
sic" egoistic incentives invoked to explain cooperation.
2.1. Greed, fear, and the pursuit of self-interest. Beginning
their research as El theorists, Dawes et al (1986) designed
their initial experiments to distinguish between two selfish
motives (Coombs 1973): "Greed" to receive the good
without contributing ("free riding") versus "fear" that one
may lose money in a futile support of the public good (the
"sucker's payoff"). These experimenters conducted a se-
ries of "step-level" public-goods games of the type just
described; a specified number of contributions ("give"
choices, e. g., "5 or more") of $5 supplied to the subjects in
the form of a promissory note were required for the
experimenters to provide a monetary bonus of $10 to all.
That was the "standard" condition in the experiment. In a
no-free-ride condition, the opportunity to free-ride was
eliminated by truncating the amount paid to subjects at $ 10
in the event the public good was provided. The experi-
menters explained this modified structure, complete with
the payoff matrix, in the same way they explained the
standard structure. If greed is a motive for defecting (not
contributing), eliminating the incentive for it should
enhance contributing. Contributors might still lose the
value of their promissory note, but if the public good was
provided, a noncontributor would make no more money
than a contributor. In contrast, a money-back guarantee
condition eliminated the possibility offutile contributions.
The experimenters explained that contributing subjects
would keep the $5 they gave to the group if too few subjects
overall gave to yield the $10 bonus. Although this condi-
tion eliminated the fear of losing their $5 as the result of
giving it to the group, subjects could still make $15 rather
than $10 by keeping it whenever enough others gave their
$5 to yield the $10 bonus. Table 1 illustrates payoffs for the
three conditions; it is similar to the payoff matrices pre-
sented to the subjects.
Subjects were tested in groups of seven requiring
either three or five contributors to obtain the public good.
Over three replications, the rate of contributing averaged
51% in the standard condition; 58% in the money-back
guarantee condition, and 87% in the no-free-ride condi-
tion. (The number of groups in each condition was,
respectively, 25, 19, and 25.) The authors concluded that
the major motive for not contributing is greed rather than
fear of futile contributing.
2.2. The rational pursuit of self-interest. Because step-
level games require a specified number of contributors
for the public good to be provided, individuals might
believe that their contribution was critical. For example,
ii exactly four others have contributed while five or more
contributions are necessary, then subjects who contrib-
ute their $5 receive the $10 bonus, which is a better
outcome than retaining the $5. Contributing is clearly
Table 1. Payoff matrices for standard dilemma, money-back
guarantee, and no-free-ride conditions
Standard dilemma
Contributors
Noncontributors
Money-back guarantee
Contributors
Noncontributors
No free ride
Contributors
Noncontributors
Less than 5
contributions
0
5
5
5
0
5
5 or more
contributions
10
15
10
15
10
10
688 BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (1989) 124
https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X0002553X
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 11 Jul 2017 at 10:48:29, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
rational and consistent with egoistic motivations if such an
outcome is likely. It is irrational, however, to believe that
one's own contribution is critical if each other subject is
assumed to have a constant probability, p, of contribut-
ing, because in groups requiring three or five contrib-
utors the probability that exactly two of the six others
would contribute [15 p2 (1 — p)4] or that exactly four of the
six others would do so [15 p4 (1 — p)2] can never be
greater than .50 regardless of the value of p. Neverthe-
less, subjects may be poor estimators of binomial proba-
bility distributions. Amnon Rapoport (1967), for example,
performed similar experiments and calculated the ex-
pected values for contributing in the three conditions
based on subjects' estimates of three probabilities: (i) the
probability that their own contribution would be futile
(i.e., that so few others would contribute that one's own
contribution would not provide enough to provide the
bonus); (ii) the probability that a contribution would be
critical, and (iii) the probability that a contribution would
be redundant (i.e., that enough others would contribute
enough to make their contribution unnecessary). Thus, in
a subsequent replication involving the standard, money-
back guarantee and no-free-ride conditions in the pre-
vious experimental design (a minimum of five contribu-
tions of the $5 from seven players required to yield the
$10 bonus), the subjects were also asked to indicate on a
100-point scale the likelihood that: (i) fewer than four
others would contribute; (ii) exactly four others would
contribute; and (iii) five others or more would contribute.
Subjects who were maximizing expected value in the
standard condition, for example, would contribute only if
their estimate of its being critical was greater than .50.
Table 2 shows the average values obtained for the
probability estimates. Subjects should cooperate in the
three conditions if their estimate of their contribution's
being critical, on the average, was large enough so that
contributing would have a higher expected value than
withholding. (The actual requisite values are given in the
table; note that this probability varies by condition; for
example, with the money-back guarantee, it is derived by
considering only the probability of contributing being
critical or redundant, because futile contributions are
returned.) Probability estimates did vary significantly by
condition, but the proportion of subjects who judged
their contribution to be critical did not. In both the no-
free-ride and the money-back-guarantee conditions, the
perceived probability of a contribution's being redundant
is enhanced and of its being futile is diminished by a ratio
of 2:1. Some directional support for the hypothesis that
subjects ascertain and pursue their self-interest in accor-
dance with the expectation model was obtained in the no-
free-ride condition only; the non-contributors' estimate
of futility was .51 compared to the contributors' estimate
of .20. Virtually no contributors, however, believed that
their contribution was critical to obtaining the public
good with a probability sufficient to justify the "give"
decision. In fact, pooling across all conditions, 67% of the
contributors believed that so many others would contrib-
ute that their own contributions would be redundant.
2.3. The reasonable pursuit of self-interest. The foregoing
results could still be interpreted according to El theory.
If potential gains are subjectively more valuable than
potential losses, a contribution's being critical may not be
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Table 2. Predicted and obtained probability estimates
of making futile, critical, and redundant contributions
Experimental condition
(expected value) and
choice
By condition
Standard dilemma (.50)"
Money-back guarantee
(.37)
No free ride (.27)
By choice and condition
Standard dilemma
Contributors (N = 9)
Noncontributors
(N = 26)
Money-back guarantee
Contributors (N = 15)
Noncontributors
(N = 20)
No free ride
Contributors (N = 27)
Noncontributors
(N = 8)
Subjects
that
Futile
.47
.27
.27
.24
.55
.25
.28
.20
.51
' estimated probability
their contribution
would be
Critical
.21
.25
.24
.29
.18
.29
.21
.23
.25
Redundant
.32
.48
.50
.46
.26
.46
.50
.57
.24
"Subjects maximizing expected value should cooperate if and
only if their probability estimate for their cooperation's being
critical is greater than the value indicated in parentheses.
important and people might be willing to contribute
despite their estimates of probable outcomes. After all,
even if a contribution is redundant, a contributor will gain
$10 rather than $5 if the bonus is provided.
To see whether contributing could be enhanced when
subjects had the opportunity to "educate" each other, van
de Kragt et al. (1983) tested 12 groups in new conditions
in which subjects could communicate with each other.
What happened was that every group used discussion to
make a decision about who would and would not contrib-
ute. In 10 groups, exactly the minimal number of contrib-
utors was designated (2 groups specified more than the
minimum number), everyone so designated contributed,
and there was 100% provision of the public good, with
overprovision in 3 of the 10 groups (i.e., people who were
not supposed to contribute did so anyway). The most
common means of designating who was to contribute was
a lottery, followed by volunteering; one group attempted
to establish which group members were the neediest.
Subjects designated as contributors, knowing that only
the minimal number was specified, knew that they could
not receive the bonus unless they contributed. The fact
that all such designated subjects contributed appears to
indicate that a contribution's being critical, which had
played little role in the expectation analysis, was a power-
ful motive to contribute.
Subjects' expectations about the number of contribu-
tions from others in their groups are consistent with the
idea that discussion reduces uncertainty and perceived
risk; the pooled variance of expected contributions was 11
times as high in the previous no-discussion conditions as
it was in this new discussion condition. Somewhat unex-
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pectedly, however, subjects in the no-discussion groups
appeared to tailor their expectations to the requirements
for providing the bonus; the mean number of expected
contributors was always higher when five contributions
were required than when three were required. This
suggests that subjects either believe that "the group" will
tend to its own welfare, or that they are focusing more on
incentives confronting the group as a whole than on
individual incentives.
As long as one knows that one's own contribution is
necessary for obtaining the bonus and one assumes that
other designated contributors are equally aware that their
contributions too are necessary, self-interest will pro-
mote contributing without any help from conscience,
normative considerations, or group identity. Again,
greed is impossible, as in the earlier no-free-ride condi-
tions. This interpretation, however, is not supported by
the explanations the subjects themselves provide for their
behavior. A research assistant coded into six categories
the explanations subjects gave for their choices in the
discussion conditions in which the contributors were
designated.9 Seventy percent of the contributors and
90% of the noncontributors (who were designated not to
contribute) attributed their choice to "the group's deci-
sion." For comparison purposes, the reasons for contrib-
uting in the previous money-back guarantee and standard
conditions were collapsed (because they did not produce
significant differences). In these conditions, the most
common explanations for contributing involved nor-
mative constraints, such as appeals to concepts of justice,
charity, and equity (40%); selfish considerations such as
wanting to make the most money or "looking out for
number one" (26%); and, finally, willingness to take a risk
(17%). In contrast, comparable explanations in the discus-
sion condition were 2%, 5%, and 0%. Thus, following
group discussion, contributors did not explain their be-
havior in terms of normative constraint or a reasonable
expectation of an egoistic payoff. The most common
explanation for not contributing in the conditions without
discussion was private payoff (80%), followed by un-
willingness to take a risk (17%).
2.4. Designating contributors. Two variables were con-
founded in the foregoing experiment: the decision to
designate subjects as contributors and the opportunity to
engage in discussion, which has been found to raise the
rate of contributing in similar games (e.g., Dawes et al.
1977; Jerdee & Rosen 1974; Rapoport 1974). The reason
for such discussion effects is unclear, although the usual
assumption is that discussion triggers concern for group
welfare or feelings of obligation. Discussion in the experi-
ments just described may simply have served to reinforce
how critical the choices of the designated contributors
were - both to their own receiving of the bonus, and to
others' getting it. If this factor is the basis for the perfect
cooperation observed, then any method that convinces
potential contributors that their contribution is necessary
for obtaining the bonus - and assures them that other
group members likewise recognize their own contribu-
tions to be critical - should yield almost perfect coopera-
tion. Although the explanations of the subjects did not
support this interpretation, it needed to be investigated
experimentally because subjects do not always have in-
trospective insight into the actual factors influencing their
choices (cf., Nisbett & Wilson 1977). Perhaps the subjects
were in reality motivated by egoistic incentives, but
simply cited nonegoistic factors in explaining their behav-
ior to the experimenters.
Van de Kragt et al. (1986) conducted an experiment
with five conditions to test the above possibilities. In all
conditions, the general procedures were the same as
those described earlier, except that there were nine
people in each group, of whom five or more had to
contribute if everyone was to receive the $10 bonus. In
two conditions a set of contributors was designated by
having subjects draw a chip from a bag containing five
blue poker chips and four white ones. Blue chip holders
were designated as potential contributors who had to
make a choice between contributing their $5 promissory
notes to the public good (the $10 bonus) or retaining it for
themselves. White chip holders had no choice to make;
they simply retained their $5 promissory notes and re-
ceived the additional $10 bonus if all blue chip holders
contributed, otherwise not. Thus, if all blue chip holders
contributed their note for the $5, a decision made pri-
vately and anonymously, a $10 bonus would be dis-
tributed to all group members, white chip and blue chip
holders alike. In one condition, a discussion followed the
drawing; in the other condition, decisions were made
immediately after the experimenter was satisfied that all
participants understood the game.
There were also two conditions in which there was no
designation of which subjects could contribute. One was a
replication of the standard conditions in the previous
experiments. Another condition had the same structure,
but subjects were permitted up to 10 minutes to discuss
the problem. This discussion period took place before
subjects knew the number of contributions necessary for
producing the $10 bonus; they were told that after discus-
sion this number would be from a paper bag with num-
bered poker chips drawn by a randomly selected subject.
The lottery was rigged (an exception to the care usually
taken to avoid deception) so that the number five was
always drawn. The reason for not making this number
known to the subjects prior to discussion was that the
previous experiments had indicated that the subjects
would designate five among themselves to be contrib-
utors had they known that five contributions were neces-
sary. (The experimenter monitored discussion to prevent
subjects from using a variant of this procedure.)
In a fifth condition (labeled "super simple ") there were
five subjects in each group; all were required to contrib-
ute to obtain the public good. In this condition, the
contributions of everyone in the group were critical for
receiving the bonus. Hence, the number of such critical
people was the same as in the other conditions, but all
members confronted the same problem. All were aware
that everyone knew that each was critical; the problem
was, accordingly, very simple.
The results are presented in Table 3. As indicated in
that table, designating a group of people whose contribu-
tion is critical enhances rates of contributing, but not
enough to yield the $10 bonus more often than in the
standard condition. Unexpectedly, the rate of contribut-
ing in the super-simple condition, where self-interest was
so clearly contingent on contributing fell far short of the
84% to 100% range anticipated; and in no instance was the
public good provided. We will suggest an explanation for
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Table 3. Rates of contributing and providing the public good
in designated set experiments
Table 4. Consistency with expectations for contributing
and noncontributing
Condition
Designated sets'"
Super simple
No discussion
Discussion
No designated sets
No discussion
Discussion
Rate of
contributing
64%
84%
100%
47%
84%
Rate of
providing the
public good
(provided/ total
groups)"
0% (0/5)
54% (6/11)
100% (11/11)
60% (6/10)
100% (10/10)
"Five of nine contributors required for public-good provision.
fcThe percentage of designated contributors (blue chip holders)
is reported in these conditions.
this finding later. The finding for the super-simple condi-
tion does eliminate the subjects' understanding (of the
logic of being critical to obtaining the bonus) as an
explanation for the facilitating role of discussion. If this
understanding accounted for the effects of discussion, the
super-simple game would yield near perfect cooperation,
which does not occur.
As indicated in Table 3, the rate of contributing among
designated contributors in the discussion condition was
100%; the public good was hence always provided — a
replication of the results of the first study where subjects
themselves designated contributors. But discussion in
and of itself resulted in contributing at the same level as
did designating who should contribute without discussion
(84%); and discussion led to the provision of the $10
public good in every group.10 Finally, if it were important
that the subjects in the groups themselves - rather than
the experiments - designate the contributors, the rate of
contributing among such people should not be 100%
when they are designated by lot. But it is.
2.5. The consistency between expectations and behavior.
In these studies, the experimenters once more investigat-
ed subjects' ability to determine their best interests and
to pursue them accordingly. Subjects were asked (after
their decisions had been made) how many others in their
group they expected would contribute. If one expects
one's contribution to be critical, then contributing is
rational and consistent with the expectation; similarly, if
one expects one's contribution to be futile or redundant,
withholding is rational and consistent. But "pessimists"
(who expect fewer than the required number of people to
contribute) or "optimists" (who expect the required
number or more to contribute) who contribute anyway
are economically irrational. We call the relationship be-
tween individuals' expectations about the number of
other contributors and their actual contributing behavior
consistency with expectations.
A widely held intuition is that expectations always
precede behavior; people assess (perhaps on an intuitive
basis) the likelihood of other group members' contribut-
ing and then they behave accordingly. In this view,
Condition
Designated sets
Super simple
No discussion
Discussion
No designated sets
No discussion
Discussion
Contributors
67%
74%
87%
21%
8%
Noncontributors
89%
86%
[none]
88%
72%
consistency with expectation should be relatively high
and independent of the individual's own choice about
whether or not to contribute. There is evidence, how-
ever, that people's expectations of others are based on
how they themselves have behaved: That is, people use
their own behavior as a cue in predicting the choices
other group members will make or have already made
privately (Dawes et al. 1977; Messe' & Sivacek 1979). If
so, then contributors would expect higher rates of con-
tributing than would noncontributors - even if this high-
er rate meant that their contributions would be unneces-
sary.
Table 4 shows the percentage of subjects whose behav-
ior was consistent with their expectations for contributing
and non-contributing subjects in each of the five condi-
tions. When there was no designation of who should
contribute, 84% of contributors were inconsistent.
Among these inconsistent contributors, 90% in the no-
discussion condition and 96% in the discussion condition
believed their contributions would be redundant. In
contrast, the behavior of non-contributors was consistent
with their expectations in all conditions; 8 of 10 believed
that their contributions would be unnecessary. Hence
their behavior - but not that of contributors - was
consistent with their egoistic incentives as they judged
them to be.
2.6. Noncontingent contribution. The El theorist might
argue that the high rate of contributing in discussion
conditions is still due to the private advantage that is
contingent on group welfare, despite the inconsistencies
between the behavior and expectations of the contrib-
utors. If the link between personal payoff and group
payoff were broken, so that an individual's contribution to
the group did not benefit the donor, an El theorist would
predict a substantial drop in the rate of contributing. To
test this prediction, van de Kragt et al. (1986) designated
five people in nine-person groups as contributors by
lottery (as in the earlier experiments, by having five blue
chips and four white chips drawn from a bag). Subjects
were instructed, however, that whether or not any partic-
ular member of the group received the bonus depended
on the behavior of the others in the group. White chip
holders received the bonus if at least four blue chip
holders contributed, blue chip holders if all four other
blue chip holders contributed. Thus, each blue chip
holder would receive $5 more by not contributing than by
contributing no matter what the other blue chip holders
did - $15 rather than $10 if they all contributed, $5 rather
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than $0 if one or more of these others failed to contribute.
Retaining the $5 is the dominating strategy.u There were
three experimental conditions: one as described, with
discussion, one without, and a baseline condition in
which each subject received the $10 bonus if four or more
of any of the remaining eight subjects contributed.
There was no difference in the rate of contributing
between the subjects in the baseline condition (30%) and
the blue chip holders in the no-discussion condition
(28%), indicating that designating the contributing set has
no effect if there is no contingency between one's own and
others' outcomes. The difference between these rates of
contributing and those in the standard dilemma (47%; see
Table 3) suggests that some individuals recognize that
contributing might serve their personal interest when
payoff is contingent on their own choice. In the discussion
condition, however, 96% (24 of 25 people) contributed.
Thus, even when group interest provides no egoistic
incentives, discussion yields essentially the same rate of
contributing as it did when a subject received the bonus
only if the group did; discussion has this effect even
though the rate of contributing in the baseline noncon-
tingent condition is lower than that in the standard
condition.
2.7. Conscience. If "a good conscience is our only sure
reward," the effect of discussion may be to make the
demands of conscience salient. Humans are still selfish,
so the argument runs, but internalized social norms
provide internal rewards for behaviors that are desirable
according to social teaching and punishments for those
that are socially undesirable; this thereby provides ego-
istic incentives to cooperate (cf., "cooperation among
genetic competitors" [Campbell 1975; 1982]). If this is so,
individuals acting to satisfy the demands of conscience
would be as likely to contribute to strangers in another
group as to members of their own group. To test this
proposition, Orbell et al. (1988) devised a "give-away"
dilemma to compare contributions to one's own and other
groups under conditions of discussion or no discussion.
Groups of 14 subjects were randomly divided (again, by
drawing poker chips) into two groups of 7 that met in
separate rooms. All subjects were given a promissory
note for $6 and told that if they chose to give away their
note, 6 "other people in the experiment" would be given
$2 each. (Subjects were presented with a payoff matrix as
well.) How much - if anything - a contributor received
depended on the contributions made by other group
members, as did the amount a noncontributor received -
which was always $8 more than a contributor received
(because contributors neither retained their $6 nor re-
ceived $2 from their own contribution). The situation is a
social dilemma because each subject is $6 better off
keeping the money, but if all give theirs away, all receive
$12 - a better outcome than the sure $6 everyone can
make by keeping the note.
In half of the groups, subjects were initially told that
their contributions would benefit members in their own
group; in the remaining groups, subjects were told the
contributions would go to comparable members in the
other group (and that a bonus for them would come from
members of the other group as well). This initial belief
condition was crossed with final belief at decision-making
time. In half the groups of each type, a "switch for
Table 5. Rates of contributing
in the beneficiary-switched experiment
Initial belief that beneficiaries
of contributing are:
Own group Other group
Final belief that beneficiaries
of contributing are:
Own Other Own Other
group group group group
No discussion
Discussion
38%
79%
30%
59%
45%
32%
20%
29%
experimental purposes" in the identity of the benefici-
aries was announced three minutes before the decision.
For subjects initially believing that the beneficiaries
would be their own group members, the actual benefit
would go to the corresponding members in the other
group. For those initially believing that the other group
would be the beneficiaries, the actual benefit would go to
members in their own group (see Table 5). In summary,
initial belief (beneficiaries in own group versus other
group) and final belief (likewise) were crossed to form four
types of groups. Half the groups of each of these four
types were allowed up to 10 minutes to discuss the
problem, half not. Switching the locus of beneficiaries
occurred only after discussion was finished. Eight 7-
person groups were tested in each of the resulting eight
conditions.
Table 5 shows that, contrary to the clear-conscience
hypothesis, discussion does not enhance cooperation
when beneficiaries are in the other group. It enhances
contributing to the subjects' own group only. Further
analysis also showed that the initial belief about the locus
of benefit was more important than the actual locus. We
interpret the results of the experiment as generally sup-
portive of an ingroup biasing effect (Tajfel & Billig 1974),
discussed in more detail in the following section.
2.8. Discussion. In the experiments described above,
allowing subjects a period for discussion reliably elicited
contributing. The last experiment indicates that discus-
sion per se is not a completely adequate account for
contributing in these social dilemmas. We believe that
the best explanation for the effects of discussion is that it
engages ingroup bias. This tendency to evaluate one's
own group positively and to reward it preferentially has
been extensively documented in cross-cultural field stud-
ies (Brewer & Campbell 1976) and laboratory experi-
ments. Tajfel (1970; 1981; Tajfel & Billig 1974), for exam-
ple, discovered the remarkable flexibility of the bias in
experiments using what is termed a "minimal group
situation." Subjects in these studies are randomly as-
signed group membership ostensibly on the basis of the
outcome of a trivial judgment task, such as whether they
overestimated or underestimated the number of dots in a
display, or on the basis of a preference between two
abstract painters. Without ever actually meeting a mem-
ber of their own group or the other one, participants were
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asked to make a choice from a distribution of paired
payoffs for a member of each group identified only by a
group name and an individual number. Subjects system-
atically distributed greater sums to those they supposed
to be members of their own group than to members of the
other group. Further research (reviewed in Brewer 1979)
demonstrated that ingroup biasing is a remarkably robust
and easily elicited psychological phenomenon, often in-
volving total strangers combined into groups on totally
superficial bases.
Tajfel and Turner (1979; Turner 1987; Turner & Giles
1981) argue that group behavior is mediated by a redefini-
tion of the self in terms of shared category membership,
or social identity. Social categorizations become inter-
nalized as self-images and as regulators of behavior.
When social identity is salient, individuals react to them-
selves and others as exemplars of the group rather than as
differentiated individuals. Thus, group identification
rather than individual self-interest can be the basis for
cooperative behavior. (Note that social identity theory is
not an explanation for the ingroup bias; rather, it concerns
the elicitation of the bias by cultural categories and social
structures.)
Clearly, a group's discussion of the dilemma facing its
members is a considerably more substantial basis for
establishing group identity than estimating dots on a
display or stating a preference for Klee or Kandinsky.
Social identity, by reducing the distinctions between
one's own welfare and that of others, explains our sub-
jects' willingness to contribute in the face of expectations
of their contribution's being redundant. The results of the
"give-away" game (section 2.5) are consistent with
Brewer's (1979) conclusion that ingroup biasing consists
of increased favoritism toward members of one's own
group rather than hostility toward members of other
groups. This is also consistent with Brewer's later finding
(1985; Brewer & Schneider 1987) that being in a small
group can, under certain circumstances, mediate contrib-
uting to larger collective interests.
Finally, ingroup biasing may explain the dismal rate of
contributing in our super-simple game, where self-in-
terest was so clearly compatible with egoistic incentives
for cooperation. Brewer (1981), summarizing the results
of cross-cultural studies of ethnocentrism, argues that
social identification forms the basis for the "deper-
sonalized trust" characteristic of ethnic group identity.
There is a universal tendency to evaluate members of
one's own group as friendlier, more trustworthy, and
more honest. If ingroup identity is the basis for coopera-
tion, then subjects in the super-simple game may have
lacked the trust essential for promoting group welfare
even when it was so clearly compatible with egoistic
motives. Without group discussion or even an identifia-
ble "other group," the public good bonus of $10 was
never provided in the super-simple game.
Assuming that a case can be made for the evolution of
the ingroup bias, social identity theory illustrates how
innate mechanisms as well as evidence of considerable
flexibility can be accommodated within a Darwinian
framework: The tendency to favor one's own group may
be a fixed species characteristic, but the bias is engaged
by drawing category boundaries that vary over time, size
of social group, context, and the favorableness of the
salient distinctions characterizing the group. In the fol-
Caporael et al.: Selfishness examined
lowing section, we suggest a general hypothesis about the
evolution of human cognition that provides grounds for
considering in-group biasing to be an innate tendency.
3. Sociality
Theorists have suggested a variety of conditions leading
to sociality: intergroup warfare and cannibalism (Alex-
ander 1971), big game hunting (Washburn & Lancaster
1968), and parental care (Lovejoy 1981), for example.
These theorists envision characteristic hominid capacities
(e.g., group cohesion, communicating ability, and intel-
ligence) as preconditions for sociality; in contrast, ex-
tractive foraging (Parker & Gibson 1979) would not re-
quire such capacities. A solitary initial state is often also
envisioned. In arguing that tool use evolved out of neces-
sity, for example, Brace (1962, cited in Wolpoff 1987, p.
269) writes, "It would seem a weaponless biped trudging
over the savanna with a ripe load of meat would be an
exceedingly poor bet for survival." Even with a weapon,
however (particularly with anything like the earliest stone
tools), a single biped is a poor bet for survival.12
Despite the evidence that human ancestors were so-
cial, sociobiological models of cooperative behavior (e.g.,
Alexander 1987; Hamilton 1964; Trivers 1971) also de-
scribe ancestors who begin in isolation and evolve to a
social state in order to achieve the same egoistic goals
they had in their prior isolated state. Yet the catarrhines
from which the hominid line derives (35 million years ago)
were already social; paleontologists identify the key ques-
tion to be about the kinds of social groups ancestral
catarrhines lived in (Fleagle & Kay 1985). If the so-called
first-family collection (Johanson & Edey 1981) can be
taken to represent a single contemporaneous group, then
bipedal, small-brained Pliocene hominids gathered in
mixed sex and age groups at least 3 million years ago.
Stone "choppers" were manufactured 1.8 million years
ago in hominid campsites showing evidence of food col-
lection, and the same tool technology persisted for about
a million years. Our predecessor, Homo erectus (1.6 to .5
million years ago), used stone flake technology, pene-
trated the temperate zone, used fire, hunted cooper-
atively, and lived in small groups. According to Foley
(1987, p. 10), "the high level of sociality represents] the
starting point in any consideration of human evolution."
The precedence of sociality appears to be difficult to
incorporate in evolutionary formulations, however. In
spite of his injunction, Foley (1987, p. 223) defines
"community" as the species hominids ate, those that ate
hominids, and those with which hominids competed: His
definition fails to include interactions with conspecifics in
social groups as an important, or even identifiable, cate-
gory. Gowlett's (1984) analysis of the mental abilities
discernible from tool making is similarly constrained.
There is no hint that the activity must be learned over
time from other individuals who themselves mastered the
skills under tutelage. Surely the "basic pattern of opera-
tion of the human mind" would include this ability as
much as the capacity to construct chains of activity that
extend in space and time (Gowlett 1984, p. 183).
Hypotheses abut innate mental abilities or tendencies
require a basis in evolutionary ecology, a discipline that
attempts to identify the problems humans faced when
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they were evolving and the solutions to those problems
shaped by selection processes (Foley 1984; 1987). Gener-
ally speaking, the problems have two sources: the type of
animal (e.g., mammal, bipedal, and so forth) and the
environment with which it interacts. The following ac-
count, which we believe to be consistent with the princi-
ples and existing research in evolutionary ecology, could
doubtlessly be refined by specialists in the field. Two
conditions of early hominid evolution indicate that group
living was essential for individual survival. First, isolated
nonarboreal individuals would be more vulnerable to
predation than individuals in a group. Second, edible
resources in the habitat were dispersed in "clumps" (e.g.,
an antelope carcass or fruit-bearing tree). Frequently,
such resources were composed of more material than a
single individual could use, and in the case of meat, would
involve interspecies competition with other carnivores
over carcasses (Potts 1984). Given the morphology and
ecology of early hominids, the optimal foraging strategy is
to search collectively for resources and share them
(Kurland & Beckerman 1985). (Group foraging is optimal
when the marginal costs of food sharing are offset by a
higher "hit rate" for locating food resources. [See
Houston & Macnamara: "A Framework for the Func-
tional Analysis of Behavior" BBS 11(1) 1988.] Thus, the
interface between the individual and the habitat is a
group process: Group living buffers individuals from the
risks of predation and starvation. The more effectively a
group can forage, the greater the individual benefit of
group membership. There are constraints on group size,
however. The maximum number of individuals is limited
by the carrying capacity of the environment. Similarly,
because groups mediate individual survival, a certain
minimum number of group members is required. Under
such conditions, the small face-to-face group (15 to 30
individuals) becomes a primary locus of selection pres-
sures (cf. Campbell 1983).
The morphology and ecology of hominids are the bases
for the sociality hypothesis, which consists of two general
propositions:
(1) To the extent that exploiting a habitat may be more
efficient as a collective rather than an individual process,
not only would more successful groups prevail, but so also
would individuals that were better adapted to group
living. Because a group mediates individual contact with
the habitat and the number of niches in groups is limited,
fitness should be correlated with the evolution of percep-
tual, affective, and cognitive mechanisms that support
the development and maintenance of group membership
(Caporael 1983). Competition within groups should have
generated escalating selective pressures for mechanisms
supporting increasingly complex social behavior - includ-
ing the "competition for good will" (Williams 1966) and
the detection of within-group "cheaters" (Trivers 1971).
These escalating selective pressures may account for the
evolution of increased brain size (cf., Trivers 1971), which
shows a rapid directional trend typical of specialization for
some specific feature of the environment (Eldredge
1985). This trend is puzzling in the case of a generalist
species such as Homo sapiens.
Rozin (1976) posits hierarchically organized adaptive
specializations initially "wired" to their specific functions
and inaccessible to other systems in the brain. According
to him, cognitive evolution is based on the increasing
accessibility of older adaptive systems for solving prob-
lems in new domains. This notion of accessibility also
applies to individual development where independent
capacities may become more generally accessible (e.g.,
children initially understand that a number of marbles
may be the same whether the marbles are lumped to-
gether or spread out, but they are unable to apply the
same logic to identical volumes of water in narrow or wide
vessels). Learning involves "bringing to consciousness
some of the limited-access programs, the 'cognitive un-
conscious,' already in the head" (Rozin 1976, p. 246).
Rozin's framework is the basis for a second proposition:
(2) Mechanisms evolved for sociality may be accessed
by other adaptive specializations (most notably language)
and generalized to problems in domains for which they
were not adapted - including interactions with nonsocial
objects (Humphrey 1976) and large-scale social organiza-
tions. For example, children, "primitive" peoples, and
even sophisticated scientists may attribute human char-
acteristics to inanimate objects. When prediction or con-
trol of a phenomenon is important, and no theory exists to
explain its behavior, people may "default" to attributing
human motives, intentions, and agency until a better
explanation can be devised (Caporael 1987; cf. Sellars
1963). In the case of large-scale social organization, group
identity is often achieved by words, songs, flags, or other
symbols that engage the in-group bias. Achieving organi-
zational goals usually requires subdivision into small
groups. Military organization epitomizes both of these
features: Participation can be induced by patriotic ap-
peals, but combat is conducted by small face-to-face
subgroups that may engage intense ingroup loyalty.
Rozin (1976) developed his theory of cognitive evolu-
tion in the context of comparative animal behavior. We
believe that the ecological approach recommended by
Foley (1984; 1987) - a focus on what were the problems
human ancestors had to solve - could add another evolu-
tionary dimension to psychological theorizing about con-
temporary human behavior (cf., Campbell 1982; 1983;
1986). Two related psychological experiments suggest
how such hybrid evolutionary/psychological conjectures
could be arrived at. Kramer and Brewer (1986) found that
people were more likely to restrain their use of a common
resource (taking points worth money from a common pool
that was slowly replenished) when they identified with a
superordinate group rather than one of its subgroups.
They also investigated the effects of how the choice
between cooperating (taking fewer points from the pool)
and defecting (taking more points) was presented (Brewer
& Kramer 1986). A social dilemma can be framed as either
a "public-goods dilemma" or the equivalent "commons
dilemma" (see Glossary). In a public-goods dilemma, the
choice is whether or not to contribute resources in hand
to promote the common good; in a commons dilemma,
the choice is whether or not to restrain taking resources
from the common good to promote individual welfare.13
Brewer and Kramer found that when subjects identified
with the superordinate group and were presented with a
problem such as a commons dilemma, they restrained
their use of resources regardless of group size. The same
dilemma presented as a public-goods problem, however,
was found to be sensitive to group size; people contrib-
uted significantly more in groups of 8 than in groups of 32.
These findings suggest the following hybrid evolution-
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ary/psychological conjecture: In the habitats in which
hominids evolved, the distribution of resources may have
posed something like a public-goods problem rather than
a commons-dilemma problem. The more frequent prob-
lem in the evolutionary context was to distribute available
resources rather than to practice restraint in the use of
resources. If food sources were dispersed but profitable,
optimal group size depended on the probability of en-
countering a given resource clump and on the return per
individual (Kurland & Beckerman 1985). Thus, lacking
"evolutionary experience," people may be indifferent to
group size (all else being equal) in commons-dilemma
problems, but in public-goods problems group size may
serve as a cue about whether or not to cooperate.14
The evolutionists' research on resource distribution
and foraging could help explain psychological findings.
Psychological research could also be useful for theorizing
about human evolution. For example, the ease with
which in-group biasing effects can be elicited might
indicate that intergroup conflict may not have existed at
the high level that is popularly assumed (Lewin 1987).
The bias is more consistent with the view that there were
cycles of macroband formation and dispersion as sub-
groups. The two kinds of groups would have conflicting
advantages and disadvantages related to information
flow, maintaining organizational flexibility, and merely
surviving (Jarvenpa & Brumbach 1988). This explanation
is less exotic than positing cannibalism or warfare as
"prime movers" in human evolution, but could be closer
to the truth.
It is surprising that group living might be overlooked or
even rejected as a significant factor in the evolution of
characteristics that we recognize as human. Alexander
(1979), for example, briefly considers the hypothesis that
the advantages of group living were so powerful that
humans developed the tendency to live in groups. He
rejects this hypothesis on two grounds: (1) Group living is
so deleterious to reproduction that it can be accounted for
only by external threats (most notably, other humans),
and (2) the hypothesis is distasteful. Alexander believes
that positing a tendency to live in groups would mean that
humans were inflexible "captives of [their] genetic histo-
ry" (p. 222), compulsively living in groups despite the
drawbacks. Sociobiologists minimize the importance of
archaeological research and fossil evidence (Washburn &
McCown 1978) because in their view, contemporary
behavior and social institutions can be explained in terms
of people's attempts to maximize their inclusive fitness.
We feel that human sociobiological theory may be
unduly influenced by the "representativeness heuristic"
(Kahneman et al. 1982), according to which effects resem-
ble their originating causes. Assuming that there was an
initial solitary human state, labeling human sociality as a
"problem," analyzing human behavior by examining self-
interested motives, and focusing on nepotistic and re-
ciprocal transactions (Alexander 1979) - these all reflect
features of population geneticists' models: single genes,
the genetic problem of self-sacrificial altruism, individual
selection, kin selection, and selection for reciprocity.
Human action is taken to resemble gene action. The
heuristic error is to mistake evolutionary forces for the
psychological mechanisms that result from them. Be-
cause phenotypic "selfishness" is representative of genet-
ic "selfishness' (the replacement of alternative alleles in a
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population by an unmotivated, mechanistic process), the
former is insulated from the effects of natural selection,
precluding the evolution of "cooperative" cognitive
biases that ultimately benefit the organism's genes.
Our pessimism about the value of explaining contem-
porary human behavior in terms of fitness maximizing
derives not only from the above considerations, but also
from the sociality hypothesis. If cognitive evolution in-
volves the increasing accessibility of adaptive specializa-
tions, and the hallmark of intelligence is increasing access
to such specializations in solving new kinds of problems
(Rozin 1976), then fitness may explain the origins of
mechanisms underlying behavior, but not their role in
domains for which they were not originally specialized.
Cheney et al. (1986) draw similar conclusions about non-
human primate intelligence. Primates typically perform
poorly in laboratory settings with nonsocial problems
(e.g., transitive inference with paired stimuli) that are
logically similar to problems they regularly solve in social
relationships (e.g., inferring dominance hierarchy from
paired interactions). The poorer performance may be
explained by the need to extend sophisticated cognitive
mechanisms adapted for manipulating social objects to a
different domain: the manipulation of nonsocial objects.
Our own evolutionary analysis and the primate work
suggest that social cognition may be the "general case" of
human cognitive activity, and nonsocial "cold" cognition
(e.g., logical problem solving and statistical reasoning) a
derivative ability (Ostrom 1984; Zajonc 1980a, 1980b).
Part of El's allure is its heuristic convenience. It
organizes a variety of behaviors under a single explanato-
ry umbrella. As a heuristic device, it fails less because it
makes incorrect predictions (in fact, deviations from its
predictions, as we have shown, are informative) than
because it precludes alternative views of human nature
(Abelson 1976). El theory creates the illusion that the
ultimate ends of human behavior - the satisfaction of self-
interest - are known and only the means remain to be
discovered. There is no apparent reason to test the
validity of El assumptions; and possible discontinuations
are "explained away" with "just-so" stories or claims
about revealed preference. El theory is hence "pre-
emptive" in that there is no apparent need to consider
alternatives. We have tried to show that an equally useful
alternative can be developed that is consistent with evo-
lutionary principles.
4. Summary and conclusions
All social theories make psychological assumptions, even
those that reject the significance of psychology (Jahoda
1982). The assumptions are frequently drawn from folk
psychological beliefs that ascribe considerable explanato-
ry power to people's selfishness and intuitive rationality.
These El explanations may be so entrenched that eco-
nomically costly and irrational social practices must be
explained away as satisfying selfish ends "unconsciously."
Sahlins (1976) criticizes such explanations on the grounds
that "economic man" is an idiom of Western culture, not a
fact of human nature.
In sociobiology, the folk concept of selfishness is sup-
plemented with a genetic account to explain moral sys-
tems. Alexander (1987, p. 109) proposes that such sys-
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terns are built on the basis of five "giving rules" that
humans are evolved to learn: (1) give to a genetic relative,
(2) give when the recipient is likely to give you back more
than was received, (3) give if sanctions for the failure to
give are likely, (4) give if observers of the giving are likely
to provide you with benefits in the future, and (5) "in all
other situations do not give" (emphasis ours). Contrary to
Alexander's rule (5), subjects in our investigations gave
away their money.
The experiments we report provide evidence against
such El theories. The studies eliminated widely accepted
explanations for cooperation: reciprocity, friendship,
kinship, custom, and conscience. Cooperation was en-
hanced by the elimination of free-riding, the assignment
of social roles, and, of course, egoistic incentives. Egoistic
incentives are neither necessary nor sufficient for indi-
viduals to support group welfare. In the absence of
discussion, both choice and people's explanations for
their choice are consistent with egoistic incentives -
either monetary rewards or internal rewards for "doing
the right thing." But group discussion was found to
increase the rate of cooperative choices dramatically and
led both contributors and non-contributors to expect
overprovision of the public good, resulting in a nor-
matively irrational choice for those who nevertheless
decided to contribute.
A proponent of El theory might still argue that discus-
sion serves as a cue for reciprocity: In the long run,
responding to such cues benefits the individual even if
there is no reciprocation for any specific social interac-
tion. Because most people's prior prosocial behavior is
not anonymous and occurs in the context of discussion,
subjects might more or less "automatically" contribute in
a similar context - the way they automatically use turn
signals without distinguishing empty roads and populated
ones. This explanation has shortcomings. For example,
Dawes et al. (1977) found that the discussion of an
irrelevant topic (the proportion of people at various in-
come levels in Eugene, Oregon) led subjects to contrib-
ute in a similar dilemma game at the same level as no
discussion, and rates of contributing in these conditions
were significantly lower than when subjects discussed
their social dilemma. It seems that if discussion is to serve
as a cue, it must be specifically targeted toward the
problem at hand. In addition, other manipulations of
identity - in the absence of discussion, or even without
meeting other group members - are as effective in
promoting group welfare as discussing the dilemma. In
Brewer's (1985; Kramer & Brewer 1986) depleting-re-
source dilemma experiments, people were told that a
computer lottery would determine the value of accumu-
lated points. Subjects contributed more points in a "com-
mon fate" condition in which a single lottery determined
the value of points for all group members than in a
differentiated fate condition in which the lottery deter-
mined the value of points for members in a subgroup.
Subjects who were led to believe (by false feedback on a
computer screen) that members of their own subgroup
were most responsible for the overuse of the resource
compensated by restraining their own use. Those who
believed that the overuse was due to members of other
subgroups increased their use. Group discussion appears
to involve psychological mechanisms that can also be
engaged by other manipulations.
The sociality hypothesis was introduced as an alter-
native to El theory and as an explanation for the ingroup
bias. According to this hypothesis, the cognitive/affective
mechanisms underlying certain human behaviors evolv-
ed in a social setting involving small face-to-face groups.
Once evolved, these mechanisms could then be applied
in domains for which they were not specifically adapted.
Separating the history of mechanisms from their current
utility has several advantages. For example, we could
predict (and experimentally test) "mismatches" between
once useful mechanisms and their role in the modern
world (e.g., heuristic rules-of-thumb that lead to error
under some contemporary problem-solving conditions;
cf, Cosmides 1985). Evolutionary ecologists and psychol-
ogists could join forces with specialists in other disciplines
in seeking a fuller understanding of innate mechanisms
and their origins. This "bi-level" approach might also
help to forge a more satisfying compromise between
"innatists," who argue that the primary determinants of
social behavior are biological, and "environmentalists,"
who favor individual learning and culture as primary
causal factors (cf, Caplan 1978). If we distinguish past
functioning and present functioning, the considerable
flexibility of human behavior need not be inconsistent
with innate mechanisms.
The last objection to the sociality hypothesis we will
address here is likely to come from biologists. We have
argued that evolved cognitive and affective mechanisms
are a factor in the experimental effects we report. It was
adaptive for ancestral humans to identify automatically
with an ingroup and to accept its goals as their own. Such
automatic commitment to group goals is not - in Maynard
Smith's (1984) terms - an evolutionarily stable strategy
(ESS). A strategy of maintaining group membership by
appearing to pursue group goals while successfully de-
fecting whenever possible to individual advantage could
"destabilize" a group cooperative strategy (i.e., hypo-
crites would replace cooperators). As Logue (1984, p.
Ill) points out, however, "an animal that ordinarily
optimizes well may be confronted with a complex prob-
lem involving many alternatives that is beyond the ani-
mal's present mental capacity." The consistent choice of
alternatives that successfully fake social commitment
while secretly defecting from this commitment is a prob-
lem beyond our present capacity. There is a trade-off
between devoting energy to seeking out such alternatives
and obtaining the results of successful group activity; both
involve mental "competition." As Simon (1980) and many
others have noted, our cognitive capacities are limited.
Frank (1988) argues that the easiest way to be accepted by
others when appearing to be a cooperator committed to
the group is to actually be a cooperator, thereby preserv-
ing energy for pursuits other than dissembling. Many of
these pursuits are likely to be more advantageous than
secretly defecting. Moreover, the negative payoffs for a
single mistaken choice can be devastating. Campbell
(1975) and Axelrod (1984), among others, have pointed
out that the sanctions for uncovered hypocrisy in most
societies are severe - occasionally extending to total
ostracism from the group. Such an alternative should
accordingly be chosen only rarely.
Despite our objections to El theory, we do not believe
that the effort expended over centuries to devise egoistic
incentives for cooperation is wasted. Many of the social
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Confess
Not confess
Prisoner B
Confess
7, 7
10, 1
Not confess
1, 10
2, 2
problems that must be solved today involve large groups
of people unknown to each other - a novel departure from
the conditions of human evolution. Our work does call for
considerably broadening the scope of research on social
dilemmas, however, as well as a serious reexamination of
the "selfish human nature" assumptions that dominate
the human sciences. Self-interest is only one "invisible
hand" described by Adam Smith. The other was a univer-
sal "fellow feeling," one that even "the greatest ruffian,
the most hardened violator of the laws of society, is not
altogether without" (Smith 1759/1976, p. 7).
APPENDIX
A useful prototype for social dilemmas is the prisoner's dilem-
ma, which is usually illustrated with the following scenario. Two
prisoners are charged with a crime. The police want a confession
from at least one prisoner. The prisoners are separated and each
is offered the same deal: "If you confess and your partner
doesn't, you'll get a light sentence and your partner will be
imprisoned for a long time; if neither of you confess, you'll both
serve a few years in prison; if both of you confess, you'll both
serve many years in prison." The choices confronted by the
prisoners ("players") can be represented as a game matrix that
shows the outcomes ("payoffs') for all combinations of confess-
ing and not confessing. In the matrix below, these are repre-
sented as years in prison.
Prisoner A
By convention, the first number in each cell entry is the payoff
for Prisoner A and the second is the payoff for Prisoner B. Each
player prefers to minimize the number of years in prison.
Prisoner A observes that if Prisoner B confesses, then A's own
confession will lead to 7 years in prison rather than 10. If
Prisoner B does not confess, then A's confession will lead to 1
year rather than 2. Therefore, regardless of what Prisoner B
chooses, Prisoner A should choose confessing. But Prisoner B is
confronted with the same choice, and therein lies the dilemma:
If both confess, then both are worse off than if both had not
confessed. In this example, confessing is a dominating strategy
(because it leads to the fewest years in prison), but it results in a
deficient equilibrium (because both prisoners could have spent
fewer years in prison if they had chosen the alternative, non-
dominating strategy).
Again by convention, not confessing is termed "cooperating"
and confessing is termed "defecting"; people choosing these
strategies are termed "cooperators" and "defectors," respec-
tively. In this article, we have tended to use the terms "contrib-
utors" and "noncontributors" because they are more descriptive
of our subjects' behavior than is the conventional usage.
The scenario above and the following glossary should help the
reader unfamiliar with game theoretic terminology to follow the
discussion in the target article.
GLOSSARY
Commons dilemma: A social dilemma in which the cooper-
ative strategy requires refraining from behavior that benefits
oneself at a cost shared by other group members. Overgrazing a
common pasture destroys the commons.
Cooperation: Choosing a dominated {q.v.) alternative (or
"strategy") that yields higher payoffs to all other players than the
alternatives dominating it no matter what the other players
choose (e.g., not confessing in a prisoner's dilemma). In other
words, choosing a strategy that benefits others.
Defection: A choice or strategy that yields a higher payoff to
the player choosing it (no matter what combination of strategies
other players choose) than does an available cooperative
strategy.
Dominating strategy: This is a strategy that (1) yields at least
as high a payoff for the individual choosing it as any other
alternative strategy no matter what others choose, and (2) leads
to a higher payoff than any other strategy for at least one
combination with others' choices. If dominating strategies exist
for all players, then the outcome resulting from their mutual
choice is the sole equilibrium in the game; if the outcome is
deficient, the game is a social dilemma.
Equilibrium: An outcome resulting from each player's choice
of a particular strategy is an equilibrium outcome if no player can
obtain a higher outcome by unilaterally choosing another strat-
egy. An equilibrium is deficient if some other possible outcome
yields higher individual payoffs to every player. A game may
have more than one equilibrium; for example, consider a two-
person game in which each player chooses a strategy, A or B,
yielding $1 to both if both choose A, $2 to both if booth choose B,
and $0 to both if one chooses A and one chooses B. Mutual
choices of A or of B both result in equilibrium outcomes; the
equilibrium resulting from a joint choice of A is deficient.
Evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS): A dominating strategy
or, alternatively, a "mixed" strategy where choosing between
available strategies on a probabilistic basis guarantees that if all
players adopt the mixed strategy no other strategy or combina-
tion of strategies can yield a higher expected payoff.
Public-goods dilemma: A social dilemma in which the cooper-
ative strategy requires a contribution to a good that is shared by
all, whether or not they contribute. Public broadcasting is a
public good.
Revealed preference: Outcome preferences inferred from
actual choices without reference to any criterion of preference
independent of the observed choice. If a player does not choose
an apparently dominating strategy, then a revealed preference
analysis requires that some other strategy be identified as
"dominating.": This is because by definition at least one payoff
(of any possible sort, including inferred "psychic rewards") that
could result from the strategy chosen must be preferred to the
payoff resulting from choosing the apparently dominating
strategy.
Utilities: Personal values of outcomes. In a revealed prefer-
ence analysis, actual choices can be used as measures of utilities
provided such choices do not violate any of the axioms of rational
choice (e.g., if A is preferred to B and B is preferred to C, then A
must be preferred to C too; see von Neumann & Morgenstern
1947). Many researchers infer utilities from choices made in ar-
tificially simple situations to determine whether actual choice is
consistent with rational choice axioms. Thus, rather than assum-
ing that actual choice by definition yields utilities, their concern
is whether a particular choice maximizes expected utility.
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N O T E S
1. We use "egoistic incentive theory" to refer to the very broad
category of explanations of human behavior (used even in ancient times,
e.g., by Thucydides) based on the premise that human nature is
"fundamentally selfish" (Richards 1987). The historical continuity and
wide currency of these explanations justify identifying them as "the
selfish paradigm" (Schwartz 1986). "Economic man theories" are ver-
sions of the paradigm supposedly legitimized by science (e.g., reinforce-
ment theory, economics, sociobiology). Economic man theories may be
loosely woven accounts of human nature or quantitative formalizations
of the conditions of choice behavior or decision making. The common
thread is the premise of basic selfishness.
Nevertheless, the term "selfishness" does not work well as a descrip-
tive category in science. Not only is it enormously value-laden, it is
associated with different causes (e.g., genes or original sin) depending
on one's initial assumptions. Without a shared framework, discourse
using an identical term can be confusing. For example, distinctions
between individual and group interests can be obliterated as in Camp-
bell's (1982) "clique selfishness." This refers to choosing to cooperate for
the benefit of face-to-face subgroups (e.g., disciplinary departments) at
the expense of the larger collective group (e. g., a university). We resort
to the neutral, albeit awkward, term "egoistic incentive" because it
highlights two important assumptions in the selfishness paradigm.
(1) People's behavior can be explained as responses to incentives, and
(2) incentives are valued by the individual, not a group entity. This does
not mean we have eliminated the term "selfishness" from our vocabu-
lary - it is still useful in contexts where it connotes a continuity between
scientific work and cultural milieu.
2. To claim that humans are basically social is not to claim they are
basically altruistic (Trivers 1985) or that they have an innate moral sense
(Richards 1987). Obviously, human behavior can be characterized as
selfish as well as cooperative and altruistic. Our concern is with the
species-typical "cognitive machinery" (i.e., mental structures and pro-
cess) that underlies certain kinds of behavior. We suggest that this
machinery evolved because it enhanced fitness under the historical
circumstances of human evolution. This machinery cannot be reduced
to a single motivation. The reader who believes that El theories are true
by definition may defend the belief on grounds that whatever leads to
evolutionary success is ipso facto "selfish." This explanatory framework
has two flaws. First, it conflates the cognitive machinery with the genes
"building" the machinery. Second, it leads to a tautological explanation
of prosocial behavior: Because humans are basically selfish, one can
assume that their behavior reveals egoistic preferences even if an
unobservable incentive must be posited (e.g., to "feel good"). The
assumption that El theories are true "by definition" eliminates the
possibility of disconfirming the assumption by empirical research.
3. Game theory is the formal description of decision making under
conditions of conflict. The characteristics of a game include assumptions
about the players (self-interested rationality); rules for specifying how
resources (points, money, and so forth) may be used; strategies specify-
ing what should be done under various contingencies; and payoffs,
which depend on the strategies used by the players. A game may be a
descriptive device (e.g., Maynard Smith 1984), it may be modeled by a
computer program (Axelrod 1984), or it may be played by people -
subjects participating in experimental games (as reported in this target
article). In a game, each player selects a strategy and receives a payoff,
the value of which is contingent upon the strategy selected by the player
and the strategies of the other players. Games are distinguished (and
frequently named) by variations in the rules, strategies, and payoffs.
(For details, see Appendix.)
4. A tit-for-tat strategy in symmetric games (as Axelrod's [1984] were)
can be reformulated in a logically equivalent form making no reference
to reciprocity: Defect if and only if the sum of points received is less than
the sum of points the other player has received. This equity-based
framing results in cooperation on the first play, defection after the other
player's first defection (if it occurs), and cooperation after the other
player's first switch from defection to cooperation (if it occurs) - as in tit-
for-tat. A player or computer program based on achieving absolute
equity would thus respond identically to one based on absolute reciproc-
ity; moreover, it would be just as effective (or ineffective, if it results in
alternation) with another player sensitive to absolute equity as with one
sensitive to absolute reciprocity. This reformulation illustrates the
potential ambiguity of results consistent with a single model of coopera-
tion, or strategy for "achieving" it. In contrast, throughout this target
article we have attempted to devise experimental tasks that yield
differential predictions from contrasting models, or that at least compare
the presence of an explanatory factor with its absence.
5. In defense of Beecher (1847/1972), we must point out that her
arguments are representative of the ones women frequently use both to
explain a complex network of powers over which they have little control
and to try to force that network to adjust to their own interests (see
Friedlander et al. 1986). Suffragettes successfully collected "compensa-
tion" for their subordination and touted their Providentially superior
moral nature to obtain the vote.
6. In the Grether and Plott (1979) study, subjects preferred a gamble
in which they could win $4 with a probability of 35/36 and lose $1 with a
probability of 1/36 to a gamble that paid $16 with a probability of 11/36
and a loss of $1.50 with a probability of 25/36. Nevertheless, these same
subjects were willing to pay more for the opportunity to play the second
gamble.
7. As this game is presented, it is not strictly true that subjects always
receive more money when holding back their contribution - i.e., that
not contributing the $5 is strictly a dominating strategy. If exactly four
other subjects contribute, a subject receives a final payoff of the $10
bonus for contributing while retaining only $5 as a result of not
contributing. This slight deviation will be addressed later in the paper
when more complicated experiments designed to eliminate it are
discussed. The latter are variations of the experiment described, which
was the first in the series investigated and is discussed here because of its
simplicity.
8. The advertisements ottered respondents $4 for showing up for a
scheduled appointment and "between $0 and $ depending on your
decision and the decisions of others in the experiment." The second
amount varied between $18 and $38 depending on the experiment. The
ads also emphasized that no prior experience was necessary. On aver-
age, about two-thirds of the subjects were students, the rest were
townspeople, often unemployed.
In discussions with other researchers, we found that objections to the
subject recruitment and population were of two kinds: Some objected
that the small amount of money made cooperation especially easy.
Others suggested that cooperation in the experiments could be traced to
subject characteristics such as moral beliefs or religiousness; to suspi-
cion that the experimenters were duplicitous and noncooperation would
be exposed; or to failure to understand experimental instructions.
Concerning the first objection: The money was very real to these
subjects, who can be assumed to have needed it; there was also
substantial variance in the amounts available, depending on the deci-
sions made. As to the second objection, we acknowledge all these factors
- plus the large number of other possible subject characteristics, beliefs,
attitudes, fears, and so forth - influencing why people cooperate. In one
study, for example, we found a slight positive correlation between
cooperation and frequency of church attendance. We assume, however,
that such variables are randomly distributed across conditions by the
procedures and that the emphasis on anonymity of choice and the lack of
deception convinces most subjects.
9. We are frequently asked what our subjects are "thinking" during
these experiments. Their explanations of their behavior tell us less about
the underlying psychological factors than about how people perceive
their behavior. Both behavior and perceptions of it are influenced by
cultural context, personal values, and the sorts of explanations people
prefer. In other words, verbal reports do not explain behavior; rather,
they too are data requiring explanation by recourse to cognitive and
social factors.
10. This 84% figure is somewhat misleading when compared to the
100% contributing rate in a designated set game with discussion. In the
former case, every group member is potentially a contributor; hence the
average percentage contributing is calculated over all group members.
In the latter case, the average percentage contributing is based only on
the designated contributors because others were "designated"
noncontributors.
11. If four of the designated five contributed, then the defector
would get the bonus, but the other four would not because there would
not be enough others contributing for them to do so. The bonus is not a
"pure" public good because it admits exclusion rather than equal
provision to all group members.
12. Landau (1984) has analyzed the narrative structure of evolution-
ary scenarios. She found the structure to be identical to that used for folk
tales and hero myths. It seems likely that the tacit assumption of an
initial solitary state is an unwitting artifact of this narrative structure
rather than an intended theoretical proposition.
13. In the seven-person "give some" games described earlier, the
choice between giving $12 to other group members versus keeping $6 is
equivalent to a "take some" (commons dilemma) choice between retain-
ing $12 with no effect on other group members versus taking an
additional $6 with a $12 fine assessed against the other group members -
$2 each - for this $6 personal gain.
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14. Clearly, to pursue this line of thought would require a better
understanding of the human-habitat relationships that were important
to human adaptation. The ecology of a relatively mobile hominid group
that travels from resource to resource regularly presents choices that
differ from those of a more sedentary group that stores and conserves
food resources. The timing of the emergence of different practices
would suggest different cognitive predictions. In addition, a better
understanding is needed of how features in the environment are
selected as relevant for making choices. Liebrand (1984), for example,
does not find reductions in contributing when group size expands.
Brewer (personal communication) explains the effect of how the prob-
lem is presented as a function of the salience of individual versus
collective identity inherent in the task. Public-goods problems focus
attention on one's own behavior, whereas collective interests are the
focus for commons-dilemma problems.
Open Peer Commentary
Commentaries submitted by the qualified professional readership of
this journal will be considered for publication in a later issue as
Continuing Commentary on this article. Integrative overviews and
syntheses are especially encouraged.
Ambivalent sociality: The human condition
Marilynn B. Brewer
Department of Psychology, University of California, Los Angeles, Los
Angeles, CA 90024-1563
In exposing and challenging the pervasiveness of individual self-
interest assumptions in the behavioral sciences, Caporael et al.
have taken a major step toward freeing our science from the
constraints imposed by that view of human nature. The study of
prosocial behavior has long been harnessed to the implicit
assumption that the occurrence of cooperative or altruistic
behavior is problematic, calling for extraordinary adjustments of
our basic models of behavioral choice in order to account for
apparent deviations from purely self-interested motivation.
In the social-dilemma literature, this assumption is manifest
in the idea that collective dilemmas can- be resolved only if
individuals are in some sense "tricked" into violating hedonistic
rationality - either by changing the rules of the game or by
obscuring the basic conflict between individual and collective
welfare. The impressive program of research undertaken by
Dawes and his colleagues effectively challenges this view of
collective decision making. Using the subtractive method, they
have demonstrated the presence of self-sacrificing cooperative
behavior in the absence of any apparent egoistic incentives.
More important, the near 100% rate of cooperative choice
obtained following group discussion demonstrates convincingly
that, under the appropriate conditions, ingroup cooperation is
just as "natural" as self-gratification as a rule for individual
decision making.
If Caporael's sociality hypothesis is accepted, it prompts
social and behavioral scientists to address the interesting ques-
tions posed by the task of identifying the "perceptual, affective,
and cognitive mechanisms that support the development and
maintenance of group membership" (sect. 3, para. 6). In the
interests of furthering that research agenda, I would like to
correct two general misconceptions prevalent in evolutionary
psychology that might interfere with our ability to explicate
those mechanisms.
The error of confusing form and function. The first misconcep-
tion is the assumption that form necessarily reflects function. In
sociobiology this is represented by the search for the "altruistic
gene" (and its psychological correlate, the altruistic drive) as the
basis of prosocial behavior. It is very possible, however, that the
mechanisms that support group cooperation are not directly
represented phenomenologically as "self-sacrifice" or "collec-
tive welfare," but rather as cognitive extensions of self-interest.
Psychological theories of self, dominated by individualistic
conceptualizations of human nature, have seldom acknowl-
edged the blurring of distinctions between self and others in the
formation of self-concepts. Yet we know that social isolation has
devastating effects on human functioning (both cognitive and
affective), and that many behaviors that are irrational in terms of
individual self-interest are explicable when one takes into ac-
count the individual's identification with significant social
groups. Much of human behavior is sustained because it is
symbolic of or helps preserve an individual's self-conception as a
member of particular social groups.
This aspect of self-concept is explicitly recognized in Social
Identity Theory (Turner 1987; Tajfel & Turner 1985), which
posits that identification with significant social groups entails "a
shift towards the perception of self as an interchangeable exem-
plar of some social category and away from the perception of self
as a unique person" (Turner 1987, p. 50). Our own experimental
research on social dilemmas (e.g., Brewer & Kramer 1986;
Kramer & Brewer 1984) has demonstrated that the intensity of
an individual's identification with a group has a profound effect
on a subject's willingness to restrict individual gain to preserve a
collective resource. Our work also supports the contention that
there are inherent limits to the size of social groups that can
engage such cooperative mechanisms. If group identification is a
symbolic extension of an individual's self-concept, then that
identification must provide for distinctiveness and differentia-
tion, as well as for a sense of belonging. If distinctive social
identities are essential to human functioning, then what Camp-
bell (1982) calls "clique selfishness" may well be a more power-
ful and intractable form of selfishness than even the most
extreme individual self-interest.
The error of unidlmenslonal thinking. The second misconcep-
tion characteristic of evolutionary psychology is the representa-
tion of "selfishness" and "altruism" as endpoints of a single
bipolar dimension, with the idea that "human nature" falls
somewhere along this continuum. In contrast to this view, I
have posited elsewhere (Brewer 1976) that self-gratification and
collective identity are independent, opposing processes that are
reflected in ambivalence and variability of responding in the
face of conflict between individual and collective welfare.
The potential variability of choice behavior in social dilemmas
is exhibited most strongly under conditions of collective crisis.
In our resource-dilemma experiments, subjects tend to behave
relatively homogeneously when the availability of the shared
resource is not threatened. However, when the resource pool is
being depleted, individual choices are polarized. When a collec-
tive social identity has been made salient, group members
respond to a crisis by reducing dramatically their own resource
use. However, when a collective social identification has not
been provided, individuals respond to the depletion of the
resource pool by increasing immediate resource use at the cost
of long-term resource availability. Because subjects are ran-
domly assigned to group conditions in these experiments, we
can assume that such variability is not simply a function of
individual differences in social motives. The results suggest
instead that both response modes are present in all individuals,
subject to selective engagement in different social contexts.
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Sociality: Costs, benefits, and mechanisms
Thomas Caraco
Behavioral Ecology Group Biological Sciences, State University of New
York, Albany, NY 12222
I found the target article's arguments disappointing. Caporael et
al.'s conclusion that selection favored attributes maintaining
group membership in early humans is almost certainly correct,
but hardly novel.
Natural selection, by definition a process influencing a popu-
lation's gene frequencies, can ultimately only imply "self-
ishness." That is, evolutionary self-interest must rule at the
ultimate level when natural selection occurs. The neo-Darwi-
nian concept of inclusive fitness follows logically, if only approx-
imately, from the population-genetic definition of natural selec-
tion. Primacy of this ultimate-level "selfishness" need not
obtain for all forms of genetic evolution, but the target article
equates evolution with natural selection.
The mechanisms favored as a consequence of natural selec-
tion, however, defy such a simple categorization, particularly
when we consider the ecological complexity of a social group.
Ultimate self-interest (defined by the dynamics of gene frequen-
cies) can favor selfish, cooperative, altruistic, and mutualistic
responses by one individual toward other individuals. Caporael
et al. recognize this distinction and still misinterpret the dif-
ference in its verbal analysis of an n-person prisoner's dilemma.
Overall, the target article lacks rigor and logical consistency.
Natural selection is marshalled in, critiqued, and later recalled
as the organizing concept. Initially, the authors appear to
dismiss natural selection (or is it just mechanisms inhibiting
cooperation?) as a "cultural belief and not a "reasoned argu-
ment." But in section 3, paragraph 4, they adopt a "Darwinian
framework " to suggest an explanation of "adaptations" for group
living. I was put off by a series of apparent contradictions; most
occur because Caporael et al. so often confuse ultimate and
proximate phenomena. An increased frequency of a "selfish"
gene modulating a behavior need not imply that selection has
favored a greater propensity to defect in a social interaction. The
authors do not appear to appreciate that evolution by natural
selection in solitary and social organisms is ultimately a "selfish"
process in both cases, because it is natural selection. The
outcomes of selection in the two cases, however, can vary from
extreme intraspecific aggression to highly cooperative or even
altruistic social interactions. The lack of clarity concerning
ultimate and immediate causation will not generate much sym-
pathy among evolutionary biologists. Genes always compete
when exposed to natural selection; the dynamics of the process
allow only competitive "selfishness." The behavioral mecha-
nisms through which they compete may include cooperation,
which surely has been the case during primate evolution. In
their second footnote, Caporael et al. attempt to discriminate
between "cognitive machinery" (i.e., proximate mechanisms)
and the influence of natural selection (ultimate phenomena), but
the text suffers from a semantic confusion. I hope other readers
found subtleties I missed.
The experiments seem to indicate that humans cooperate
more often than the currently popular tit-for-tat scheme (Ax-
elrod & Hamilton 1981) might predict. Perhaps this behavior
represents an epiphenomenon of an evolutionary heritage of
social life in groups organized largely by bonds of kinship. But
Caporael et al.'s sociality hypothesis suggests a plausible sce-
nario to me. Many primates require continued membership in
the same social group for survival and reproduction. Presum-
ably, this was true for early humans. Natural selection would
indeed have continued to favor individuals whose attributes
promoted their position within the group, provided the basis of
those attributes was directly or indirectly genetic and heritable.
Cooperation with group members, even when defection in a
particular interaction might yield a greater momentary benefit,
could have been an important element in the maintenance of
group cohesion. The mechanistic propensity to cooperate, es-
pecially coupled with in-group biasing (increasing the proba-
bility of reciprocity) seems a logical outcome of individual
selection.
Caporael et al. are not the first to assume that in human bands
an individual's survival and the survival of the individual's
offspring were enhanced by group membership. Lack of an
egoistic incentive (a mechanism inhibiting cooperation) might
have imposed a cost of sociality at times, but the benefit of group
membership advanced individual fitness sufficiently to over-
come the cost. If I have paraphrased Caporael et al.'s argument
correctly, the sociality hypothesis reduces to the standard cost-
benefit paradigm of behavioral ecology. Considering coopera-
tion as a cognitive mechanism, rather than as a phenotype with a
fitness, does not suggest a novel perspective. Again, I may have
missed some subtle point, but I can't recommend this target
article to students.
Selfishness reexamined
R. I. M. Dunbar
Department of Anthropology, University College London, London WC1E
6BT, England
The conclusions developed in this target article are, I believe,
essentially correct, but the arguments on which they are based
perpetuate three important (and depressingly common) errors
concerning sociobiological explanations of behaviour. It is es-
sential to be absolutely clear about just what predictions so-
ciobiological theory would make about human behaviour lest we
run the risk of throwing the baby out with the proverbial
bathwater.
The first misunderstanding is the suggestion that the self-
ishness of genes implies the selfishness of individuals. Although
in principle this is one possible interpretation, it is neither
essential to, nor a necessary consequence of, any sociobiological
theory. The equation of genetic and individual selfishness con-
flates ultimate and proximate levels of explanation. It is for this
reason that it is possible for genuine altruism (mediated by
motivations of altruism) to evolve through the selfishness of
genes. The issue hinges on a proper reading of the term "selfish"
in this context: The phrase "selfish gene," coined by Dawkins
(1976), is intended as a metaphor - a reminder to us that when
we determine the costs and benefits of behaviour, we must do so
in terms of the number of copies of a given gene gained and lost.
It carries no motivational connotations.
The equation of genetic and individual selfishness also fails to
note the importance of "mutualism" as a driving force in the
evolution of sociality (see Dunbar 1988; 1989; Maynard Smith
1982; Wrangham 1982). This is especially so for mammals in
general and for primates in particular. To ignore the advantages
of cooperation that arise through mutualism is to ignore the very
basis of mammalian sociality. In this context, the error is per-
haps forgivable on Caporael et al.'s part: Those few sociobiolo-
gists who have engaged, with notable eclat, in popularising
human sociobiology have tended to perpetuate the same error.
The reason, I suspect, lies in the fact that, without exception,
their backgrounds lie in the study of invertebrates or nonmam-
malian vertebrates where the more direct control of genes over
behaviour renders a mechanistic view a very reasonable approx-
imation. But it is extremely difficult to find a sociobiologist who
works on mammals (and, a fortiori, on primates) who espouses
such a simplistic view (see, for example, Cheney et al. 1986;
Dunbar 1984; 1988; Smuts 1985). Quite why both those who
have dabbled in human sociobiology and their critics have been
so desperate to class our own species with the bees and ants is an
interesting question for the sociologists of science.
The second source of misunderstanding concerns the histor-
ical origins of human sociality. Caporael et al. make a great play
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of the fact that sociobiologists assume human behaviour as we
see it now arises out of an asocial precursor state, whereas, as
they rightly point out, both the archaeological record and the
evidence from living primates indicate that hominids have
always been social. Unfortunately, this confuses two key aspects
of biological explanation, namely, explanations about evolution-
ary history (or phylogeny) and explanations about evolutionary
function. This is a distinction that was stressed nearly three
decades ago by Tinbergen (1963) in a seminal paper. Building on
an earlier analysis by Huxley (1942), Tinbergen (1963) pointed
out that, in attempting to answer the question "Why is X the
case?" when studying behaviour, we can produce four very
different (and logically independent) kinds of answer: These
would be answers to questions about motivation (or proximate
causation), function, ontogeny, and evolutionary history. We
conflate these at our peril.
The reason sociobiologists consider asociality the primitive
condition against which to evaluate an observed social state is
not that they presume our immediate ancestors to have been
asocial, but that they want to know why a given behaviour
persists in the population. What happened before is not neces-
sarily relevant to why an organism is social now. (Indeed,
Caporael et al. themselves point out that a character can evolve
for one reason, and then be captured by another functional
system and so turned to new purposes.) Whereas the question of
origins has its own intrinsic interest (and may allow us to see why
evolutionary history took one particular course rather than
another), the question of evolutionary function (which is what
lies at the heart of sociobiology; see Dunbar 1982) is concerned
exclusively with the issue of why a given characteristic is main-
tained in the population in the here and now. This is especially
important with respect to such a characteristic as social life,
which incurs major costs. Group life, as all recent work on
primates has emphasised (see, for example, Dunbar 1988; van
Schaik 1983; Wrangham 1980), incurs serious costs in terms of
increased social and ecological stresses. Without some positive
advantage to grouping, groups will naturally disperse as indi-
viduals revert to the logically more primitive state of a solitary
existence.
Hence, the correct question to ask, as Alexander (1979) and
others have recognised, is why humans are still social. To argue,
as Caporael et al. do, that it is a hangover from our evolutionary
past is to beg questions about the forces that maintain genes in
evolutionary equilibrium over time. More serious, perhaps, is
the very pessimistic view of human nature they hold - a view,
incidentally, that is both at odds with classical Darwinian theory
and incompatible with the general thrust of contemporary
sociobiology. A Darwinian perspective, above all, emphasizes
the dynamic aspects of the evolutionary process, whereas so-
ciobiology, with its emphasis on organisms' strategic behaviour,
lays considerable stress on the flexibility of behaviour (especially
in the more advanced species).
This source of confusion highlights the third misunderstand-
ing, namely, the assumption that sociobiology necessarily im-
plies genetic determinism. Caporael etal. speak, for example, of
the "'innatists' who argue that the primary determinants of
social behaviour are biological." Allow me, yet again, to dis-
abuse those who persist in this fallacy, for it conflates yet another
ofTinbergen's (1963) senses of "why," this time questions about
ontogeny, with questions about function. That we can show that
behaviour has an evolutionary function (by which I mean that it
maximises genetic fitness) does not necessarily mean that it is
genetically determined (see Dunbar 1982; 1988). Learning, as
has so often been pointed out (see, for example, Plotkin 1988;
Plotkin & Odling-Smee 1981; Pringle 1951), serves the same
function as a mechanism of inheritance that genes serve. In-
deed, this is the principal point of the last chapter of Dawkins's
(1976) book, The Selfish Gene.
These criticisms do not, of course, invalidate the experimen-
tal results. Nor do they invalidate the inference that people do
not necessarily behave in ways motivated by personal self-
ishness all the time. But, then, I would suggest that we might
have anticipated that on sociobiological grounds anyway, the
views of a minority of sociobiologists notwithstanding. I am not
convinced, however, that these results, of themselves, would
persuade a sceptic that humans are not innately selfish. After all,
as Caporael et al. themselves note, punitive sanctions are
imposed on cheats and hypocrites in most societies, and this
surely implies that altruism is something we have to be taught.
It is two purely methodological points, however, that oblige me
to hesitate in going all the way with the authors' argument.
First, I wonder whether a "no loss" situation is really a strong
enough test to uncover such innate selfishness as humans might
possess? All sociobiological arguments hinge on the relative
magnitude of the costs and benefits of a given course of action.
Hence, it is important to distinguish two senses in which we
commonly use the term "altruism": A weak sense in which the
altruist incurs no significant cost by his action and a strong sense
in which there is such a cost. Only the latter counts as altruism
under sociobiology's rubric; even then, the costs have to be
genetic, and it is difficult to see how donating five dollars is likely
to incur a loss of genetic fitness for the donor. However,
allowing for the moment that the donation of five dollars can be
considered a bonafide cost, we cannot easily avoid the problem
that the net cost to the donor in all these experiments is zero:
Subjects merely pass on money that has just been given them.
From a sociobiological point of view, we would expect indi-
viduals to behave more altruistically under these conditions
than if they were being asked to donate five dollars of their own
money, so that they risked being five dollars poorer by the end
of the experiment. I would hazard the guess that the proportion
of donors would be significantly lower in the second condition.
Meanwhile, I suggest that we are obliged to conclude that these
tests are not adequate to indicate an innate tendency to behaVe
altruistically.
My second disquiet concerns the role that social learning
plays in all human behaviour. As I understand them, Caporael
et al. want to argue that people are essentially altruistic on the
grounds that they do not behave selfishly in groups where
discussion is permitted. Yet, the results clearly show that when
decisions are made in the absence of any face-to-face knowledge
about other group members (or, indeed, in the knowledge that
the beneficiaries will be members of another group) people are
more likely to behave selfishly. What is missing here is, I think,
an appreciation of the extraordinary power of the processes of
socialisation, especially when these are combined with the
capacity for learning with which we are endowed.
I am equally unhappy about the implied change of motivation
under these contexts: The results seem to suggest that subjects'
self-confessed reasons for donating or withholding their money
in the experiments in which discussion was permitted are that
the group's decision obliged them to behave thus, whereas they
openly admit to acting in self-interest when making their deci-
sion in isolation. Yet, as anthropologists have so often learned to
their chagrin, people are notorious dissemblers when it comes
to justifying their behaviour - and never more so than when that
behaviour can be interpreted as being antisocial. It should
surprise no one that those who are given a group sanction to
behave antisocially should gratefully use that as an excuse to
cover up their real motives. It seems to me that there are serious
confounding variables hidden within the experimental design.
I suspect this means that we need to be very much more
sensitive to the details of the social context than we have all
(anthropologists, psychologists, and biologists alike) been in-
clined to be. This is surely one of the key lessons that so-
ciobiology has to offer us, for sociobiological rules are always
context-dependent. Very few can be expected to apply univer-
sally to all members of the same social group, never mind the
same species. What to one individual may be a trivial cost, to
another may be exorbitant. Their respective decisions on
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whether or not to behave altruistically will vary accordingly.
Hence, so far from the results of their experiments disproving
Alexander's (1987) rule 5, as Caporael et al. suppose, I would
suggest that they in fact reinforce rule 3 - "give if sanctions for
the failure to give are likely." In a social context, sanctions
perpetually hang over our heads; we are never entirely free of
them. It is this complexity that makes human (and primate)
sociobiology both so difficult and so challenging to study: We
cannot afford to make simple-minded assumptions about how
individuals will behave.
Biological underpinnings of social systems
Niles Eldredge
Department of Invertebrates, American Museum of Natural History, New
York, NY 10024-5192
Sociobiology is a logical outgrowth of contemporary evolution-
ary theory - a form of "ultra-Darwinism" rooted in the notion
that organisms are locked in a constant struggle to maximize
their genetic representation in succeeding generations. Daw-
kins (1976), following this line of thought to its extreme, went so
far as to imagine organisms as mere vehicles for genes - the real
schemers engaged in the perpetual race to leave more copies of
themselves than their rival alleles to the next generation. Biotic
nature is portrayed in a curiously skewed manner under this
world view: We are to believe that the structures we see -
organisms, ecosystems, species, social systems - are mere
epiphenomena of their underlying genetically encoded informa-
tion. Moreover, ultra-Darwinism is shot through with teleology:
The entire purpose of organisms (and in some formulations, of
ecosystems, species, and social systems as well) is the preserva-
tion and further transmission of the underlying genetic informa-
tion. Something is odd on the face of it when the instructions for
assembly are deemed more significant than the assembled
structure.
But such is the modern evolutionary perspective, which
purports to deal with why biotic systems are the way they are
from a historical, adaptive point of view. A functionalist perspec-
tive typically leads to rather different postulates. A "pure"
ecologist (i.e., one not particularly concerned with the integra-
tion of ecology with evolutionary theory) is not constrained to
view interactions among organisms as entirely competitive.
There are whclly neutral, mutually advantageous, and parasitic
possibilities as well - and this spectrum of interactive pos-
sibilities obtains whether the organisms are conspecifics (the
issue here) or not.
Caporael et al. are suggesting that a purely ultra-Darwinian
perspective on (specifically human) social organization manages
to get the evolutionary story precisely backward. Their initial
perspective is strongly functional, however. They observe that
nonkin cooperation is a characteristic, functional aspect of many
mammalian social systems (insects are something else again).
They offer an experimental protocol and results that confirm
that cross-genealogical cooperation is indeed part of the makeup
of human social behavior. They then extend such functional
considerations to an evolutionary perspective by suggesting that
the "fitness" of individuals lacking such cooperative inclinations
is likely to be correspondingly reduced. One cannot help feeling
that theirs is likely to prove a more accurate depiction of human
social structure than that typically found in standard so-
ciobiological treatments, including those they cite.
More generally, recent analyses (see Eldredge, 1986, for
references) have focused on the consequences for the establish-
ment of biotic structures when organisms put their economic
and reproductive attributes to use. In a nutshell, (sexual) re-
production leads to the formation and maintenance of local
reproductive populations (demes), themselves parts of species.
Species are parts of larger-scale genealogical systems: mono-
phyletic taxa. On the other hand, economic activity (for orga-
nisms, matter-energy transfer for development, growth, and
somatic maintenance - staying alive) leads to the assembly of
local ecological populations, which are parts of local (and dis-
tinctly cross-genealogical) ecosystems; local ecosystems are
parts of larger-scale, regional ecosystems. Organisms are inher-
ently and simultaneously parts of two ontologically distinct,
hierarchically structured systems - as a simple consequence of
engaging in economic and reproductive activities. The point
here is that social systems are manifestly hybrid; they result
from peculiar and idiosyncratic (re-) integration of organismic
economic and reproductive functions. Is the "nuclear family"
economic or reproductive in nature? The answer can only be
"both."
The version of evolutionary theory from which sociobiology
springs severely elides the distinction between economic and
reproductive organismic functions. Seeing all forms of behavior
- even patently economic behavior - as just a manifestation of
the competition to leave more of one form than another of
genetic information, dampens the functional, economic side of
any description of organisms or larger biotic systems. Seeing the
organization of virtually any form of biotic system strictly from
the perspective of the perpetuation and transmission of underly-
ing genetic information, and understanding such processes to
derive wholly from competition among organisms to maximize
their genetic representation in succeeding generations (in part
through the mechanism of "kin selection") begs the question of
the significance, in a moment-by-moment functional sense, of
economic activities. And it misses the main point raised by
Caporael et al.: Relations among organisms, whether con-
specific or not, or whether involving economic or reproductive
activities, cannot be seen as wholly competitive lest essential
ingredients of the fabric of living systems - especially social
systems - be left out of our very description of nature.
Surely we require a sound, functional description of systems
the origins of which we seek to explain in evolutionary terms. It
is true, as so many evolutionists have been at pains to point out
of late, that the causal pathways leading to the development of
any given system may be quite tortuous; current functions may
be a misleading guide to evolutionary history (cf. Gould & Vrba
1982). But Caporael et al. are reacting to the opposite, and
arguably more pernicious, tendency: To frame descriptions of
the structure of natural systems explicitly and exclusively in the
light of a particular set of theoretical presuppositions. The
resulting descriptions can only be as good as the theory on which
they are based.
Cooperation is alive and well
C. Scott Findlaya and Charles J. Lumsdenb
'Department of Biology, University of Ottawa, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada
K1N 6N5 and department of Medicine, University of Toronto, Toronto,
Ontario, Canada M5S 1A8
Electronic mail: "findlay@uohawa.bitnet blumsden0@utormed.bitnet
Research works best when theory and experiment communi-
cate. The consequences of such a dialogue are apparent in the
target article. Caporael and her colleagues have strong claims
against the egoistic incentive (El) perspective just because they
have applied insights from game theory to their small-group
designs. The sociobiology of El and selfish genes will never be
the same.
In concentrating on the putative distribution economy of
early hominids, the authors' search for an explanation overlooks
culture's presence per se. Surprisingly, culture learning is all
that one needs to account for the evolution of non-EI altruistic
behaviors that benefit one's group. When culture must be
learned, group selection can be very effective in spreading non-
EI behaviors through a population. Moreover, contrary to the
authors' claims, the non-EI altruism so spread can be evolu-
tionarily stable. This is so despite the traditional beliefs (for a
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survey, see D. S. Wilson 1983) about how unimportant group
selection is in populations where behavior is genetically deter-
mined. Biocultural populations, where learning and behavior
depend on what others know and do, turn out to be much more
susceptible to group selection effects.
As a result, we favor an evolutionary explanation structured
along the following lines: Suppose that N social groups comprise
the population, with p(, (= 1,...,N denoting the relative size of
the €th group. Altruistic behavior is in part determined by a
single diallelic locus. Take reproduction to be asexual, although
the results for the diploid case are similar if there is no domi-
nance. There are then two genotypes, A and a, with A denoting
the altruistic genotype, and two phenotypes, B and b, with B
denoting the altruistic phenotype, yielding four possible phe-
nogenotypes: ab, aB, Ab, AB. We are interested in non-EI
altruism, which benefits others at true fitness cost to the indi-
vidual. If ye and ze denote the frequency of the altruistic gene
and phenotype respectively in group €, then
9-2
I
Pfil (1)
give the corresponding mean frequencies in the population as a
whole. Each generation, adults produce offspring who, after
socialization and within-group selection, disperse according to
the standard Wright island model, with a rate m at which each
group exchanges members with the global population. Migra-
tion and reproduction take place continuously.
Let s be the fitness cost of altruism, measured in terms of
decreased survival of the altruistic phenotype, and Ietj5 be the
probability that an offspring with gene j develops the altruistic
phenotype (i.e., adopts the non-EI altruistic behavior strategy
from its congeners). Adoption probabilities will in general de-
pend on both the offspring's genotype and the observed fre-
quency of this altruistic behavior in the adult population, so that
/ has the form of a learning rule subject to gene-culture trans-
mission (Lumsden & Wilson 1981): J5 = fi(ze). If A denotes the
altruistic genotype, we take this to mean that/* &/<• for all ze;
that is, an A-genotype is more likely to adopt the altruistic
phenotype than is the o-genotype. Furthermore, we assume
that the greater the frequency of a trait in the parental genera-
tion, the more likely its adoption by the offspring - a form of
cultural influence on behavior and development known as trend
watching (Lumsden & Wilson 1981). A generic form of a trend-
watching cultural transmission function is
ft(ze) = a)(ze - 1)], (2)
where - l ^ u ^ S a ^ l represents each genotype's sensitivity
to cultural transmission of the altruistic phenotype from the
general social environment.
Group selection, as we will relate it to Caporael et al.'s
findings here, takes the form of differential productivity:
Whereas the non-EI altruists have a within-group fitness of (1 -
s):l relative to selfish nonaltruists, the absolute survival rates of
offspring in groups characterized by a high frequency of altruists
among the parents exceed those of selfish groups. Let P > 0 be
the regression of group fitness on the proportion of altruistic
phenotypes in the parental generation. Then the rate-of-change
in the relative size of group € is just
Pe = (3)
where the clot denotes the time-rate of change dpe/dt. The
corresponding rate of change for the frequency of the non-EI
altruism gene in the population as a whole is then
- sd(2h - 1)] - sd[Vz -Q)-
(4)
Here h = y + z- 2yz, d = aA - a" £ 0, and Vy, V,, and V .^ are
the between-group phenotypic and genetic variances and
covariance respectively, all of which are positive. In the case of
Commentary /Caporael et al.: Selfishness examined
purely genetic transmission, where the probabilities of adopting
the behavior strategy are genetically determined and indepen-
dent of the non-EI altruistic behavior frequencies ze in the
group, the non-EI altruistic gene frequency in the population
changes at the rate
y = + P) - syQ - y)]. (5)
D is the difference in the penetrances of the two genes with
respect to the altruistic phenotype and DV is the covariance of y
and z under purely genetic transmission of the adoption
probabilities.
To compare instantaneous rates of evolution under the two
modes of transmission (gene-culture and purely genetic), we set
the average difference in the adoption probabilities for gene-
culture transmission across the population equal to the corre-
sponding penetrance differential for pure genetic transmission.
The between-group selection effects are then rendered identi-
cal for the two types of transmission (i.e. DVy = V ), allowing
comparisons to be drawn. The rate of evolution of the altruistic
gene under this type of gene-culture transmission exceeds that
under pure genetic transmission if
(25 - 1)(1 - 2y)Vyz > 0. (6)
Of particular importance to the data of Caporael et al. are the
conditions under which a non-EI altruism gene will increase
when introduced into a population initially monomorphic for
the selfish-behavior gene (conditions of initial increase), and the
conditions under which the same altruism gene can resist
invasion by a selfish gene (conditions of evolutionary stability).
The former corresponds to A increasing when rare (y —* 0), the
latter to A increasing when close to fixation (y —> 1). For a small
y, we see from eq. (6) that less of a between-group (P) compo-
nent of selection is required for initial increase under gene-
culture transmission of the altruism gene if z > .5, whereas for y
near one, the corresponding criterion is z < .5. When these
inequalities hold, the range of conditions over which genetic
evolution of the altruism gene can occur is expanded under
gene-culture transmission relative to the purely genetic case,
often dramatically so (Figure 1).
This kind of model for the evolution of non-EI altruism
incorporates what we believe to be a critical element lacking in
earlier theses about group selection's role, namely, the explicit
characterization of how genetic and cultural information interact
to mediate socialization. Such models suggest that, for popula-
tions with both genetic and cultural shaping of learning and
behavior, group selection (and supraindividual selection in
general) may be more important than previously realized. In
particular, genetic evolution of non-EI altrustic behavior can
occur under conditions precluded if learning strategies were
determined by genes alone, rather than by the interaction of
genes and culture.
Sociobiologists have for some time cautioned against taking
selfish genes and inclusive fitness maximizing as the final an-
swer, especially for human evolution, where the effects of co-
evolving genes and culture are so poorly worked out (see, e.g.,
Lumsden & Wilson 1981, pp. 297ff. and the subsequent liter-
ature). Human sociobiology is best characterized as a field
enlivened by competing answers to its "central problems," not
monolithic consensus - popular summaries or news pieces to
the contrary notwithstanding. Its continued vitality depends on
mathematical theory working in partnership with such data as
Caporael and her colleagues have provided here, data that
cannot be ignored.
BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (1989) 12:4 703
https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X0002553X
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 11 Jul 2017 at 10:48:29, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
Commentary /Caporael et al.: Selfishness examined
0.2 0.4 0.7 0.9
0.5-
0.4-
0.3-
0.2- •
W
. 0.1 - •
S o.o- •
a>oo
cg
© 0.5-r
Q)
0.4-
0.3"
0.2-
0.1-
0.0-'
0.8 1.3 2.4 5.0
0.3
1 h •+• •+• •+• I
0.50 0.55 0.60 0.65 0.70 0.75 0.50 0.55
5.0 1.6
0.60 0.65 0.70 0.75
5.0 1.7 0.6
h •+• •+• +• -r- h - I -
0.00 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.00 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50
Altruistic phenotype frequency, z
Figure 1. (Findlay and Lunsden). Enhanced efficacy of group selection under gene-culture (GC) versus pure genetic (G)
transmission. Shown are contour plots of ln[Pmin(G)/Pmm(GC)], where Pmin(-) is the minimum value of the between-group
regression coefficient P required for the altruistic allele to increase in the total population, given a within-group selection coefficent
s and altruistic phenotype frequency z. For all plots, Vy = .005, Vz = .08, V^ = .07. For 1A and lC,d=- .40, whereas for IB and
ID, d = —.80, with A and B describing the situation when the altruistic allele is rare (y = .01), C and D when y is close to fixation
(0 = -99).
Ecological and social factors in hominid
evolution
Robert Foley
Department of Biological Anthropology, University of Cambridge,
Cambridge CB2 3 DZ, England
Electronic mall: rafi10@phx.cam.ac.uk
As the study of human evolution has become increasingly
behavioural in orientation, a contrast has developed between
social and ecological explanations for the patterns we observe in
the archaeological and fossil record. The result has been that
alternative models of social and ecological causality are seen as
competing explanations for the same phenomena. Caporael et
al. have opted for the primacy of social explanations, citing some
of my work as examples of models that do not include social
factors as primary causative factors in human evolution (Foley
1984; 1987). Particularly important here is my definition of the
hominid "community" to exclude conspecific interactions (i.e.,
social relationships). That definition, however, refers specifical-
ly to the "ecological community," as used by ecologists studying
interspecific relations. Such a community is not the same as a
"social community" - i.e., repeated interactions between con-
specifics - and therefore should not be taken to rule out the
likelihood that many of the individuals of a species involved in an
ecological community also operate within a social context, and
therefore as part of a social community. As Caporael et al. point
out, primates are strongly social; hence, social factors are bound
to have been important during the course of human evolution.
The critical question is not whether early hominids formed
social groups, but what the specific character was of those
groups (Foley & Lee 1989; Foley 1989).
The key question, then, concerns the nature of the interaction
between social and ecological communities and how we move
beyond social versus ecological explanations to discussions of
how the one may be predicated upon the other.
This problem may be considered at two levels. First, the
problem of communities: Early hominids existed in a matrix of
other organisms (the ecological community). The extent to
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which they were able to acquire resources in the context of
competition from those interacting organisms was critical to
individual survival and evolutionary success. This may seem to
imply ecological determinancy and the primary importance of
interspecific competition, which at one level is almost certainly
true. Interspecific competition, however, is a more complex
phenomenon. Although species may be described as competing
with each other, in evolutionary terms this can be mediated
through intraspecific mechanisms. For example, those indi-
viduals of Species A that are able to exist successfully in the
competitive presence of Species B will do better (be selected
for) relative to those individuals of Species A who suffer in the
presence of Species B. If sociality reflects intraspecific rela-
tionships, it will also be dependent on the competitive context of
the ecological community.
The second level arises from the foregoing conclusion: What
is the role of sociality (which is essentially an expression of the
nature of intraspecific competition) within this larger context? It
may be argued that sociality will occur if it enhances an indi-
vidual's reproductive success within its specific ecological con-
text. This means that particular types and levels of sociality will
reflect the extent to which the benefits of, for example, coopera-
tion, exceed the costs. The high levels of sociality within the
hominid lineage should therefore reflect the ecological condi-
tions in which they evolved. Principal among these conditions
are the use of high quality, patchily distributed resources (e.g.,
meat) and predatory risks in open environments (Foley 1987). In
this sense, social explanations are not rivals of ecological expla-
nations but depend on them, and Caporael et al.'s general
hypothesis easily may be integrated in an ecological framework.
Many would argue (e.g., Humphrey 1976), however, that
once sociality exists, it becomes its own driving force in evolu-
tion, and it will therefore evolve independent of ecological
factors. This seems to be one of the main thrusts of Caporael et
al.'s target article, and a view that is becoming increasingly
popular in models of human evolution (e.g., Byrne & Whitten
1988). In particular, it has been argued that encephalization
during the course of hominid evolution reflects increasing social
complexity. The claim that social and other biological processes
are independent is hard to maintain, however, when one is
considering long-term evolutionary patterns. Although the en-
largement of the human brain may well have been prompted by
the need to cope with increasingly complex social problems and
situations, this pressure would have existed for virtually all
species that have evolved sociality. The brain has not evolved in
other social lineages at the same rapid rate as in hominids,
however, suggesting that social factors alone cannot account for
the pattern we observe. [See also Glezer et al. "The "Initial
Brain" Concept" BBS 11(1) 1988.]
The implication is that the advantages of sociality are held in
check for most species, and that independent factors may inhibit
the evolution of both large brains and complex sociality. Among
primates and hominids, sociality seems to depend on a large
brain, and a large brain is a major cost, in evolutionary terms. In
particular, the maternal and growth costs may be such that, for
most species, such an evolutionary development is strongly
inhibited (Martin 1983). The conclusion to be drawn is that
although the selective advantages of sociality, cooperation, and
so forth, are high, so too are the costs, and it is only rarely that
these constraints are escaped. Although the drive toward in-
creased sociality is general, only among hominids did the eco-
logical conditions exist that allowed this evolutionary drive to be
realized. Defining those ecological conditions must remain a
high priority in palaeoanthropological research. The value of
such articles as Caporael et al.'s is that they show that this
research must be carried out in conjunction with other ap-
proaches that emphasize the centrality of social factors in hom-
inid evolution.
Commentary /Caporael et al.: Selfishness examined
Honesty as an evolutionary stable strategy
Robert H. Frank
Department of Economics, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY 14853
Caporael et al. have performed a valuable service with their
meticulous survey of the evidence against the egoistic model.
There is also considerable insights in their alternative account of
human sociality. As they forthrightly acknowledge, however, a
potential serious objection to their model is that automatic
commitment to group goals is not an evolutionarily stable
strategy (ESS). For example, a population of conformists could
be invaded by individuals who obey group norms when others
are looking, but behave opportunistically when they cannot be
observed.
The authors respond that such a strategy may not be feasible
because it places too great a burden on limited cognitive re-
sources. And true enough, a person who lies and cheats fre-
quently is likely to be caught sooner or later, no matter how
clever or careful he may be. Yet we know that there are people
who do break rules on selected occassions and seem to prosper
in the process. Consider, for example, a person whose strategy
is to follow all group norms except those that are manifestly
impractical to enforce. Such a person would not tip at restau-
rants away from home, or make anonymous donations to charity,
or vote; nor would he return a lost wallet found on a street
corner. But where convenience dictated he would pour
pesticide down his basement drain or toss litter on a deserted
beach.
Such a person has little reason to fear direct group sanctions,
even after a lifetime of such transgressions. And the strategy is
simple enough to fall well within the bounds of human cognitive
abilities. It follows, I believe, that the non-ESS critisism must
be taken seriously. Without a satisfactory response to it, the
Caporael et al. sociality model falls short as an account of
nonegoistic behavior.
As I have argued in detail elsewhere, nonegoistic behavior
becomes an ESS once we introduce a simple but important
modification to Caporael et al.'s model (Frank 1988). That
modification would be that the predisposition to behave non-
egoistically should be observable, possibly at some cost. The
following example captures the essence of the argument.
For simplicity, suppose the problem that tests people's ego-
ism is a prisoner's dilemma like the one in Table 1. Suppose
further that there are two kinds of people in the population,
cooperators (Cs) and defectors (Ds), and that each type has a
distinguishing feature (for instance, a sincere or sympathetic
manner in the case of the Cs, and the lack thereof in the Ds).
Suppose, finally, that this distinguishing feature can be ob-
served only by those who incur a cost of 1 unit. People who incur
this "cost of scrutiny" can tell Cs from Ds at a glance. To all
others, the two types are indistinguishable.
The first question that confronts a C in this environment is
whether it makes sense to incur the cost of scrutiny. By incur-
ring it, he removes all risk of interacting with a D, and is thus
assured of a payoff of 3 units (the 4-unit payoff Cs receive when
Table 1 (Frank). Payoffs in a prisoner's dilemma
Player X
Cooperate Defect
Player Y
Cooperate
Defect
4 for each
6forY
OforX
OforY
6forX
2 for each
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Figure 1 (Frank). Average payoffs for cooperators and defectors.
• (population share
of cooperators)
they interact, less the 1-unit cost of scrutiny). If he and other Cs
do not incur the cost of scrutiny, he will interact at random with
another member of the population, in which case his payoff will
be either 4 or 0, depending on whether he happened to pair with
a C or a D. If rc denotes the share of Cs in the population, each
Cs expected payoff in the random-interaction case is given by
Ec = rc4 + (1 - rc)0 = 4ro.
In this example, it therefore pays for Cs to incur the cost of
scrutiny whenever rc < 0.75, the value for which Ec = 3. For
example, in a population with rc = 0.5, Ec = 2 < 3, which implies
that Cs expect to do better by paying the cost of scrutiny. With rc
= 0.9, by contrast, Ec = 3.6 > 3, and so the Cs do better by simply
taking their chances.J The expected payoffs for the two groups in
this example are shown as functions of rc in Figure 1.
Note in Figure 1 that the expected payoffs for Cs exceed those
for Ds when rc < 0.75, the region in which Cs incur the cost of
scrutiny. Because of this difference in expected payoffs, the
population share of Cs will tend to grow in this region. Con-
versely, the expected payoffs for Ds exceed those for Cs for
values of rc between 0.75 and 1.0, the region in which the two
types interact at random. It follows that the share of Cs will tend
to decline when 0.75 < rc ^ 1.0. The stable equilibrium in this
example occurs when rc = 0.75. At that value of rc, both
cooperation and defection are evolutionarily stable strategies.
This example is very much like the model suggested by
Caporael et al. In both cases, people who behave honestly do so
because they are predisposed to adopt group norms. The as-
sumption I add is that people have the capacity to make accurate
character judgments about at least some other people. In sup-
port of this assumption, there is evidence that the affective
states that underlie a cooperative predisposition are accom-
panied by observable symptoms that are difficult to fake. The
key to the cooperators' survival lies in these symptoms. Without
them, cooperation is not an evolutionarily stable strategy. A
blush may reveal a lie and cause great embarrassment at the
moment, but in situations that require trust there can be great
advantage in being known to be a blusher.
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NOTE
1. Whenever it pays Cs to incur the cost of scrutiny, it can never pay
Ds to do so because Cs will be able to avoid them. Nor does it pay Ds to
incur the cost of scrutiny when rc > 0.75 in this example, because the Ds
will always get a higher expected payoff in that region by simply
interacting at random.
Selfish genes and ingroup altruism
Allan Gibbard
Department of Philosophy, University of Michigan. Ann Arbor, Ml
48109-1003
Electronic mall: allan_gibbard(iiub.cc.umich.edu
Caporael et al. urge evolutionists to consider "what psychologi-
cal characteristics might have evolved as adaptations to living in
small groups." In a beautiful set of experiments, they show that
discussion can evoke willingness to contribute to one's group,
even in the absence of any incentive we would normally think of
as egoistic. All this I applaud.
These findings fit in well, I would insist, with talk of "selfish
genes." Such talk is metaphorical: An organism, the claim is,
will look as if its genes had designed it to replicate those very
genes. Would metaphorically selfish genes make for literally
selfish people? The paper contains a fine brief discussion of why
they might not. Natural selection would produce not a perfect
calculator assessing each action for its contribution to a person's
inclusive fitness. Instead, it would shape psychic heuristics:
Emotional and cognitive mechanisms that worked well in the
conditions under which human beings evolved - where working
well boils down to spreading one's genes in later generations.
Now if defection was almost always fraught with grave reproduc-
tive risks and reliable mechanisms for identifying the exceptions
would have been costly, selfish genes might favor simple
heuristics that say to cooperate. Few of our ancestors, after all,
left their groups one by one through a payout room. The authors'
"sociality hypothesis" is that "the cognitive/affective mecha-
nisms underlying certain human behaviors evolved in a social
setting involving small face-to-face groups." This suggests the
kinds of costs and opportunities selfish protohuman genes must
have faced. The evolutionist's problem is to determine what
kinds of psychic heuristics would pay off genetically in these
circumstances.
Thus far I may be in full agreement with the authors (apart
from the abstract with its quick disparagement of "selfish gene "
theories). Caporael et al. avow, though, a "pessimism about the
value of explaining contemporary human behavior in terms of
fitness maximizing." If they mean explaining directly, in terms
of current striving for reproductive success, I agree with this
too. I would stress, though, the importance of careful thinking
about fitness long ago. There is a place for game theory here, and
the game theory will have the abstract structure of egoistic
incentive theory. What recurrent kinds of situations among our
ancestors might have borne most on the prospects of their genes'
reproducing themselves? What would the "payoffs" to the genes
have been from various combinations of possible strategies.
What kinds of psychic mechanisms would these selection pres-
sures shape?
Discussions in the target article leave puzzles that game
theory might help unravel. "It was adaptive for ancestral hu-
mans to identify automatically with an ingroup and to accept its
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goals as their own." It would be adaptive to do so in some cases
and maladaptive in others, I would think. We should be on the
lookout both for cues that prompt group feeling, and for cues
that prompt alienation and self-protection. We should ask how
heuristics tied to such cues would fare in terms of inclusive
fitness. Moreover, even for group feeling, we need to fill in the
evolutionary story. Group feeling was adaptive, we think, be-
cause it prompted a person to cooperate. Cooperation was
adaptive because defection would be punished, perhaps by
exclusion from the group. The story is incomplete, though, until
we have explained tendencies to punish. To punish someone for
not providing a group benefit may itself be costly. It can draw
retaliation, and it can lose one opportunities for bilateral ex-
change. To enforce group solidarity is to provide a public good;
why will anyone do so? My question is not what gain our
ancestors saw in enforcing group norms. It is what payoffs their
genes might have gotten, and what shape the punitive tenden-
cies would have in order best to garner those payoffs. The game
theory of small group enforcement may suggest something
about our current psychic mechanisms: what kinds of cues they
respond to and what kinds of actions they prompt.
I agree with the authors in rejecting egoistic incentive theory
as the full story of our current proclivities. Let me say a word,
though, about what egoistic incentive theory is. It is no single
theory, but a loose collection of theories. The notion of a
person's good is vague, and different specifications of what
constitutes a person's good will give different content to the
theory that each person pursues his own good. Pleasure and
pain seem obvious cases of personal goods and ills, and money
makes a good surrogate. Common sense is puzzled, though,
when it turns to other things people want, such as fame, being
valued, being worth valuing, or being father to a line of kings.
Not everything a person will act to bring about counts as part of
his good, by the commonsense standards that give the notion its
meaning. Still, common sense is unsure where to draw the lines.
Any particular egoistic incentive theory must specify what the
goods are that each person is acting to obtain. What we learn
from these experiments is that no such theory works if it keeps
what will count as egoistic payoffs remotely within the vague
confines of the ordinary notion.
Finally, a word on testability. Philosophers now tend to see
red at intimations that respectably empirical theories must be
directly testable. Scientists are in the business of testing, true
enough, but a theory is never tested all by itself. The bearing of
evidence on theory is more roundabout. A theory, after all, has
no observational consequences taken alone. Deriving observa-
tional consequences requires auxiliary assumptions, tacit or
explicit. The theory of the selfish gene is not directly testable,
and neither is Caporael et al.'s sociality hypothesis. Neither is
the worse in consequence; both are broadly empirical theories.
How they can be made to respond to evidence must be a long
story, but roughly, one assesses a theory both by its cogency and
by its fecundity in contributing to fuller, more specific pictures
that pass observational tests.
Folk psychology takes sociality seriously
Margaret Gilbert
Department of Philosophy, University of Connecticut, Storrs, CT 06268
Caporael et al. make several references to folk psychology,
which they take to conflict with their position. I shall argue that,
rather, they should see folk psychology as an ally.
I take "folk psychology" to be the account of psychological
functioning implicit in everyday thought and talk. It includes
both conceptual categories and forms of explanation. The
human sciences would do well to characterize it accurately, for
subjects will generally perceive themselves and others in folk-
psychological terms, and these perceptions may be expected to
help generate behavior (see Winch 1956; 1958; also Taylor
1971). If folk psychology envisages only selfish motives, this will
provide a degree of support for the hypothesis that human
behavior is always selfishly motivated. Those inclined to reject
this hypothesis will need to explain why folk psychology diver-
ges from the truth as they see it.
So, does folk psychology ally itself with those theorists who
see human behavior as "basically selfish and individualistic?"
There is more than one way to interpret this question. I shall
consider two options and answer both in the negative.
Consider first the everyday meaning of the word "selfish." On
this construal selfish behavior aims only to advance the subject's
personal well-being. There may of course be some cynical folk
who regard human behavior as basically selfish in this sense. But
in everyday thought and talk people often give and accept
explanations of behavior in terms of a person's generosity,
concern for others, and so on, explanations that are understood
to rule out the idea that the behavior in question was selfish.
This confutes the idea that folk psychology assumes that people
are basically selfish in the everyday sense under discussion.
Now consider a claim such as "she contacted him because she
wanted to relieve his suffering. " As it stands, this hardly imputes
a selfish motive in the sense discussed above. (Compare, "She
contacted him because she thought this would lead to her
promotion.") One might, however, characterize it as an "indi-
vidualistic" explanation, for it characterizes as crucial to the
subject's motivation the fact that someone (the subject)
personally wanted something. One might also characterize it as
selfish in a highly technical sense: It is the subject's own
personal wants, not another's, that are at issue. In the example,
the subject herself wants such and such.
Does folk psychology assume that human behavior is basically
selfish and individualistic in the sense that satisfaction of the
subject's own personal wants (preferences, desires, goals) is the
"organizing principle" of human behavior (sect. 1.5, para. 1)?
One can see this as a question about what forms of reported
"practical reasoning" are considered intelligible. So we should
ask whether people judge that a premiss about what "I want" or
"I prefer" is a necessary component in any course of reasoning
that is sufficient rationally to motivate action. I shall now argue
that this is not so. Folk psychology countenances a quite differ-
ent, alternative structure of motivation. This allows that behav-
ior need be neither "selfish" nor "individualistic" in the senses
now at issue.
I have in mind certain forms of reasoning from premises
involving the pronoun "we," including premises of the general
form: "We seek such-and-such" or, "We value such-and-such."
Concrete examples of such premises include, "We want to
preserve the commons" and, "Our goal is cleaner air."
Here is a simple example of reasoning that would be judged
self-sufficient and valid from a practical point of view:
Premise (1): We seek to preserve the commons.
Premise (2): The commons will be preserved if and only if I do
not graze a cow on the commons.
Conclusion (3): I should not graze a cow on the commons.
I do not claim that in all situations in which (1) is perceived to be
true, (2) will be perceived to be true. I am arguing simply that (3)
would normally be judged to follow from (1) and (2) as they
stand. In particular, there is no need to posit a suppressed
premise such as, "I seek to preserve the commons," or "I desire
that we get what we seek" (see Gilbert 1989, p. 424 ff; see also
Sellars 1963b and elsewhere, references in Gilbert 1989).
One might wonder whether premises of the "We seek . . . "
form are decomposable, from a logical point of view, into a
conjunctive premise involving a set of judgments about particu-
lar individuals such as "I seek, and each of these others seek. "
Though in certain cases "We seek . . . " could be interpreted as
having this conjunctive logic, it can be argued that quite stan-
dardly it does not. Rather, people use "We seek . . . " of them-
selves and certain others when they understand that there is
something like a tacit agreement among them jointly to pursue a
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certain goal. (I argue for this at length in Gilbert 1989, especially
pp. 167-203; see also Gilbert 1987.) If this is right, one can see
how, from "We seek X," plus appropriate premises about the
means to achieve X, a conclusion about what an individual
should do can follow directly, without the interposition of any
assumptions about what that individual wants or seeks. Indeed,
no single individual's aims need be referred to.
Some further points, very briefly: It seems that part of the
logic of "We seek such-and-such," is that it implies a commit-
ment not to act for the sake of personal benefit if this will
prejudice "our goal." In relation to a specified area of action, one
has "given oneself over" to "our goal" (see Gilbert 1989, pp.
424-25).
A typical context in which "We" is used is a discussion:
Participants are involved in a joint project (the discussion itself)
and this may generate further joint projects. Given the logic of
the corresponding "we" statements, it is clear that any joint
project stands to generate a degree of self-abnegating and
group-enhancing action.
The fact that folk psychology apparently allows for nonin-
dividualistic motivation, and the specifics of its concepts, should
not be overlooked in the course of the scientific debate in which
the authors of "Selfishness examined" are engaged.
The case of the "redundant" donor: Neither
egoistic nor altruistic
Gene M. Heyman
Department of Psychology, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138
The assumption that individual behavior is governed by rational
self-interest has maintained a powerful hold on social science,
psychology, and biology. In economics, it is usually assumed
that individuals choose in order to maximize utility; in psychol-
ogy, recent accounts of learning and motivation have proceeded
from the assumption that organisms maximize reinforcement
rate (or some similar variable); and in biology, genes have been
depicted as "selfish" and rational according to the criterion of
promoting self-replication. However, egoistically rational moti-
vational theories have not gone unquestioned. It has been
argued that such theories are incomplete because they ignore
fundamental psychological factors, such as emotions (e.g.,
Frank 1988) and cognitive biases (e.g., Kahneman et al. 1982).
Researchers who have compared matching law and optimization
predictions have often concluded that matching is the more
general principle and that when optimization does occur, it can
be shown to be a special case of matching (e.g., Herrnstein
1981).
In the target article, Caporael, Dawes, Orbell, and van de
Kragt add their names to the list of critics who find that
"economic man" provides too limited a model for human and
subhuman motivation. They note that humans and other crea-
tures often appear to behave altruistically rather than selfishly.
Rational self-interest theories, which Caporeal et al. refer to as
"egoistic," account for this by trying to show that selfless acts,
such as heroism and team play, are misleading, and that upon
analysis such behavior proves to be as egoistic as the more
transparent maneuverings of the entrepreneur. Caporael et al.
reject economic retranslations of altruism and offer instead a
dualistic system. There are, they imply, two types of motives:
selfish ones and altruistic ones. The problem, of course, is how
to distinguish between them. Caporael et al.'s solution is im-
plied by the dichotomy. They designed experiments that they
claim eliminated - subtracted out - egoistic motives so that the
resulting behavior was necessarily altruistic.
Caporael et al. ignore the possibility that human motivation is
not exhaustively categorized by their two-part scheme: egoistic
or altruistic. However, a large percentage of the subjects in the
social-dilemma experiments described by Caporael et al. made
decisions that appear to have been guided by a principle that
was neither egoistic nor altruistic. These subjects, who com-
prised about one-half the sample, donated their initial dole,
$5.00, even though they stated that the donation was unlikely to
help anyone else and they knew that it would be subtracted from
any profits they might gain. Caporael et al. label this sort of
donation "redundant," but they do not give the phenomenon
special emphasis. Redundant contributions, however, as will be
argued below, are theoretically important and call into question
the apparently straightforward dichotomy between egoistic and
altruistic motivations. A summary of some aspects of the experi-
mental procedures and of Caporael et al.'s approach will help
show why this is so. Following this, it will be argued that
redundant contributions were motivated by the desire for equi-
table social relations, and that this principle, equity, is neither
simply altruistic nor egoistic.
In the standard procedure, each subject received a $10.00
bonus if a critical number of fellow participants (e.g., 5 of 9)
donated $5.00. If less than the critical number donated, there
was no bonus, and if more than the critical number donated,
there was no additional benefit. Thus individual subjects who
made what they believed to be a redundant donation absorbed a
$5.00 loss and to the best of their knowledge helped no one else.
Put somewhat differently, a redundant contribution was by
definition not egoistic (the $5.00 loss), and the belief that the
donation was redundant implies that the incentive could not
have been altruistic.
Caporael et al. explain redundant cooperators in terms of a
sense of allegiance among players. According to a process
referred to as "in-group biasing" and "group identification,"
individuals react to themselves and others as exemplars of the
group rather than as differentiated individuals. Caporael et al.
write (and this is the whole of their account of redundant
donors): "Social identity, by reducing the distinctions between
one's own welfare and that of others, explains our subjects'
willingness to contribute in the face of expectations of their
contribution's being redundant." Caporael et al.'s explanation
assumes that the motivation for redundant contributions was
group welfare, but according to the pay-off structure, this could
not have been the case - a redundant contribution, by defini-
tion, could not intentionally help anyone. One might argue that
the subjects did not understand the social-dilemma contingen-
cies; however, Caporael et al. claim that the experimental
procedure ensured that subjects clearly grasped the conse-
quences of cooperating and defecting. Thus, the question re-
mains, why did so many subjects contribute if they did not
expect the contribution to enhance the winnings of the other
players? A plausible answer is provided by equity theory.
Caporael et al.'s summary of egoistic theories suggests that they
would label equity theory egoistic. However, below it is sug-
gested that equity theory differs in significant ways from rational
self-interest.
According to equity theory, social interactions are evaluated
in terms of costs and benefits relative to the costs and benefits
accruing to the other participants in the transaction (Brown
1986; Homans 1974). It is important to note that the scale is
relative, not absolute. Thus, one prediction is that relative
discrepancies rather than absolute levels of deprivation moti-
vate action. Another, stronger, prediction is that under certain
conditions (1) people can feel overcompensated and (2) they
will make efforts to reduce personal undeserved advantage.
Brown and Herrnstein (1975) cite an example. Adams and
Jacobsen (1964) found that college students would work consid-
erably harder at a proofreading task if they believed they were
overpaid. The redundant donor in the Caporael et al. studies
may be a second such example.
Some subjects may have felt that it was not fair to earn more
($15.00) for defecting (not donating) when others earned less
($10.00) for cooperating. Unlike the college students in the
Adams and Jacobsen study, the social-dilemma subjects did not
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have the opportunity to invest more work, so the only way to
reduce the discrepancy in equity was to reduce their pay. Thus,
donations occurred even when they believed they would be of
no assistance to the group. This interpretation could be checked
by comparing the proportion of equity-based verbal reports
from those who defected and those who donated with the
understanding that a donation was redundant.
The assumptions associated with equity theory and the ap-
proach advocated by Caporael et al. differ in interesting ways.
Caporael et al. assume that social interactions are motivated by
either strictly egoistic or strictly social incentives. For example,
their basic methodological strategy is to remove egoistic incen-
tives and test whether cooperation persists. If it does, then by
the logic of their strict dichotomy, it must have been maintained
by social incentives. In contrast, the desire for fairness or
justice, as depicted by equity theory, is synthetic in that it
entails both egoistic and social ends. Individuals tally their costs
and benefits and are goaded into action if the ratio seems
discrepant. However, whether a cost-benefit ratio is acceptable
is determined by how others are doing. Social mediation has two
consequences: First, if all parties in the social exchange come to
a similar judgment, the disparity, except for its sign, is equally
felt. Second, an action that reduces a disparity in equity for one
party necessarily reduces disparities in equity for all parties. For
example, by working harder or taking a self-imposed pay-cut, an
overcompensated employee can reduce the resentment that
fellow workers are likely to feel. Thus, in contrast to the
dichotomy of social and egoistic ends assumed by Caporael et
al., the desire for equity simultaneously serves both egoistic and
group goals.
It should be pointed out, though, that equity may in some
sense be a deficient or unstable equilibrium state. Note that the
desire for equity does not necessarily lead to an optimal
cost/benefit ratio, but simply the same ratio as others obtain.
For example, if the participants in the social-dilemma experi-
ments had not felt compelled to act fairly, they could have gone
home at least $5.00 richer, and done so without cost to others
(assuming that their estimates of redundancy were more often
correct than not, which appears to be true). Thus, if equitable
relations are generally not optimal, it is surprising that they are
not upended by more nearly optimal social exchanges.
Are redundant contributions a unique consequence of non-
iterated social dilemmas or representative of a class of social
motivations? The answer is not clear. On the one hand, the
desire for equity is not the only incentive that promotes behav-
iors that enhance the welfare of more than one member of a
social exchange. For example, good citizenship is rewarded and
is in turn helpful for others. On the other hand, equity-based
solutions are not necessarily optimal, and it is possible that
equitable but nonoptimal social relations are unstable.
Selfishness reexamined: No man is an island
Alasdair I. Houston8 and William D. Hamilton13
'King's College Research Centre, Cambridge University, Cambridge CB2
1ST, United Kingdom and "Department of Zoology, Oxford University,
Oxford 0X1 3PS, United Kingdom
Electronic mall: houston@vax.oxford.ac.uk
The target article combines experiments on human choice in a
social setting with some general discussions on selfishness and
cooperation in an evolutionary context. We find the experi-
ments interesting and agree with the authors that they provide a
challenge to sociobiological views of human behaviour. They do
not seem, however, to imply such a radical difficulty for current
sociobiological and evolutionary theory as Caporael et al. sup-
pose. In the first place, the extension of theory that they
themselves suggest is needed is not really outside the existing
framework. This is the major point discussed below. In the
second place, the experiments, although throwing light on a
socially welcome aspect of human nature, may be no more
puzzling, ultimately, than the maladaptive behaviour of a but-
terfly beating on a windowpane. In other words, psychologists'
experiments, like other single-encounter social situations of
civilised life, may be just as evolutionarily novel for us, and
therefore just as confusing, as glass panes are to butterflies. This
idea does not detract from the value of the experiments, which,
if the idea is right, warn us that our behaviour is not stable at its
present level of cooperativeness: Cheats, though uncommon,
may be doing uncommonly well, and the proclivity to cooperate
may be slowly declining (see also Hamilton 1971; 1975). Thus,
the target article and its discussion may encourage us to consider
remedial measures.
Turning now to Caporael et al.'s own interpretations of their
findings, one of our major objections concerns the characterisa-
tion of egoistic incentive (El) theories and an apparently alter-
native Darwinian framework. Selfish gene theory is of much
broader scope than Caporael et al. suppose. It is in fact the basis
of the current Darwinian approach. Although Darwin himself
couldn't refer to genes, because they weren't known, the pre-
sent theory has the same definite and individualistic spirit of
interpretation that he used.
As follows from this, the authors' view of El theory as part of
sociobiology is open to objection. We clearly cannot speak for
everyone who has used evolutionary considerations as a basis for
speculation about human nature. To the extent that some
people see selfish gene theory as a basis for only selfish be-
haviour, Caporeal et al. may be justified in the line that they
take. We would argue, however, that their view of selfish gene
theory and El theories is misleading. They say: "According to
El theory, people will always choose the selfish strategy in social
dilemmas" (sect. 1, para. 5). This is not true if kinship is involved
or if there are repeated interactions. The authors go on to
consider a variety of ways in which an individual's incentives
may change in such a way that cooperation emerges. These ways
are coercion, conscience, reciprocity, and inclusive fitness (IF)
maximization. We feel that the last two categories do not really
belong with the first two. The authors give the impression that
IF theory attributes explicit incentives to individuals such that
each rationally computes the IF associated with various options
("behavior . . . can be explained in terms of people's attempts
to maximize their inclusive fitness " sect. 3, para. 12). Rationality
is actually seen asacorollaryofEItheory(sect. 1.4, para. 2). But
IF says nothing about rationality, or the exact nature of the
mechanistic and psychological processes involved.
Coercion and conscience may indeed change an individual's
incentives so as to remove dilemmas, but reciprocity and IF
theory do not rest on this basis. IF theory (Hamilton 1964) is a
way of looking at the spread of genes, that is, a way of imple-
menting the Darwinian approach that the authors themselves
favour. Similar remarks can be made about reciprocity ("Dar-
win's emphasis on individual advantage has been formalized in
terms of game theory. This establishes conditions under which
cooperation based on reciprocity can evolve" [Axelrod & Hamil-
ton 1981, p. 1,396].) The fact that such evolutionary conditions
may underlie human behaviour does not necessarily remove a
dilemma. We may in fact be conscious of a conflict between
"our" interests and the maximization of IF.
Although we have argued that conscience differs from re-
ciprocation plus IF as a potential explanation for cooperative
behaviour, we are not barred from believing that conscience has
been shaped by our evolutionary past so that certain sorts of
behaviour are encouraged. (This form of evolutionary explana-
tion may be an example of what Caporael et al. refer to in section
1.4, paragraph 3 as "positing intervening selective processes."
The use of such a two-level approach is by no means unique to
cultural evolutionists: In discussions of the evolution of be-
haviour it is common to distinguish the evolutionary advantage
and the behavioural mechanisms - see Houston 1980; Houston
& McNamara 1988, for further discussion and references.) In
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their treatment of conscience (sect. 2.7), Caporael et al. ignore
the possibility that conscience may be group-biased. People
may be automatically applying rules for cooperating in a way
appropriate to outdated circumstances whenever they find
themselves in any face-to-face or generally "believed-in" group,
treating this group as if it were not so ephemeral as the condi-
tions of the experiment say - as if they couldn't believe that it
could be so ephemeral because, in the Palaeolithic, for which
their reactions are evolved, groups never were.
And in reality, when participants are allowed to discuss face to
face they may also not want to be branded even possible or
probable cheaters, in case the same people are met again in real
life outside. If the experimenters want to get as close as possible
to true rational motivations, maybe they should do everything
by mail: Send out the dollar bills with a description of what the
game is, how things will be arranged and grouped when and if
the bills are sent back, and so on. The improved generosity in
face-to-face discussion groups suggests to us that either the
rationality of the subjects refuses to unlink the experiments from
reputations valued in real life or else it reflects a quasi-innate
reaction to the perceived formation of a group, a reaction that
was adaptive long ago when groups were hardly ever ephemer-
al, and is now no longer adaptive. We suspect that the authors
favour the second alternative, but they somehow seem to see it
as contrary to sociobiology or selfish gene theory. This funda-
mental issue recurs in the context of revealed preference.
Caporael et al. says that the sociobiology of choice rests on the
revealed preference approach. We do not agree with this claim.
Revealed preference amounts to seeing a concept such as utility
as inferred from choices; as long as choice is consistent, such a
function can be constructed to describe choice. A sociobiological
approach, whether it is called selfish gene theory, IF maximiza-
tion, or a Darwinian framework, tries to find costs and benefits
that would render the observed behaviour favoured by natural
selection. Even if behaviour is consistent, no such explanation
may be possible (see also Houston & Staddon 1981; Houston &
McNamara 1988). In other words, behaviour can be consistent
without making evolutionary sense. [We note in passing that a
male elephant seal has been recorded as showing consistent and
indeed seemingly thoughtful "psychopathic" behaviour towards
members of another species (Best et al. 1981) and that dolphins
sometimes extend altruistic behaviour to members of other
species (Connor & Norris 1982).]
In the context of Caporael et al. 's emphasis on the importance
of groups in human evolution, it is interesting that in his
discussion of the prisoner's dilemma, Sen (1973) writes: "I
would argue that the philosophy of revealed preference ap-
proach essentially underestimates the fact that man is a social
animal, and his choices are not rigidly bound to his own prefer-
ences only" (pp. 252-53). We feel that Caporael et al. have
underestimated the extent to which previous work has consid-
ered this idea. Wilson (1975) writes: "It is likely that the early
hominids foraged in groups" (p. 567), and he goes on to mention
that this may have given some protection from predators.
Hamilton (1971; 1975) emphasises group living and attendant
group selection in early man, pointing out that because group
members would have been almost always related, group selec-
tion and IF theory offer equivalent interpretations.
The rationality of cooperation
Leonard D. Katz
Department of Philosophy, University of Connecticut, Storrs, CT
06269-2054
Electronic mall: ldkatz@uconnvm.bitnet
I shall suppose that Caporael et al. are right in their claims that
people readily come to identify with a group, to respect what
they perceive as group decisions or demands, and to contribute
resources for group welfare, even at some cost to their indi-
vidual advantage. But I shall challenge their statement, made
most baldly in the Abstract, that their subjects' decisions to
contribute resources are based "frequently on irrational
grounds." Caporael et al.'s coupling of "individualistic, selfish"
with "rational" might suggest that they accept as definitive of
rationality the "economic man" view - a view they reject as
descriptive of human behavior. But quite aside from any ques-
tion of whether the unselfish pursuit of group welfare as an end
is to count as irrational simply as such, in section 2.5 Caporael et
al. raise a problem that seems to impugn the means-end ra-
tionality of many of their contributing subjects.
Our own decisions often count as part of our evidence about
what others will decide when similarly situated. Accordingly,
Caporael et al. suggest, their contributors' estimate of how
many other group members will contribute (elicited after their
decision has been made) has been raised owing to their own
decision to contribute. But many should, in consequence,
believe their contributions redundant for achieving the payoff
for the group - in which case a present decision to contribute
must, it seems, be irrational. Caporael et al. say that these
subjects' behavior (based on a past decision) is "inconsistent"
with their (postdecision) expectations. This, presumably, is the
basis for the claim about "irrational grounds" in the Abstract.
But what should the poor subjects have done to be clear of this
charge? Presumably, they should have considered beforehand
now the fact of their decision would change their decision-
relevant evidence. First, the need for doing this would not be
salient to nonexpert subjects. Second, it would be no easy task.
Subjects would have to keep track of their probability estimates
and of their attitudes toward the different risks involved. Con-
tributing will be a reasonable strategy for some of those who
have group welfare as an end. And others may easily mistake
their own case for one of these. Third, some sets of initial
probability estimates and evidential weightings (for changing
these estimates on the basis of new information about one's own
decision) should result in oscillation between a tentative deci-
sion to contribute (which leads to greater confidence that one's
contribution will be redundant, and hence to its withdrawal) and
the resulting tentative decision not to contribute (which results
in enough, but not too much, lowering of one's confidence in
others' contributing, so that it once again seems rational to
contribute, given the greater chance one will make the decisive
difference . . .). It is at least not irrational for a person (es-
pecially given typical "real world" time, information, and pro-
cessing constraints) to follow a general policy of sticking with an
original decision in cases that "go on forever" (or seem to do so).
It is still more important that we be aware that socialized
human subjects (whatever you tell them!) will have purposes
and policies going beyond short-term individual and group
profit. People don't like being taken for suckers, but they also
like to pull their weight and do their share in even an incipient
fair scheme of cooperation. (Dissonance reduction may be a
further source of decision-dependent expectation bias.) They
may even have autonomous desires to do their share even when
they believe their contribution to be redundant, at least so long
as they are not freed of their obligation to contribute by group
decision or some other especially salient symmetry-breaking
consideration. If nonmoral payoffs (whether for individuals or
groups) are not our only ends, then even a contribution ill-
designed to increase such nonmoral payoffs need not be an
irrational choice of means.
Even absent any freestanding ultimate moral concern for
justice as such, the best policies for imperfectly social animals
such as ourselves will generally not be all that different from one
based on an autonomous concern for fair play. They will give a
high weight, especially when compared with trivial short-term
individual or group advantage, to increasing the opportunities
for future cooperation. Caporael et al.'s "stranger" subjects
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were fellow students or fellow townsmen, and may have per-
ceived each other as such. They certainly perceived each other
as fellow human beings, and as such capable of communication
and cooperation on an indefinitely extendible scale. The willing-
ness to cooperate is a most important instrumental public good
and one susceptible to erosion when expectations of cooperation
are disappointed. Our ability to (reversibly) put aside our
individual aims, regarding ourselves as constrained by social
goals, decisions, or demands (either explicit or perceived as
naturally arising from the circumstances of the case) seems an
appropriate adaptation to our general social situation. The
contributors presumably wanted to be perceived collectively
(even when not individually) by each other and by themselves
(even when not by others in the redundant contribution case) as
people capable of sustained cooperation, in part because they
also wanted to be people of this kind - in a world that is, after all,
larger than the one-shot social dilemma of the experimental
design. That design cannot prevent people from importing the
policies they follow when they pay their taxes and make charita-
ble contributions. Such policies can be approved by us as
rational means given our mixture of group-biased (but indefi-
nitely extendible) altruistic and selfish ends and the dependence
of these ends on our own and others' dispositions to cooperate.
But then these policies are not irrational.
Selflessness examined: Is avoiding tar and
feathers nonegoistic?
Douglas T. Kenrick
Department of Psychology, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ 85287
Electronic mall: atdtk@asuacad.bitnet
Ecologist James Lovelock has noted that "new ideas follow a
predictable progression. First people say, 'It's absurd!' Then
they say, 'Maybe.' And finally they say, 'We knew it all along'"
(quoted in Cowley 1988). Over the last decade and a half,
sociobiology has progressed from the absurd through the maybe
phases. Given the nomological network of evidence from cross-
cultural, comparative, neurophysiological, and behavior genet-
ic research, it is no longer defensible to hold the position that
evolutionary analyses are irrelevant to human social behavior.
However, the word "sociobiology" itself retains a poor market-
ing value among social psychologists. The mode du jour is to use
the term "sociobiology" for "bad" evolutionary theory, and to
distinguish it from informed evolutionary theory of the kind that
any intelligent person should have known all along. But so-
ciobiology is a very broad term, referring simply to the study of
the biological basis of social behavior (Wilson 1975). The field of
study is defined, plainly and simply, by the general assumption
that evolutionary principles will apply not only to morphological
structures, but also to behaviors. [See BBS multiple book
review of Kitcher: "Vaulting Ambition" BBS 10(1) 1987.]
Pardon the language, but this sounds like sociobiology.
Sociobiology implies no necessary commitment to one particu-
lar proximate fact or another. A "sociobiologist" (if anyone with a
poor sense of public relations wanted to admit to being one) is
certainly not committed to the view that every decision made by
an individual will be "selfish."The notion of "inclusive fitness,"
which has generated ample supportive data (Trivers 1985),
suggests one condition under which individual altruism might
have been selected. Although Caporael et al. indicate some
discomfort with this, evolutionary analyses imply "selfishness"
not in a literal sense, but in an ultimate genetic sense. If
particular classes of individual selfless acts would, on average,
promote survival, reproductive success, or benefit for related
individuals, they will be selected (for genetically selfish
reasons). At this level, the theory is not a tautology. There have
no doubt been animals (human and otherwise) whose genes
inclined them to act in genetically unselfish ways. The likely
selection pressures against those tendencies make it a good bet
that few such inclinations will have survived. Nevertheless, it is
perfectly consistent with sociobiological assumptions to consid-
er conditions under which altruism could have been selected at
the group level (Trivers 1985; Wilson 1975).
It seems to me that the evolutionary approach presented by
Caporael et al. is a logical extension of the same reasoning that
gave us the inclusive-fitness and reciprocity models of altruism.
As the authors note, the "sanctions for uncovered hypocrisy in
most societies are severe - occasionally extending to total
ostracism from the group." Other evolution-based experiments
suggest that humans are especially cognitively tuned to detect a
cheater (Tooby & Cosmides 1989). Even in recent American
history, the penalty for defecting from group rules was tarring
and feathering. Thus, this evidence, and the evolutionary model
offered by Caporael et al. is consistent with a view of selfishness
at the level of the gene. As in the case of kin selection, we now
haveanondilemma. The best heuristic for our ancestors was "be
a group-player, or (on average) die."
Caporael et al. suggest that any tendency to welch on group
commitments was selected against in our ancestors. Their rea-
soning that humans are selected for group-living is in line with
arguments made by other evolution-minded psychologists (e.g.,
Hogan 1982). A reminder of our evolutionary history serves as a
useful caution against the social psychological view of humans as
selfish individualists, and the present effort is consistent with
other work that uses an ultimate evolutionary model to explain
seeming "irrationalities" in social psychological economics
(Kenrick & Trost 1989). Although I therefore agree with their
general framework, whatever the label, I think that selfishness
may be found here at a level much more proximate than the
gene.
Extrinsic and Intrinsic egoistic Incentives are not eliminated.
Consider the dilemma faced by a potential Judas in one of the
groups described by Caporael et al. The subject is given the
chance to walk out with his 15 pieces of silver, and none of the
other group members need ever know that he did his selfish
deed. If the subject declines this "rational" opportunity, is it
truly unselfish? I think not. There are several glaring sources of
egoistic motivation here. To begin with, the potential Judas
must face someone to collect his payoff. As a minimum, the
subject can expect the experimenter to know of his treachery.
Because people are notorious gossips, how is the subject to
know that his selfishness is safely secret? And if he meets
another group member later he may be forced to lie, with the
possibility that his nonverbal responses will give him away. The
authors themselves note the dangers of reprisals for breaking
group rules. If the subject is found out, he may suffer conse-
quences for which an extra five or ten dollars would be little
solace.
And the egoistic incentives need not come from without.
Research on children's socialization indicates that altruistic
behavior goes through three stages: (1) for primary grade chil-
dren, altruism is self-punishing; (2) for slightly older children,
altruism is used instrumentally to elicit social approval; (3) for
adults, the reward value of altruism is internalized, and adults
will act prosocially even when no one is looking (Cialdini, 1981;
Kenrick et al. 1979). So, money is not the only relevant egoistic
incentive involved here. Subjects can feel good about them-
selves for "doing the right thing." This self-reward is no doubt
maintained by intermittent extrinsic reinforcement, and model-
ling experiences. On the other side, the "unselfish" subject can
avoid the guilt of going the Judas route.
Caporael et al. argue that "egoistic incentive notions are
really untested metatheories" and they attempt to defend them-
selves against the sort of reasoning I used above by noting that
"it is always possible to hypothesize arbitrary egoistic payoffs
post hoc." However, there is another set of social psychological
studies that bears on this issue, and that offers support for an
egoistic viewpoint. Batson and his colleagues have found that
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subjects who empathize with a victim will be more altruistic
than nonempathic observers (Batson et al. 1983). In addition,
empathic helping is not sensitive to certain variations in the cost
of helping. At first glance, these findings argue against an
egoistic incentive viewpoint. However, newer findings argue
that empathic helping may be egoistic after all (Cialdini et al.
1987). Cialdini and his colleagues view altruism as a socialized
self-reinforcer - people act altruistically to make themselves
feel better, and to avoid the negative feelings associated with
acting selfishly. These authors have replicated Batson's em-
pathic helping studies and found evidence that egoism is lurking
beneath the surface of this seemingly selfless behavior. Subjects
in Cialdini's experiments indeed report unpleasant moods when
they have been asked to empathize with a victim's plight, and
they will help if that personally aversive state is not interrupted
before the prosocial opportunity. However, if they are given a
reward which dissipates that unpleasant mood, or if they are
given a drug that they think will freeze their mood, subjects'
helping drops to control levels. Thus, there are a priori reasons
to argue that Caporael et al. have not eliminated the range of
egoistic incentives that might have played a role in this research.
Simply eliminating a few (even quite a few) incentives is not
sufficient to seal the case for pure selflessness.
As a related point, the fact that subjects' self-reports do not
support egoistic explanations is hardly strong evidence one way
or the other. Jean Paul Sartre observed that sincerity is the mark
of an actor who is taken in by his own act. Caporael and her
colleagues note the research on nonconscious determinants of
behavior which indicates that experimental subjects are not
always able to describe the causes of their own behavior (Nisbett
& Wilson 1977). And even if they know the causes of their
behavior, subjects' explanations may be biased for self-presenta-
tional purposes (Tetlock 1981). Thus, a sincere expression of
group interest is suspect for several reasons.
In sum, I believe that (a) Caporael et al. make an unjustified
distinction between "sociobiology" and equivalent evolutionary
approaches to social behavior, and that (b) they have not proven
the case against selfish motivations, even at the proximate level.
Despite these reservations, I believe they have presented a
fascinating and thoughtful series of studies, and embedded
them in a provocative framework. Their evolutionary model
connects their work with other areas of social psychology, and
with other developments in the life sciences. By moving beyond
a narrow proximate analysis, they have made a worthy contribu-
tion to the emerging field of evolutionary social psychology.
Sociality versus self-interest in human
evolution
Bruce M. Knauft
Department of Anthropology, Emory University, Atlanta, GA 30322
The "sociality hypothesis" forwarded by Caporael et al. pro-
vides an important potential alternative to egoistic incentive
(El) theories and deserves serious attention. The hypothesis is
only nascently and unevenly developed, however, and rests in
this target article on a quite narrow empirical and conceptual
base.
Sociality and the study of human evolution. Though not noted
by Caporael et al., the sociality hypothesis in the study of human
evolution has explicit roots at least as far back as Kropotkin's
Mutual aid: A factor in evolution (1902; see Gould 1988; cf.
Vucinich 1988, Ch. 10). In anthropology, the central place of
sociality in early human development has a legacy in the work of
(among others) Levi-Strauss (1949) on primal structures of
human kinship alliance; Leslie White (1949) on evolutionary
features of symbolic communication; Geertz (1962) on culture
and the evolution of mind; Hockett and Ascher (1964) on "the
human revolution"; the late Glynn Isaac (1978; 1984) on homi-
nid collective affiliation; and selected contemporary researchers
on the evolutionary significance of intense sociality in simple
human societies (Ingold 1987; Knauft 1988a; 1988b; 1988c;
Testart 1985; cf. Lee & DeVore 1984).
The anthropological influence of group-collective perspec-
tives on evolutionary theory has diminished, however, punctu-
ated by William's (1966) trenchant critique of group selection
and the practical problems of establishing early humans as an
exception to his generalizations. In particular, the mental and
communicative abilities of humans - the symbols of language
that make human cultural transmission and sociality unique -
don't fossilize directly and are difficult to assess operationally in
terms of the early archeological and paleontological record.
Hence, for example, Foley's (1987, pp. 4-5) recent suggestion
that culture is not a useful concept in the study of human origins.
This belies the fact that group-collective features quite dramat-
ically distinguish the simplest human societies as ethnographic-
ally observed from nonhuman primates. These features, argua-
bly quite crucial in the development and spread of Homo
sapiens, if not Homo generally, include widespread symbolic
communication in language, diffuse rule-of-thumb sharing of
food and information (viz., beyond the parameters of inclusive
fitness), and pronounced influence of culturally defined rules on
human sexual behavior (Knauft 1988a, 1988b). Those noninten-
sive human foraging societies that have been ethnographically
studied have placed extremely high emphasis on diffuse so-
ciality and, with the exception of Australian aborigines, have
actively inhibited the development of political dominance hier-
archies among men (see Ingold 1987; Knauft 1987a; Leacock &
Lee 1982; Lee & DeVore 1984; Woodburn 1982). The great
potential significance of these features in early human develop-
ment is regularly neglected by El theorists, revealing an indi-
vidualistic competitive bias in the study of human evolution
(recent examples include Tooby & DeVore 1987 and Wrangham
1987). This bias deserves to be countered, not on the basis of a
priori disagreement, but on the basis of alternative data analysis,
hypothesis testing, and theory building. Caporael et al.'s article
is an important step in this direction.
Empirical caveats and cross-cultural context. Significant
weaknesses in the present study must be noted, however. The
empirical basis for Caporael et al.'s assertions is narrow and the
range of possible causal influences not adequately considered.
The occurrence of in-group bias in Caporael et al.'s experimen-
tal groups under "discussion" conditions may be significantly
influenced, for example, by (1) the ratio of students to towns-
people (or men to women); (2) variations in subjects' perceived
likelihood that they may encounter another group member at
some future time; (3) differences in initial expectation of re-
ciprocal altruism, e.g., students'/townspeople's history of reci-
procity with their peers and others in the community; and
(4) differences in subjects' degree of financial need. Such vari-
ables need to be empirically considered to show that variation
among them cannot account for or significantly alter the experi-
mental results.
More generally, it is virtually certain that differences in
cultural and ethnic identity strongly effect the strength of in-
group biasing: cross-cultural studies in social psychology show
major differences in collectivism versus individualism as mea-
sured among subjects from different cultures (see Triandis
1988). At the same time, the trends generally established by
these studies augur well for Caporael et al.'s basic argument:
Strong individualism correlates robustly with a high Gross
National Product and socioeconomic success (cf. ibid.). Consid-
ering these trends on a worldwide scale, Caporael et al. 's subject
population is thus among those less likely to exhibit collectivist
propensities on a priori grounds. The same may not be true
intraculturally, however: College students, as a privileged non-
wage-earning group, could perhaps be more prone to altruistic
in-group biasing than, say, a group of inner-city drug addicts, a
group of business entrepreneurs, or a group of people with
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diverse ethnic affiliations. Presently, both Caporael et al. and
the El theorists assume uniform (if antithetical) patterns of
individualism or collectivism - each projecting a single pattern
onto human evolutionary history, typically based on direct
experimental evidence from only a narrow segment of indus-
trialized English-speaking populations. The cross-cultural data
on variations in individualism/collectivism suggest that this is
likely to be a great oversimplification.
This reflects an area in need of much future attention: the
theoretical and empirical gap between Caporael et al.'s specific
experimental study and their large-scale conclusions for evolu-
tionary theory. The present study requires articulation with
"middle-range" theories concerning stages of human evolution-
ary development, on the one hand, and paleoanthropological
and ethnographic evidence, on the other. For example, Ca-
porael et al. do correctly identify hominid foraging for dispersed
and patchy resources as crucial in creating conditions that would
have selected for diffuse human sociality (see Cashdan 1980;
1985; Kaplan & Hill 1985; Knauft 1987a; 1988b; Kurland &
Beckerman 1985; Testart 1982; cf. Marshall 1979). In-group
biasing as an evolutionary tendency among small groups of
hominid kin, however, does not contravene El theories. In-
deed, concepts closely analogous to in-group biasing are at the
heart of several current El theories of ethnocentrism and war-
fare (e.g., Essock-Vitale & McCuire 1980; Reynolds et al. 1987;
Shaw & Wong 1988). What is needed is to establish the the-
oretical and ethnographic likelihood that altruistic sociality
among early humans extended outside the close kindred - that
sociality is intrinsic to human interactions in general and not
simply a latter-day extension of biogenetic in-group interest to
ever-more-inclusive categories of people who assess themselves
as having a common identity.
The suggestions of Boyd and Richerson (1985) are particularly
important here: Imitation and social learning are plausible both
theoretically and empirically as rule-of-thumb mechanisms ex-
plaining the early establishment of genuine altruism early in
human evolution. Once begun, such patterns can become self-
sustaining - group-level selection becomes possible - because
cultural transmission can proceed faster than biogenetic de-
selection and can thus establish its own channel of phenotypic
alteration and evolution. This articulates with strong empirical
evidence of just such rule-of-thumb sociality among the simplest
human societies known ethnographically, such as nonintensive
foragers. These societies almost invariably stress both coresi-
dential flexibility and cooperation among a large group of per-
sons, unrelated or distantly related as well as closely related -
e.g., through classificatory totemic, namesake, ritual friend-
ship, fictivekin, and other affiliations (e.g., Balicki 1970; Guem-
ple 1972; Lee 1979, Ch. 5; Meggitt 1962; Myers 1986; Turnbull
1965a; 1965b; 1984; Wiessner 1982; Woodburn 1984; cf. Gam-
ble 1982; Yengoyan 1984). Such simple societies, it may be
noted, are much less ethnocentrically subdivided and less war-
like than "tribal" groups with relatively greater population
densities, a more sedentary pattern and greater competitive
leadership (e.g., Chagnon 1988; contrast Knauft 1985; 1987a).
In short, delineating concrete connections between general
theory, specific social processes, and ethnographic evidence is
central to establishing the applicability of Caporael et al.'s
sociality hypothesis to various stages and contexts of human
development. Conversely, neglect of ethnographic reality leads
Caporael et al. to their most questionable statement (though not
one crucial to their larger argument): that anthropomorphism of
natural objects is a "default" mode of conceptualization, re-
stored to when objective materialist explanations are weak or
lacking. Levi-Strauss (1963) and many others have documented
convincingly on the basis of ethnographic evidence that an-
thropomorphic projections do not inhibit (and cannot be easily
explained by) materialist reasoning. Moreover, in line with
Caporael et al.'s more general argument, Durkheim (1912)
illustrated long ago on the basis of Australian ethnography that
anthropomorphism itself stems from the strength of human
sociality: Anthropomorphism "socializes " the natural world and
harmonizes it with structures of ongoing societal functioning.
Conclusion. As an alternative to El theories, Caporael et al.'s
sociality hypothesis is bold and suggestive. Unsurprisingly, it
will also need major empirical and conceptual development to
make a significant contribution to the study of human evolution.
Even without its present shortcomings, however, Caporael et
al. s announced disconfirmation of El theory is unlikely to force
El adherents to cede much ground. That El theories tend
toward nonfalsifiability is strongly evident in the responses of its
adherents to empirically based critiques of sociobiology (see
Vining 1986; Knauft 1987a; 1987b; 1988c) and is hinted at by
Caporael et al.: The teleological bent and unbridled empirical
purview of El theories make them particularly prone to recon-
textualizing data sets and time frames to avoid disconfirmation.
That El theories are largely self-sustaining makes innovative
theoretical breakthroughs more likely to arise out of forced
competition from rival theories than from within an El perspec-
tive itself. Caporael et al. 's argument must thus be judged by the
strengths of the alternative paradigm it proposes as well as by its
ability to outmaneuver the inevitable explanatory defenses of El
theorists on their own terms.
Overall, Caporael et al.'s perspective points to the tip of an
emerging body of alternative experimental and ethnographic
theory that will increasingly both challenge El theories and
broaden our understanding of human evolution in years ahead.
Though such defections from El theory tend to be punished by
El adherents - auguring toward negative Tit-for-Tat - there
may yet be hope: Boyd and Lorberbaum (1987) have shown that
no pure strategy for the prisoner's dilemma game is evolu-
tionary stable; rare mutant strategies may have important
impact as selective forces, and long-term cooperative advance-
ment may in fact ultimately depend on them (cf. also Boyd 1988;
Nowak & Sigmund 1989; Wilson & Sober 1989). The empirical
lacunae and logical leaps of Caporael et al.'s present contribu-
tion should be confronted respectfully, keeping this positive
metatheoretical possibility in mind.
Egoistic incentives in experimental games
Dennis Krebs
Department of Psychology, Simon Fraser University, Burnaby, B.C.,
Canada V5A-1S6
Electronic mail: kathy-denton@cc.sfu.ca
Caporael et al. set out to show that individuals may behave
cooperatively even though it does not advance their self-in-
terest, and therefore that egoistic incentive theories are invalid,
or at least limited. Sociobiology is singled out for special crit-
icism. The Caporael et al. target article is an ambitious attempt
to integrate theory and research on experimental games, social
cognition, group dynamics, and human evolution. It is a wel-
come antidote to research that purports to study altruism, but
fails to attend to the motives underlying observed helping
behavior (cf. Batson etal. 1986; Krebs & Miller 1985). Nonethe-
less, the target article falls short of its expiessed goal, with good
reason. Disproving the egoistic incentive assumption is equiv-
alent to disproving the null hypothesis. You can't prove some-
thing doesn't exist; you can only show you haven't found it.
Caporael et al. establish that people do not always maximize
their monetary gain, but they fail to establish that the cooper-
ative behavior of their subjects is not motivated by qther selfish
concerns.
In the studies the authors describe, individuals honor agree-
ments to contribute money to enhance the monetary gain of
their groups even though that entails the risk of losing five or six
dollars. In the spirit of the revealed-preference conception the
authors criticize, however, we must ask, "Why do individuals
sacrifice the opportunity to make an extra five or six dollars; what
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do they get in return?" My guess is that the main incentive
driving the subjects' behavior is not monetary - five bucks is a
relatively insignificant sum. Rather, the subjects are motivated
to win, or more exactly to avoid losing, at the game. In condi-
tions where there is no group discussion, their goal - the
egoistic incentive - is to avoid being suckered, which they
achieve by keeping their money. When discussion is allowed,
group members' perspective changes from "me' to "we" -
instead of me against the other members of the group, it
becomes "us" against "them" (my group against the odds, the
experimenter, another group). One reason designated contrib-
utors contribute is so they will win through their team (the "we"
in "were number one"). But there is another reason.
Subjects in discussion groups explained their cooperative
behavior as a way to honor the group's decision. To understand
what they have to gain from this, thinLof the alternative. How
would you feel about yourself if you sat down with a group of
cooperative people, made a democratic decision to maximize
the group's net gain, then violated the agreement a few minutes
later to maximize your own gains? Shades of Judas. Caporael et
al. argue that subjects were not driven by the desire to maintain
a clear conscience because they contributed only when their
donations were directed toward the group with whom they
reached a decision; however, that was the only condition in
which they made a contract. Even though subjects were told
they would never see the other group members again and no
one would ever know how they behaved, they knew. The
egoistic incentive driving their behavior would seem to be to
uphold their conceptions of themselves as honorable people,
and to maintain their self-esteem.
The authors argue that their results are inconsistent with
sociobiological theory, but the recent work of Cosmides (1985)
and Cosmides and Tooby (1987) show they are not. From an
evolutionary perspective, the question becomes "who would
propagate more genes, individuals who honor group contracts
or individuals who break them?" Note that the question is
voiced in terms of a general strategy; in Cosmides's words, a
Darwinian algorithm; in the words of Caporael et al. a "rule of
thumb." As acknowledged by the authors, the cognitive and
affective dispositions that guide human behavior were selected
eons ago in small groups of cooperating hominids. We can safely
assume that none of our ancestors ever had the opportunity
anonymously to violate a democratic decision about a division of
resources reached in a group of strangers who would never
encounter one another again. Indeed, the only setting in which
a modern human would ever encounter this situation is a
psychologist's lab. Thus, there is no reason to expect cognitive
and affective mechanisms equipped to mediate the distinction
necessary to maximize self-interest in such situations to have
evolved. Cosmides and Tooby's work [see their accompanying
commentary] "makes it clear that behavior in ancestral popula-
tions had only to be adaptive, on average, for the evolution of
mediating mechanisms to occur" (Crawford 1989, p. 12).
Inclusive fitness is based on net gains. In the constricted
social environments of our ancestors and in most contemporary
social contexts, the small gains one might reap by cheating on
group decisions are simply not worth the risk. I have advanced a
similar argument to explain the evolution of altruism (Krebs
1987; Krebs & Miller 1985). In our ancestral environments,
individuals guided by the general program or algorithm "help
those who are familiar and similar to you" would have propa-
gated more genes (by enhancing the fitness of relatives and by
supporting systems of reciprocity - see Alexander 1987) than
those who did not. Although this may not be as much the case in
modern urban environments, these "anachronistic" disposi-
tions may still mediate self-sacrificial behavior, which, because
it is no longer supported by the original gains in fitness, may be
more purely altruistic than it was in the environments in which
it evolved.
Though poorly equipped to establish the negative case - the
absence of egoistic incentives - the authors' experimental para-
digm seems fertile for investigating the types of incentives that
influence individualistic and cooperative behavior. If the gener-
al line of thought advanced in this commentary is valid, subjects
should be willing to sacrifice money to win games and to uphold
their conceptions of themselves. Our own research, however,
and that of others, suggests that the processes involved in the
maintenance of self-esteem and an adaptive conception of self
are not necessarily rational (see Krebs et al. 1988 and Snyder &
Higgins 1988). It would be interesting to compare the self-
attributions and self-justifications invoked by subjects before
they made selfish and cooperative decisions with those invoked
after the decisions. We have observed significant differences
between self and other attributions of moral behavior, captured
in what we call the "self-righteous bias" - the tendency for
people to assume that they are more likely than others to live up
to their moral ideals. It would also be interesting to examine
some of the sources of within-group variance in expectations,
self-attributions, and behavior reported by Caporael et al.,
especially those stemming from moral development. Our re-
search suggests that subjects at Kohlberg's Stage 2 would be
most prone to justify their behavior in terms of "looking out for
number one," subjects at Stage 3 in terms of the good of the
group, and subjects at higher stages in terms of equity and
justice (see Krebs et al., in press).
"Social man" versus "conscientious man"?
Vladimir A. Lefebvre
School of Social Sciences, University of California, Irvine, CA 92717
I would like to suggest an explanation for some of the experi-
mental data presented in Caporael et al.'s target article. A
formal approach to studying human moral feelings and their
relation to decision making leads us to the assumption that man
operates with evaluations "positive-negative" with the help of
an automated processor (Lefebvre 1982; 1985). The work of this
processor reveals itself most clearly when a person does not have
any objective criteria on which to base a preference. In the
framework of this approach, "conscience " is considered to be a
special cognitive process that can be described in precise scien-
tific terms. This process is not connected with any concrete
moral prescriptions of the type "care about the well-being of
another person." Caporael et al.'s critique of traditional intu-
itive approaches to consciences hence does not relate to our
approach.
It is my impression that the experimental data presented by
Caporael et al. support the hypothesis about the existence of a
"processor of conscience." This processor can manifest itself
both in experiments with bipolar choice and in experiments in
which subjects used a continuous scale [0, 1] (where 0 means
"negative" and 1 means "positive"). In the first case, the pro-
cessor of conscience predetermines the probability of making a
positive choice, and in the second case it predetermines the
"degree of positivity" (Lefebvre 1987a; 1987b; Zajonc 1987).
A mathematical model of the processor of conscience has
allowed us to explain the phenomenon of the golden section
in binary choice experiments. In experiments in which sub-
jects evaluated their acquaintances with the help of bipolar
constructs (of the type "kind-stingy") they chose a positive
pole with the frequency 0.62, which is close to the value
5 "" 0-618, known as the "golden section value" (Adams-
Webber & Benjafield 1973; Benjafield & Adams-Webber 1976).
A retrospective analysis demonstrated that the value 0.62
also appeared in other experiments with binary evaluations
(Adams-Webber 1979; Benjafield 1984).
A mathematical model of the processor of conscience also
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predicted the values of deviations from the golden section
depending on the conditions of the experiment. These predic-
tions coincided well with experimental data (Lefebvre et al.
1986). The model also explained why the value 2/3 appears
when subjects repeatedly evaluate themselves with the help of
one set of bipolar constructs (Benjafield & Green 1978; Lefebvre
1987a).
Let us look at some of the data of Caporael et al. in relation to
the hypothesis of the processor of conscience. Consider the
experiment with "super simple conditions." Each'of the five
subjects has two alternatives - to give or to keep - and they do
not have any clear criteria to make them prefer one alternative
over the other. (As a matter of fact, this is the essence of the
dilemma.) In this situation, the subjects can completely ignore
the economical conditions of the game and operate with the pure
codes "positive-negative." The strategy "to give" is connected
with activity, and the strategy "to keep" with passivity. In
accordance with Osgood's (1965) ideas, we assume that "give"
corresponds to a positive pole and "keep" to a negative pole.
The model of the processor of conscience predicts for this case
that the frequency of choosing "give" will be equal to 0.62. As is
shown on Caporael et al.'s Table 3, the experimental value for
"give" is 0.64. Of course, we cannot place too much importance
on this coincidence because the number of subjects was quite
small. (According to Table 3 there were five groups of five
subjects each, that is, only 25 people.) However, we may expect
that reproduction of this experiment with a larger number of
subjects to produce a frequency of the strategy "to give" equal to
0.62.
Consider now how the subjects evaluated their own actions.
This procedure consisted of subjects estimating (on a 100-point
scale) the probability that their contribution would be (a) futile,
(b) critical, (c) redundant. The data in Caporael et al.'s Table 2
demonstrate that neither experimental conditions nor the type
of choice (contribution-noncontribution) influenced signifi-
cantly the value of the estimated probability of "crucial." The
estimated values of "futile" and "redundant," however, differ
essentially. The authors noted that under conditions of "no-free-
ride" and "money-back-guarantee" the ratio of contributors'
estimations of being "redundant" to being "futile" is approx-
imately 2:1.
Let us analyze this point in more detail. For the sake of
convenience we construct Table 1 based on their Table 2.
Consider a bipolar construct "futile-redundant." The data in
Table 1 suggest that under conditions (1) and (3), a positive pole
for contributors is "redundant," and for noncontributors it is
"futile." Under condition (2), "redundant" is a positive pole for
both contributors and noncontributors. Let us now find the
Table 1 (Lefebvre). The data recalculated
Futile Redundant Ratio
(1) Standard dilemma
contributors (N = 9) .24(-) .46(+) 46/70 = .66
noncontributors (N = 20) .55(+) .26(-) 55/81 = .68
(2) Money-back-guarantee
contributors (N = 15) .25(-) .46(+) 46/71 = .65
noncontributors (N = 20) .28(-) .50(+) 50/78 = .64
(3) No-free-ride
contributors (N = 27) .20(-) .57(+) 57/77 = .74
noncontributors (N = 8) .51(+) .24(-) 51/75 = .68
Mean value .68
(taking into consideration the number of subjects in each
line)
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ratios of "positive" shares to the sums of "positive" and "nega-
tive" for each line: They are close to 2/3, and their mean value is
0.68. This phenomenon can be explained by the hypothesis that
when subjects indicated on a 100-point scale their likelihood of
being "futile" or "redundant" they actually evaluated them-
selves (their own actions). And in this case, according to the
mathematical model of the processor of conscience, such a self-
evaluation must be equal to 2/3.
All of the above considerations incline me to prefer the
hypothesis of "conscientious man" to the hypothesis of "social
man." However, these hypotheses are difficult to compare,
because the first one is elaborated in great detail, whereas the
second hypothesis is given only through the negation of others.
We cannot exclude the possibility that the processor of con-
science is, in fact, the very alternative to "economic man" and to
some other approaches sought by Caporael et al.
Do we need two souls to explain
cooperation?
Wim B. G. Liebrand
Department of Psychology, University of Groningen, 9718 JP Groningen,
The Netherlands
Electronic mall: Iybra@hggrug5.bitnet
As with all gregarious animals, "two souls," as Faust says, "dwell
within his breast," the one of sociability and helpfulness, the
other of jealousy and antagonism to his mates" (William James
1890).
The above quotation captures well the major thesis set forth
by Caporael et al. The question remains, however, whether it
presents a correct view of human nature. I doubt it. In my
opinion, the parsimonious view provided by the assumption
that human nature is fundamentally "selfish" has not yet been
placed in serious jeopardy by the data or the arguments put
forward by Caporael et al.
There are three reasons why I would question that one needs
to posit a biological mechanism of sociality parallel to the
selfishness mechanism, to account for cooperative choice behav-
ior in human relationships.
The first is that many of the settings in which human decisions
are made do not share the same interdependence characteristics
as the commons dilemma, and in many, one does not have to
posit sociality as a mechanism to account for cooperative behav-
ior. The second reason is that many situations that are judged by
an external observer to have the interdependence charac-
teristics of a commons dilemma, are not viewed in this way by
decision makers who assign different weightings to their own
and others' outcomes. And third, I will argue that even when an
individual is in a setting that objectively has the structure of a
commons dilemma, and which the individual subjectively expe-
riences as such, there exist strategies of self-interest or self-
ishness that may produce cooperative rather than competitive
forms of choice behavior.
As regards the first reason cited above, Caporael et al.'s
empirical evidence for their arguments is based on data coming
from one particular kind of outcome interdependence rela-
tionship, namely, that observed in the n-person commons
dilemma. There are obviously a far wider range of interdepen-
dence settings in which Faust's "soul" or "souls" of human
decision making can be expressed. A useful way of illustrating
this range is depicted in Figure 1.
In this figure, relationships of interdependence are depicted
as falling on a continuum that at one end includes those that are
purely competitive, and at the other those that are purely
coordinative. In the former, the outcomes attained are nega-
tively correlated, and the interactions tend to be highly com-
petitive and conflictual. In the latter, outcomes are positively
correlated, and the interaction between individuals tends to be
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INTRA
PERSONAL
CONFLICT
MIXED
MOTIVE
coordination competition
NO PARTIAL FULL
INTER PERSONAL CONFLICT
Figure 1 (Liebrand). Level of intrapersonal conflict for three
degrees of interpersonal conflict.
trustful, cooperative, and coordinative. Finally, there are those
relationships that do not fall strictly in either category.
The ordinate of Figure 1 depicts the level of intrapersonal
conflict that is likely to be experienced by a given actor when
making decisions in relations in which there are varying levels of
interpersonal conflict. As can be readily seen, the highest level
of intrapersonal conflict occurs in those settings where there is
partial interpersonal conflict, that is, in mixed-motive rela-
tionships such as the commons dilemma. What characterizes
such a relationship, of course, is that the interests of the
outcome interdependent participants are partially correspon-
dent and partially discordant.
So what implications does this have for the issue of whether
evolution is driven by the motives of selfishness, of sociality, or
both? As can be seen from Figure 1, the extremes of the
continuum of interdependent relationships give rise to little or
no conflict for the actor. It is in their own selfish self-interest to
cooperate in coordinative settings and to compete in com-
petitive ones. Caporael et al. do not pay much attention to these
kinds of interdependence relationships. Yet they do exist and
require no appeal to "sociality" as an explanation of the behavior
of decision makers, whether cooperative or competitive.
The above, however, does not answer the question of why
cooperative behavior, which Caporael et al. assume to be
contrary to egocentric self-interest, is observed in the commons
dilemma. I will argue that such cooperation can obtain for two
reasons, neither of which requires that one posit an evolutionary
mechanism of sociality. First, there exists a research tradition,
issuing from the work on social values by Messick and McClin-
tock (1968) and Kelley and Thibaut (1978), of explaining cooper-
ative choice behavior in mixed-motive relationships without the
need to posit an evolutionary mechanism of sociality.
1
 Basically the social value approach assumes (and observes)
that individuals transform any given objective outcome matrix,
such as the one that obtains in a commons dilemma, into a
subjective one. This transformation process occurs in a system-
atic manner consistent with the values the individual assigns to
their own and others' outcomes. Thus, subjects making choices
in experimental game settings can be playing one of a number of
games. This obtains because different subjects apply different
transformational rules to the various outcome contingencies that
define the game. Thus, if I define my self-interest in terms of
attaining coordinative outcomes, I will transform the outcomes
differently than I would if I define my self-interest in terms of
gaining a competitive advantage over others.
In either of the above cases, I am not likely to experience a
high level of intrapersonal conflict because a coordinative trans-
formation dictates cooperative choices, and a competitive trans-
formation, competitive ones. In effect, these value transforma-
tions "unmix" the motivational structure of the game. The
dilemma disappears with either transformation rule.
To date there are several studies supporting these predictable
interpersonal differences in the way people approach, behave,
and evaluate experimental games like the commons dilemma
(McClintock & Liebrand 1988). To explain this divergence in
cooperative and competitive behavior, does one posit that
individuals with one value orientation were operating under the
evolutionary principle of sociality, the others under the princi-
ple of selfishness?
Now it is also possible, if not likely, that following the
subjective transformation of the given outcomes in a commons
dilemma game, the dilemma will retain the properties of a
mixed-motive game for some individuals. If this obtains, then
the magnitude of the dilemma, as Caporael et al. rightly ob-
serve, is particularly strong if a decision to allocate valued
resources between self and others can be made once and only
once.
For one-trial prisoners-dilemma or commons-dilemma
games, game theorists have traditionally argued that the com-
petitive choice is the more rational, self-interested one because
it is dominant and minimizes the decision maker's maximum
possible loss. For the subjects invited to the laboratory, life is
not this easy, however. They are confronted with a conflict
between two appealing options. Assume that they expect the
other to be comparably sensible, as they ought to be according
to game theorists. Such a perspective would make the mutually
cooperative outcome cell resulting from a similar sensible
choice by others more attractive than the deficient equilibrium
cell achieved when they mutually decide to compete against one
another.
Of course, one or more individuals may realize that in these
circumstances a unilateral shift may be attractive if one assumes
that others will view the cooperative choice as the mutually
sensible one. Even those individuals who consider a unilateral
shift under these circumstances must realize that others are
likely to consider the same possibility. All in all, based upon the
above reasoning for those individuals for whom a social dilemma
is truly a dilemma, one would not expect the uniform selfish or
defecting behavior that would be predicted from a game the-
oretical perspective. That is, given the specific structure of a
commons-dilemma game, and some reasonable assumptions
about the interpersonal expectations of decision makers in such
forms of relations, one would expect to observe a certain level of
cooperative choices even in the absence of "classic" selfish
incentives or the application of transformation rules that convert
the common's dilemma into a nondilemma.
In conclusion then, though I certainly do not have evidence to
assert that sociality may not be an evolutionary principle com-
parable to egoistic self-interest, I do not find the arguments or
the evidence presented for sociality as a criteria of evolutionary
fitness compelling. For the time being, the single "soul" of
rational self-interest or selfishness provides the most par-
simonious explanation of cooperative and competitive behavior
in the commons dilemma.
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Love and duty: The new frontiers
Jane Mansbridge
Department of Political Science and Center for Urban Affairs and Policy
Research, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL 60201
The Western social sciences began to evolve the fundamental
assumption of egoistic incentives in the midseventeenth cen-
tury, at a moment coterminous with the evolution of the sci-
ences themselves. Economics and political science, the earliest
modern social sciences, each adopted at their founding the
assumption that human beings act only on the basis of self-
interest. As the contemporary proverb had it, "Interest will not
lie" (Gunn 1969; Hirschman 1977; Mansbridge 1990; Myers
1983).
Caporael et al.'s target article comes at a moment in intellec-
tual history when in every discipline in the social sciences, and
almost every subdiscipline, the tide is turning against self-
interest. The tendency to postulate self-interest in American
social science had hardened after World War II, when many
practitioners aimed at duplicating the kind of logic found in
Newtonian physics, or, failing that, in economics. But in 1977,
Amartya Sen's now classic "Rational Fools" began to undermine
the presumption of self-interest in economics, arguing that
commitment to a principle, which involves counterpreferential
choice, "drives a wedge between personal choice and personal
welfare," although "much of traditional economic theory relies
on the identity of the two." Sen's concept of a "meta-ranking" of
preferences goes beyond "utility" to allow placing commitment
above subjective preference.
In economics, Collard (1978), Schelling (1978), Hirschman
(1985), Frank (1988), Kalt and Zupan (1984), Buchanan (1986),
and others have followed Sen in suggesting that motives other
than self-interest play an important role in human interaction.
Elster (1990) has identified two distinct unselfish motives:
"love" and "duty," variously called "sympathy" and "commit-
ment" (Sen 1977), "empathy" and "morality" (Jencks 1979), and
"affection" and "principle" (Hume 1741). In political science,
Mansbridge (1980), Muir (1982), Maass (1983), and a spate of
recent works (Derthick & Quirk 1985; Kelman 1987; Reich
1988; Vogler & Waldman 1985) have documented many impor-
tant instances in which feelings of love or duty (solidarity with
others or the commitment to a principle) have influenced the
behavior even of elected politicians more than self-interest. In
psychology, as cognitive psychologists have begun to explore
bounded rationality, they have also joined economists in investi-
gating which self-interested behaviors people think unfair, not-
ing that consumers often try to punish firms they see as behaving
unfairly (Kahneman et al. 1986). Political psychologists (e.g.,
Sears 1990) have shown that on many issues political principles
have a greater effect than self-interest on political attitudes and
behavior. Developmental psychologists (e.g., Hoffmann 1987)
have uncovered what looks like primitive empathy in newborns,
who cry when they hear other newborns crying but not when
they hear other equally loud and aversive sounds, and more
advanced empathy in one- and two-year-olds, who spon-
taneously offer help to others they see in distress (Radke-Yarrow
et al. 1983). Even in biology, we now know that social contexts
affect human and animal biological makeup. Menstruation in
one woman causes menstruation in another (McClintock 1981;
1987). Eliminating a higher-ranking vervet monkey in a domi-
nance hierarchy causes a rise in serotonin in the second-ranked
one (McGuire et al. 1982). As evidence mounts that even the
biological self is socially constituted, the very concept of self-
interest becomes more complex. The key question concerns the
contexts in which people are most likely to put the good of others
ahead of their own.
Into this rapidly changing scene in the social sciences come
Caporael et al. with a set of experiments cleverly designed to
elaborate the contexts in which "sociality" has more effect on
behavior than self-interest narrowly conceived. Their work is
central to the development of this new frontier.
In interpreting their experiments, however, the authors ne-
glect the sense of duty stressing only love. Their experiments
actually demonstrate the positive effect on cooperation of both
duty and love. In the experiment described in section 2.7, 20 to
59% of the participants gave to others against their own self-
interest even when the recipients were members of another
group (Table 5). when subjects contribute to a group other than
their own, love (or sympathy, or empathy, or affection) for one's
own group is unlikely to be the cause of the contribution.
Caporael et al. indeed designed this experiment to distinguish
the effects of conscience and sociality. They invite us to con-
clude that those who contributed to the other group acted out of
conscience, or duty.
Even among the 32 to 79 percent who ended up contributing
to their own group, conceptions of duty may well have played a
role. In the 3- to 25-point increment we observe here over
cooperation because of conscience, we might postulate the
workings of "contingent conscience," in which members of a
group act more morally toward members of their own group
than toward others. Operationally, contingent conscience may
not be distinguishable from pure group love, and may form one
of the many motivations encompassed in "sociality" (footnote 2).
Everyday experience with honor among thieves, colleagues, or
members of any in-group certainly teaches us that conscience
may interact with loyalty to an ingroup rather than being ruled
out by it.
Is duty more self-interested than love? Caporael et al. seem to
think so. Unlike Sen, who singles out duty instead of love as
explicitly counterpreferential, the authors describe "con-
science," or duty, as an internal "payoff," and therefore an
"egoistic incentive. ' Sociality, on the other hand, is "totally
unrelated to self-interest" and works "in the absence of egoistic
incentives." The authors also interpret "sociality" in recurrently
cognitive terms, concluding in footnote 2 that it is part of a
"species-typical 'cognitive machinery'." They correctly point
out the tautology of claiming that everything is motivated by
self-interest. But the concept is clouded by their claim that
whatever is responsible for the "own-group" increment in Table
5 is cognitive and not motivated by self-interest, whereas what-
ever is responsible for the "other-group" increment in the same
table is an "egoistic incentive."
Innate selfishness, innate sociality
Susan Oyama
Department of Psychology, John Jay College, City University of New York,
New York, NY 10019
There are several nice features of the explorations reported in
the target article. Overapplied, "untested metatheories" cer-
tainly deserve scrutiny. Egoistic incentive (El) is a kind of black
hole explanation: It sucks everything into its maw, not only
engulfing all objects on the landscape, but transforming the very
landscape itself. El becomes a universal explanation by redefin-
ing all alternatives in its own terms. (Schwartz, 1986, describes
this powerful reductive process in economics, behavior theory,
and evolutionary biology.) It's good to be shown how assidu-
ously social-dilemma researchers have narrowed their subjects'
range of possible responses, and Caporael et al. are ingenious at
devising experimental situations that allow other choices, thus
opening up an overrestricted theoretical framework.
In addition to performing these services, however, I suspect
that the authors are up to something else. Some people, seeing
the dominance of El, have felt the need to combat it, not only
because of the sorts of theoretical concerns voiced in the target
article, but out of a certain dismay over the disappearance of
everyday morality in a flurry of individualistic cost-benefit
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analyses, as sweeping conclusions are drawn by evolutionary
theorists about the nature, or rather, the radical absence, of
genuine moral reasoning (Alexander 1987; Ghiselin 1974). In
addition, rationality itself comes to be defined (even in the
target article) by individual benefit. I have a hunch, developed
by reading between the lines of this article, that an unspoken
reason for these studies is the authors' discomfort with this
explaining away of morality. I share that discomfort, but have
some reservations about the tactic they have chosen to put
things right.
Once biology is accepted as the arbiter of ultimate reality,
those who object to El's totalizing vision have a small, unattrac-
tive array of options. They can tell us to combat our inherent
selfishness, to create virtue out of pure, ungrounded intention.
Or they can contest the biology. Caporael et al. deny that they
are simply countering innate selfishness with innate altruism
(note 2). I see in their efforts, however, a tacit acceptance of the
premise that biologically ratified descriptions of the moral life
have more credibility than descriptions couched in other terms,
as well as an attempt to contest the content of current biological
characterizations. I do not object to their claim that human
motivation involves more reasons than are dreamed of by El
theorists, but I am a bit concerned that their well-intentioned
efforts may lend credence to an assumption that is better
challenged than adopted.
Developments in evolutionary biology are certainly not the
only reasons we have for doubting the prevalence of fellow-
feeling in the world. Both current events and our available
means of comprehending them often seem to point inexorably to
El-style thinking. Failure to "look out for Numero Uno" is even
considered a bit psychologically unhealthy these days. For
complex reasons, we are experiencing an extraordinary poverty
of explanatory means. And, because our notions of intention are
closely linked to our ways of explaining behavior, our store of
possible reasons for acting is correspondingly impoverished.
Belief in sociobiological El, then, springs from well-prepared
ground. But so does the belief that biology defines the set of true
motives. Caporael et al. dispute the first belief but embrace the
second. Though they use the experimental apparatus of the
social sciences rather than of biology, they attack the doctrine of
innate selfishness by giving a different story about naturally
selected characters.
Stories about natural selection require considerable circum-
spection, but they are not illegitimate in themselves. What is
unfortunate is that they are often thought to reveal a profound
underlying truth, one that allows us to glimpse an eternal
genetic reality through the veneer of phenotypic appearance.
Thus, El theorists tell us what is really motivating behavior, no
matter what a person's motives may appear to be. The danger of
this kind of reasoning is that it compels us to use biology to
reclaim the full complexity of our own experience. One gets the
sense from the target article that it is not enough to demonstrate
in-group bias; one must claim an evolved "innate tendency."
This seems more than the usual psychological overgeneraliza-
tion from limited samples; it seems to reflect a tacit belief that
social motives must have natural selection on their side in order
to go up against El.
But is it true that reasons are somehow less than genuine if
they do not appear to have a selective history? Whatever its
other benefits, I would not want Caporael et al.'s work to
reinforce the already widespread assumption that behavior
about which an evolutionary story can be told is in some sense
more morally significant, more fundamental, more real than
behavior about which no such story is told. I would not want
readers to conclude that a motive or act cannot be authentic
unless it is seen to flow from selective advantage. Nor would I
want them to believe that an evolutionary history must eventu-
ate in "innateness," by most of its conventional definitions (that
it be "fixed" or immutable in individuals, for instance, or "fixed"
and universal or invariant in the species). A "bilevel approach,"
insofar as it incorporates these conventional notions of in-
nateness, retains too much traditional conceptual baggage to be
a satisfactory solution to the old innate-learned dispute. Better
to eliminate the opposition of biology to culture and learning
altogether. [See also Plotkin & Odling-Smee: "A Multilevel
Model of Evolution" BBS 4(2) 1981.]
Having found all this between the lines of the target article, I
am obviously risking being massively off base. If I am, I apolo-
gize, but it may be that some of these issues are worth thinking
about even if I have misread Caporael et al. I also hope that my
comments are not taken as a blanket criticism of their work; on
the contrary, I find it interesting, whether or not I am right
about their broader agenda.
A final note: In one of the cover letters from BBS, commenta-
tors are told that the target article will not be further revised,
but that typographical errors will be corrected; in fact, we are
asked to compile a list of such errors. Circling a typo, I thought
about the extra effort it would take to give the article the close
attention required for proofreading, and imagined, with scant
pleasure, typing up a list. How many others would point out the
same errors? Transfixed by my small dilemma, I wondered how
many commentators, having had the same thought about multi-
ple corrections, would be perfunctory in their checking, or
forego it altogether. I was glad that no one was asking me to
estimate the proportion who would be dutiful. It did occur to
me, though, that whatever estimate I made, I would have
imperfect faith in it, and would be inclined to risk being
redundant, as well as inconsistent with expectations and there-
fore irrational, just to make sure that someone did it.
In-group bias is a kind of egoistic incentive
Howard Rachlin
Department of Psychology, State University of New York at Stony Brook
and Russell Sage Foundation, Stony Brook, NY 11794
The target article presents an interesting and provocative series
of experiments designed to demonstrate cooperative behavior
without "egoistic incentives": (Els) and even counter to them.
Such nonegotistical behavior, Caporael et al. argue, is explica-
ble.in terms of an "in-group bias" (IB) which they say may have
originated in the distant past of human biology as the product of
egoistic incentives but which has long ago become a functionally
autonomous motive of individual behavior.
There is nothing wrong in principle with the above position,
but it depends critically on the success of the experiments in
eliminating plausible egoistic incentives. In its normal function-
ing, in-group bias is conceived as a bias on top of egoistic
incentives. Therefore, the burden of proof falls heavily on the
authors. If their results could be explained plausibly in terms of
egoistic incentives alone, the concept of in-group bias would be
superfluous.
I will argue that egoistic incentives can plausibly explain the
results of the experiments described in the target article and,
moreover, that Caporael et al.'s concept of in-group bias (as an
inherited cognitive mechanism separate from egoistic incen-
tives) cannot plausibly explain the results.
These experiments pose two critical questions for an El
theory: (a) Why do any subjects cooperate in the standard
procedure, given that the Els "greed" and "fear" create a bias
toward noncooperation? (b) Why does prior discussion among
the members of a group increase the number of cooperators?
Caporael et al. correctly state that "these laboratory games are
not simulations of naturally occurring social dilemmas; they are
social dilemmas" (sect. 2, para. 1). But this fact is lost in the
analysis of the experiments. The authors claim to have elimi-
nated "reputational concerns," defined in terms of El, by
keeping each player's choices a secret from the others. No
player's choices, however, were secret from the experimenters.
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Even if they were, it is far from clear that the subjects would
believe they were. In any psychological experiment part of the
subjects' "dilemma" is behaving correctly in the eyes of the
experimenter. Thus "reputational concerns" were not elimi-
nated as egoistic incentives in these experiments.
It might be argued that reputational concerns would not be
sufficient to overcome the strong incentives (greed and fear) to
defect. Table 2, however, provides some evidence that the
incentives to defect (whatever they are called) were less strong
for those who cooperated than for those who defected. There are
large and apparently significant differences between the esti-
mates of contributors (cooperators) versus noncontributors (de-
fectors) in the standard dilemma condition. Contributors esti-
mated the chance of their contribution being futile as .24 (versus
.55 for noncontributors) whereas noncontributors estimated the
chance of their contribution being redundant as .26 (versus .46
for contributors). These estimates can be used to calculate the
expected value of contributing and noncontributing separately
for the subjects who actually contributed and for those who did
not contribute. The ratio of the expected values of contributing
and noncontributing is (about) .75 for the contributors and .67
for the noncontributors. Regardless of whether these subjective
estimates are causal factors or post hoc rationalizations, they
indicate that the bias due to the (quite justifiable) fear of
appearing selfish in the eyes of the experimenters was less
difficult to overcome for some subjects than for others. Indi-
vidual subjects' choices and estimates were consistent with each
other (as "revealed-preference theory' would predict). Ca-
porael et al. may claim that such consistency of choice and
estimate is just as predictable from individual differences in in-
group bias as from individual differences in reputational con-
cern. As indicated above, however, to be successful, their
explanation of their own experiments must not just be as good as
an El explanation, it must be better.
El also has a simple explanation for why prior discussion
increases the number of contributors in these experiments. The
essential ingredient of discussion, regardless of how the contrib-
utors are chosen, is that some members of the group actually
agree to contribute and explicitly or implicitly promise the
others that they will contribute. It is true that if one considers
egoistic incentives alone (ignoring reputational concerns), there
is no reason for a person making such a promise to stick to it.
This, however, disregards the effect of the promise on those who
hear it. El theory is an objective theory of behavior. There is
nothing in El theory that says the subjects must themselves
subscribe to it regarding their estimations of other subjects'
behavior. Each member who promises to contribute will lower
the estimates of others that their own contributions will be
futile. And, conversely, each member who does not promise to
contribute will lower the others' estimates that their own contri-
butions will be redundant. These are perfectly reasonable judg-
ments based on past experience with other people's promises.
Both raise the ratio of the expected value of contributing to that
of not contributing, hence increasing the probability of
contributing.
A test of the above speculation is whether discussion without
promises made and understood has any effect on cooperation.
According to Caporael et al.'s theory, it is discussion itself, not
specific promises, that ought to create IB, and hence coopera-
tion. In an experiment (Dawes et al. 1977) described at the end
of the target article, it was found that "discussion of an irrelevant
topic . . . [no promises] led subjects to contribute . . . at the
same level as no discussion, and rates of contributing in these
conditions were significantly lower than when subjects dis-
cussed their social dilemma [i.e., made and understood prom-
ises] (sect. 4, para. 4). Thus, in Caporael et al.'s experiments, it
was not discussion alone but discussion relevant to the problem
that increased cooperation. The authors do not speculate about
what exactly makes a discussion relevant; it is not unreasonable
to assume that the critical factor was the agreement on who
would or would not contribute rather than the activation of a
"limited-access program" or a bringing into consciousness of
some "cognitively unconscious " mechanism.
This is not to say that in-group bias is unreal. These experi-
ments do show that perceived group membership strongly
biases individual decisions. But it is plausible that the bias group
membership creates derives from individual egoistic incentives
and is not a functionally autonomous motive to be set alongside
them.
Egoistic incentive: A hypothesis or an
ideological tenet?
Anatol Rapoport
University College, University of Toronto, Toronto, Ontario,
Canada M5S 1A1
By marshalling experimental evidence, Caporael et al. attempt
to refute the universal claim inherent in the egoistic incentives
(El) hypothesis: the assumption that apparently altruistic be-
haviour patterns can always be explained in terms of selfish
motives. It seems, however, in the light of the authors' own
observations, that this is a futile task. The proponents of El are
always ready to retreat to previously prepared positions by
extending the concept of "selfishness" to include any demon-
strable source of motivation not previously subsumed under the
concept. It seems advisable, therefore, to concede the El
dogma once and for all, thus rendering the hypothesis unfalsifia-
ble and, therefore, theoretically sterile. Then one can go about
the business of examining the rich variety of sources of human
motivation governing choices where the outcomes of those
choices result in the distribution of costs and benefits to self and
others.
From this point of view, the experimental findings reported
in the target article are solid contributions to social psychology.
The implied aim of refuting the universality of El, however, is
either a futile exercise (because of this unfalsifiability) or break-
ing through an open door, if El is expressed, say, in the
sociobiologists' explanation of moral systems: Give only to kin,
or in expectation of reciprocity, or to avoid sanctions, or to
project a profitable image.
There is another way of looking at the challenge to the El
hypothesis, however, namely, to focus on its ideological im-
plications. Arguments about human nature are clearly rooted in
ideological commitments. One important ideological rift is be-
tween those who derive satisfaction from winning in competi-
tion or combat and those who derive satisfaction from cooper-
ative and nurturing relations; between those who strive to
dominate others and those who tend to identify with others.
Awareness of an incompatibility between commitment to power
and commitment to love is reflected in myths, as in the tragedy
of King Midas or in the fate of Alberich, who forswore love to
acquire power. And it is reflected in the incompatability of
power-oriented and integration-oriented global politics.
Throughout history, preoccupation with power or power
struggles, being the preoccupation of the powerful, the vo-
ciferous, and the energetic, has dominated conceptions of
human nature and of society. The Hobbesian war of everyone
against everyone is the crassest example of this conception.
Classical economics, appearing on the intellectual horizon at the
dawn of the industrial revolution, chose a nonlethal version of
the Hobbesian world as the framework in which processes that
uniquely characterize the human species - production and
exchange - take place. The same framework underlies the
market model of national politics, where the epitome of democ-
racy is depicted as the maintenance of a steady state resulting
from competitive activities of interest groups. It underlies the
realist conception of international relations, where peace is
identified with the preservation of the status quo through
balance of power.
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All these models of society are expressed predominantly in
the descriptive mode. In the context of social philosophy,
however, the descriptive mode often merges with the nor-
mative. It is easy to pass from describing things as they are to
concluding that this is the way they ought to be. Witness the
ease with which Adam Smith passes from describing self-in-
terest as the prime mover of economic activity to justifying it.
It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, and the
baker that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own
interest. We address ourselves not to their humanity but to their self-
love and never talk to them of our own necessities but of their
advantages. Nobody but a beggar chooses to depend chiefly on the
benevolence of his fellow citizens (Smith 1776/1910, vol. 1, p. 13)
At times, this defense is implicit in resorting to a euphemism.
Buchanan and Tullock (1962) replace "egoism" by "meth-
odological individualism." Wicksteed (1933) replaces it by "non-
tuism."
The close relationship between cognitive and ethical evalua-
tions in the social sphere points to the importance of coupling
challenges to existing social, political, and economic systems
with critiques of the images of society and of human nature that
provide rationalizations of these systems. From this point of
view, evidence of "sociality" as an important component of
human motivation deserves serious attention, and the concept
itself deserves further theoretical development in the light of
rigorous experimental procedures.
Evidence of something that could be called "sociality" was
obtained in single plays of the prisoner's dilemma with unknown
coplayers by Terhune (1968), Pancer (1973), Hofstadter (1985),
and Rapoport (1988). In some cases, cooperative choices were
observed in up to 50% of the subjects. In these situations
reciprocity, kinship, sanctions, and image projection can clearly
be ruled out as contributing factors. The cooperative choice in
single play prisoner's dilemma has at times been attributed to
the salience of the cooperative outcome, which is not only
Pareto-optimal but also symmetric. This factor was in effect
excluded in Rapoport's (1988) experiments, where the pris-
oner's dilemma was presented in camouflaged form without
displaying the payoff matrix. Moreover, a significant increase in
cooperative choices was observed when the nature of the dilem-
ma was explained in the instructions, that is, when the domi-
nance of the defecting choice was made at least as salient as the
Pareto-optimality of the cooperative choice.
Sociality can be introspectively recognized as the identifica-
tion of self with others. In view of our biological heritage as
mammals and social animals, it is not unreasonable to attribute
this extension of the "self' to "empathy," the acute discomfort
we often feel when witnessing the suffering of another. In view
of the distinctive human "inheritance" mechanism, whereby
transmission of culturally shaped modes of cognition and evalua-
tion has overshadowed genetic transmission, it is not surprising
that empathy is often readily extended to nonkin and even to
nonhumans. On the same grounds, it is not unreasonable to
assume that sociality is a component of prime importance in the
system of human motivations.
Too important to be left to rational choice
Richard A. Shweder
Committee on Human Development, University of Chicago, Chicago, IL
60637
Electronic mall: rshd@tank.uchicago.edu
Although I am confident that Caporael et al. are on the side of
the angels in their reluctance to glorify selfishness (see Etzioni
1988 for a recent treatment of the topic), I do worry a bit that a
consideration of the useful distinction between motivation and
(rational) justification may diminish the force of their critique of
egoistic incentive (El) theories.
This is what I have in mind. Larmore (1987, p. 136) discusses a
doctrine known as "indirect consequentialism," which holds
that "whereas actions must be justified consequentially [in
terms of the goods or outcomes or ends they promote], they may
have to be motivated by nonconsequentialist considerations"
[e.g., doing what seems intrinsically right - fulfilling one's duty,
helping a friend, keeping a promise, devotion to God].
In this commentary my interest is less in the distinction
between consequentialist (teleological) versus nonconsequen-
tialist (deontological) ethics, and more in the distinction be-
tween studying the motivations for actions versus studying the
(rational) justifications for actions, and in the particular pattern
of indirection described by Larmore (1987).
The lesson I take away from the doctrine of "indirect conse-
quentialism" is that "setting A over B" may be "a better way of
pursuing B than setting B first"; which is one way of saying that
some things may be just too important to be left to rational
choice. That lesson may apply to the prisoner's dilemma, which
seems to be a paradigm case where rational self-interest is best
served by not being motivated by it.
In the target article, Caporael et al. are concerned with the
"cognitive machinery," the "mental structures and processes,"
the "underlying psychological factors" that motivate behavior.
They argue that people behave cooperatively and promote
group welfare even in the absence of the incentives that might
stimulate and encourage egoistic motivations.
The main theme of the essay is in effect what the "Book of
Job," a rather ancient document, is all about. The devil said to
God, "Job loves you for your money. The only reason he is so
virtuous is that you reward him for it, with wealth and pros-
perity." So God put Job to the test. He withdrew his favor and
brought havoc on Job's life and family. And Job remained
devout, for a very long time, even without egoistic incentives.
In the end, God never gave Job a good consequentialist reason
to motivate his righteousness, and Job never asked for one. I
suppose we should leave it to the devil to suggest that virtue
shouldn't pay.
I do not want to get into the details of Caporael et al.'s
demonstration experiments, or quibble over the cogency of
their argument that no conceivable egoistic motive (long-term
or short-term) could explain their results. The genre of the
target article - a narrow, contrived, artificially controlled ex-
periment and a sweeping evolutionary speculation trying to be
comfortable in each other's presence - may draw attention, but
I can live with contrivance and speculation. I'll leave it to others
to complain. Still, one might ask, in passing, was the experimen-
tal demonstration really necessary? After all, everyday life
provides us with numerous examples of action motivated by a
love of the virtues without regard for other, more "extrinsic"
rewards; and, as we have known for a long time, many, perhaps
most, people elect to cooperate in a single go at the prisoner's
dilemma.
Of course, I know there will always be theoretical purists
about, but they are incorrigible. And need we really be troubled
if some incorrigible hedonist wants to argue that it is merely an
egoistic or selfish motive to want to maximize feelings of decen-
cy, dignity, and personal sanctity, or to care about promoting
the real interests of others, or to keep faith with the idea of
community? So much the better for egoism, if it turns out that
self-respect is in your self-interest (see Shweder & Much 1987
and Shweder et al. 1988 for a discussion of that tenet in Hindu
ethics).
The real difficulty for Caporael et al. 's argument, as I see it, is
that the denial of in-group identification or of social (or moral)
motivations is not really entailed by any "sensible" El theory.
That is because "sensible" El theories, qua El theorists, are not
concerned with what motivates individual action; they are
concerned with the constraints (including the payoff matrix) that
actions must satisfy, if those actions are to be justified as rational.
And they assume that with competition and feedback there will
be a premium on the evolution of some set of motives for action
whose outcomes will satisfy those constraints.
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That is why so many El economists eschew any interest
whatsoever in the motivations of individual behavior. For them
a payoff matrix is a description of the constraints that actions
must satisfy if they are to be justified as rational, and it is enough
if people act "as if they were rational, so that, in the aggregate
or in the long-run, their real interests get served. Whether they
act out of a sense of duty, or to maximize self-interest, or to feel
righteous by asserting through action some fundamental value,
or merely to please high status members of their ingroup is,
from the justificatory perspective, beside the point.
So my basic worry is that to say that people make rational self-
interested decisions is ambiguous between at least two senses:
(1) (the position Caporael et al. properly reject) that all moti-
vation is self-interested (and not other-regarding); and (2) (the
position "sensible" El theorists should endorse) that, whatever
the motive, our decisions will, in effect, serve our real interests
(even as they serve other interests as well).
In other words, to justify (or explain) conduct by saying that
so-and-so does the rational self-interested thing in doing this or
that is not the same thing as saying that this or that is done for
self-interested motives. Being motivated to set A [others, com-
munity, virtue, God] over B [self] may be "a better way of
pursuing B than setting B first."
It is noteworthy that Caporael et al. conclude by honoring
Adam Smith's notion of sympathy or "fellow-feeling" (Smith
described it as "changing places in fancy," 1969/1759, p. 202).
Whether or not Adam Smith would qualify as an indirect
eonsequentialist is perhaps a debatable issue, but in his "Theory
of moral sentiments" (1969/1759, pp. 238-39), there is a discus-
sion of "the governing principles of human nature" that is
congenial to the doctrine. For Adam Smith it is the essence of
the "moral faculty" (i.e., "conscience") to determine which of
our preferences are preference-worthy, for, as Adam Smith
knew very well, it is not rational to maximize your preferences
unless they are "graceful and worthy" ("fit," "right," "proper to
be done"; see Rescher 1989 for an important discussion of
rationality that develops that point).
For Adam Smith, the justification for the moral faculty (what
gets defined as fit, right, and proper) derives not from individual
preferences but rather from a superior intelligence (a deity or
sovereign who can "direct the conduct of his subjects" with an
eye to the collective good). Yet Adam Smith recognized that the
motive for conduct is far more immediate. For the "laws of the
deity [are] promulgated by those vicegerents which he has set
up within us" and they are "attended to with the sanction of
reward and punishment," by which Adam Smith meant, quite
explicitly, the reward of self-respect and mental contentment
and the "torment of inward shame, and self-condemnation."
One might well ask: If you have Adam Smith, who needs
Freud? Instead I ask: If you have Adam Smith, who needs to
oppose moral motivations to El justifications?
The fallacy of selfish selflessness
Edmund J. S. Sonuga-Barke
Department of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, Institute of Psychiatry,
University of London, London SE5, England
When social scientists phrase theory in terms borrowed from
"ordinary" language they often create conceptual muddle. This
is especially so when these terms are judgmental. An example of
such a muddle is the idea that the rule of conscience, even when
it promotes moral acts, is the most subtle form of human
selfishness. El theorists regard actions determined in this way
as "selfish" when they can be traced back to some inconspicuous
internal "psychological" reward. It is as though the tricks of
those saints canonized for lifelong selflessness have at last been
exposed.
Having accepted this argument, and ruled out the role of
other social and material incentives for cooperation, Caporael et
al. feel that the failure of El theories of choice in social dilemmas
is demonstrated by a bias toward "own-group" giving, which
they argue cannot be traced back to the effects of the "psycho-
logical" rewards associated with a "clear conscience."
But the authors have mistaken a conceptual problem for an
empirical one. The error that is actually made by El theorists is
more fundamental than the present authors realize. Caporael et
al. charge El theorists with making an incorrect statement about
human nature, the falseness of which is demonstrated by the
series of game-theoretic experiments described here, although
their real error is to believe that the theory allows them to make
any sensible and helpful statements at all about human nature.
This error is nicely demonstrated by the way conscience is
conceptualized by some El theorists. The term "conscience,"
used in this way, acts only as a figure of speech for those
psychological mechanisms that organize the internal rewards
that regulate interpersonal behavior. So the question for these
El theorists is not "Does conscience play a role in regulating
social action (by definition it must)? but "How does it operate?"
Given this, it is clear that El theorists might reinterpret Ca-
porael et al.'s final experiment as showing that the internal
rewards associated with a "clear conscience" are organized on a
more specific level (that of the "ingroup") than the present
authors had at first imagined. Caporael et al. had argued that the
actions of conscience should not disciminate between "own"
and "other" group.
Indeed, implicit in the alternative sociality hypothesis pre-
sented by Caporael et al. is a recognition of the conceptual hole
they have dug for themselves. Having argued that the "psycho-
logical payoffs" associated with acts of conscience could not
explain "in-group" biases, they propose that "cog-
nitive/affective" mechanisms which have evolved in "small face-
to-face groups" form the basis for these biases. Clearly the term
"cognitive/affective" mechanisms is just another figure of
speech for what some El theorists, and the present authors, had
previously meant when they talked of conscience.
At this point, it will be helpful to compare the way the authors
use the concept of El in the theories they discussed with
Rachlin's use of rationality in his Behavioral Economics [see also
Rachlin et al.: "Maximization Theory in Behavioral Psychology"
BBS 4(3) 1981.] At first glance, the two concepts appear to
behave in a very similar way. For Rachlin (1980) "rationality"
performs the function of an abstract working assumption rather
than a hypothesis about the nature of human motivations. It
provides the axiomatic basis from which falsifiable predictions
are derived about the function maximized by particular behav-
iors. All behavior is by defiition "rational"; the aim of behavioral
economics is to discover the maximand. This approach can
provide an alternative way of looking at certain common psycho-
pathological phenomena. For example, Sonuga-Barke (1989),
has suggested that the core components of childhood hyperac-
tivity (impulsiveness, inattention, and overactivity) can each be
regarded as maximizing experienced levels of reward immedia-
cy-
Similarly, the way El theory uses the term "conscience" as a
"catchall" to explain prosocial action highlights the unfalsifiable
nature of El theory. Like statements about rationality in
Rachlin's theory, statements about human selfishness originat-
ing from El theory are tautologous. The difference between the
two approaches is that whereas Rachlin adopts the assumption of
rationality to sidestep what many feel are uninteresting and
perhaps even unanswerable questions about human nature (cf.
Lea et al. 1987, Ch. 5), El theorists make the mistake of thinking
that they can answer these questions and hence make judg-
ments about human nature's essentially selfish quality.
This clearly cannot be done. Given the unfalsifiable nature of
these statements - thus, the logical impossibility of describing
an unselfish action in terms of El theory (its polar term) - we can
see that the concept of selfishness is empty and redundant. In
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fact, given all this, for El theorists to say that all actions are
selfish gives us no more information than to say all actions are
actions and each has some cause. El theory, as usually present-
ed, cannot, by its very nature, make sensible judgments about
the essential quality of human nature. The mistake of Caporael
et al. is to imagine that it could.
So on what level do statements about "selfishness" make
sense? Correct use of language in scientific discourse depends
on a recognition of its meaning in ordinary language. For
example, one meaningful use of the term rests on the idea that a
selfish act is the product of calculations motivated by desire for
personal gain. With this usage it is clearly possible to conceive of
both selfish and unselfish acts. Of course, it is still possible that
the apparently selfless saint is driven by such motivations, but at
least it is not necessarily so.
Demonstrating unselfishness: They haven't
done it yet
Stephen C. Stearns
Zoology Institute, University of Basel, CH-4051 Basel, Switzerland
The issue is important, the experiments are interesting, the
results suggest optimism, but this research program is not yet
strong enough to bear the weight of the claims the authors make.
Caporael et al. have not shown that most people do not behave
selfishly most of the time. They have shown that some people
make small sacrifices to benefit group interest in a context that
all involved clearly recognize as a "test situation." Whether that
behavior will translate into larger sacrifices in larger groups is an
unanswered question.
What is the maximum size of the group in which such effects
occur, and how does the size of the sacrifice an individual is
willing to make vary with the size of the group whose interests
are at stake? Even if the effects are real and general across
cultures for groups of 10 to 20 people, that does us little good if
they dwindle or disappear in groups of hundreds of millions or
billions of people.
War is, after all, possible only among groups that include
some members who are willing to sacrifice themselves for the
general welfare, but the same psychology that permits that
sacrifice also identifies the opposing groups as the enemy. The
tragedy of the commons might be avoided in a small group in
which each member could be motivated on irrational grounds to
undertake sacrifices for the good of the whole, but if the
maximum size of the groups in which such sacrifices can be
expected is much smaller than the population of the planet, then
several large groups may simply organize themselves all the
more efficiently in competing for the remaining resources. That
is precisely the effect that one hopes to avoid.
Table 5 suggests that in-group, out-group effects are quite
real. Does it do the cause of peace or the environment much
good if an inevitable consequence of belonging to one group is
being antagonistic to another such group? That just shifts the
problem of selfishness to another scale or organization; it proba-
bly makes it worse.
Even if people can be convinced that they belong to a group
defined as the population of the whole planet, whose interests
they share and should promote, the question remains: How
large an individual sacrifice will be made, on average, to pro-
mote those interests? Is the maximum likely sacrifice too small
to be effective? Is peace or a healthy environment worth world-
wide economic stagnation? Many would regard that as too high a
price to pay for either. Even if a few large groups (nations) were
willing to pay the price, history shows that a minority of defec-
tors can destroy the whole system and engage the altruists in
acts of self-protection whose byproducts are every bit as de-
structive as selfishness would have been in the first place. The
lessons of history do not, in general, leave much room for
optimism, and history itself can be regarded as a long series of
psychological tests with much larger sample sizes and payoffs
than those described here.
Defining the limits of selfishness and understanding just how
much people are willing to do without is doubtless important.
Much more important, however, is knowing how to educate
people to understand what is in their long-term self-interest.
Short-sighted altruism is almost certainly worse than long-
sighted selfishness in terms of its practical impact on the en-
vironment and on the quality of life of the average citizen of the
planet. The limits of our motivation are not so critical as the
limits of our comprehension. Once the problems are under-
stood, several different motivational systems could lead to
solutions acceptable to all - even if one of the motivational
systems is selfish and one of the groups that must accept the
solution is altruistic.
Can we afford not to believe that man is
selfish?
Nils Chr. Stenseth
Department of Biology, Division of Zoology, University of Oslo, Blindern
N-O316, Oslo 3, Norway
Caporael et al. claim that man, Homo sapiens, is basically a
cooperative creature - not a selfish creature as sociobiologists
often suggest (e.g., Dawkins 1976). Caporael et al.'s claim may
or may not be right.
I am by no means convinced that such a broad conclusion can
be reached on the basis of the experiments they discuss. Neither
am I convinced that we, on the basis of the material they
present, need to ask for a "serious reexamination of the 'selfish
human nature' assumptions" (sect. 4, para. 7) that they claim
dominates the human sciences.
Space does not allow me to discuss fully the validity of the
conclusions drawn by Caporael et al.
Whether or not humans are selfish, however, is an interesting
problem, both to biologists and to human scientists, partly
because the answers may help us understand the way we go
about organizing society: Do we need egoistic incentives and
constraints (enforced by, for instance, laws and traditions) to
cooperate and not jeopardize mankind's future existence? Do
we really need restrictions regulating individuals' behavior to
make them cooperate and not destroy the future existence of our
own species and not overexploit the common resources such as
fish and wildlife, clean air, and clean water?
We need to ask what are the consequences of viewing Homo
sapiens as a cooperative creature, should he really be egoistic.
Unfortunately, these consequences may be rather disastrous.
(Viewing humans as egoistic should they really prove to be
cooperative by nature has no similar disastrous consequences.)
Currently, there is a tremendous overexploitation of our
common resources (e.g., World Commission on Environment
and Development 1987). Such natural resources as fisheries,
much of the African savannas, tropical rain forests in South
America, and so forth, as well as such common resources as
clean air, clean water, and so forth, are currently being de-
stroyed - they may not be available for future generations. It
seems clear that these resources are being destroyed because of
man's inability to cooperate to preserve/conserve his resources.
Hardin's (1968) discussion of "The Tragedy of the Common" is a
case in point.
With this background we may ask: Can we, under the current
circumstances of resource destruction, take the risk of er-
roneously assuming man to be cooperative by nature and there-
by take the risk of not imposing as many restrictions on indi-
viduals' behavior as we otherwise would do? In society at large
and to policymakers in particular, taking such risks might seem
rather rewarding on a short time scale (they might get voters'
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support), but it could well turn out to be ruinous in the long run:
It might bring us to the tragedy of the commons faster than ever
by overexploiting fisheries, and so forth, and by polluting the air
and the water. It is more important than ever not to make
erroneous decisions on these issues. Whether it is natural for
human beings or not, we must start cooperating more than we
have until now. The view held by Caporael et al. makes us less
willing (or likely) to provide the appropriate measures needed
for cooperation to result if we are in fact selfish creatures.
The message conveyed by these authors could indeed be
rather damaging if people take it seriously. Because their em-
pirical basis for claiming that man is cooperative - not selfish - is
rather meager, this is rather unfortunate: Indeed, it may prove
disastrous.
As scientists we should, of course, have an open view about
how the world functions. We should indeed be careful not to let
our political views influence the way we think nature is struc-
tured. That is, we should not let our political attempts to protect
the resources surrounding us influence our scientific conclu-
sions about basic human nature. As citizens of this earth,
however, we should also be aware that our theories are being
used - consciously or not - as a basis for formulating policies.
Because we do not know the true nature of humans, we would
minimize the likelihood of error by assuming that we exploit
nature in an egoistic manner. I wish Caporael et al. had been
clearer on this point.
Time is running short. We cannot afford to believe that man is
basically unselfish if he really is selfish.
Counting contributions
Karl Halvor Teigen
Department of Cognitive Psychology, University of Bergen, Bergen,
Norway
In studies of human behavior, the answers offered depend
heavily on the questions raised. Which behaviors call for an
explanation? According to Caporael et al., there is a bias in
contemporary psychology toward regarding cooperative behav-
ior as a deviant phenomenon to be explained, whereas self-
ishness seems to be accepted as the normal state of affairs,
making the egoistic incentive (El) theory an explanation by
default. It is easy to agree with the authors that the primacy of
the individual versus the group is a matter of metatheoretical
assumptions, but one may well ask whether paradigmatic con-
flicts at this level can ever be settled by appealing to experimen-
tal results. The route taken by Caporael et al. is to demonstrate a
class of phenomena that El models are presumably unable to
explain. It would perhaps be even more fascinating to start from
the opposite assumption, namely, that people are basically
social beings (not a very revolutionary assumption, after all),
making cooperative behavior the norm rather than the excep-
tion. The burden of proof would then rest with the researcher
who wanted to demonstrate instances of behavior that were
purely individualistically motivated - which might well turn out
to be an equally difficult task. Perhaps the most parsimonious
model would be one that assumed human actions to be invari-
ably determined by in-group considerations, but with wide
margins for what could constitute an in-group, including
"groups" with N = 1 as the limiting case. (Even then, the single
"group member" whose welfare the actor is trying to maximize
will not necessarily be the actor himself.) From this point of
view, the important research questions will concern the possi-
ble determinants of in-group composition and size. It may not
always be fruitful to draw a sharp line between individualistic
and collective motives, not even for didactic purposes. Caporael
et al.'s treatment of conscience is a case in point: There are
obviously El theories of conscience (e.g., the Freudian one).
But the concept of conscience is not exclusively a matter of
internal punishments and rewards. To do something according
to one's conscience may well be to do it according to one's social
nature, not out of selfish fears or feelings of guilt and remorse.
Perhaps there is a need for a more inclusive analysis of what the
concept of conscience could entail before it is dismissed as
another subtle version of the El doctrine.
So when does cooperative behavior fail to appear? My best
guess, based on Caporael et al.'s data, is that this will occur
when people have no identifiable target for their contribution,
or when their contribution appears to be futile. The authors
make a point of showing that a number of subjects (Ss) behave
"inconsistently" with their beliefs, especially in being willing to
contribute for the common good even if their contribution is not
"critical." But it should be noted that Ss are never directly asked
whether they believe their contributions are redundant or are
serving a purpose. They are just asked how many of the other
participants they think will make a contribution. This way of
putting the question may be ill-suited to assess the importance
that Ss attach to their own actions. Judgments of responsibility
and causality are known to be influenced by which actor one is
focussing on. Moreover, probability judgments, like those used
in the present study, can be given several interpretations. Even
if one thinks there is more than a 50% chance that a sufficient
number of other participants will be paying, one's extra pay-
ment can be perceived as necessary for arriving at the "safe
side." Actually, Ss may think that because anyone's contribution
is equally important, it follows that each one's contribution
really matters. As shown with verbal probability estimates,
equal likelihoods tend to be interpreted as great likelihoods
(even when the number of equiprobable alternatives ranges
from 4 to 8), especially for the individual or the outcome that
happens to be in focus (Teigen 1988). Without such collective
illusions, very few people might have bothered to contribute
their votes on election day. Although they have give their Ss a
fair chance of showing their willingness to cooperate, Caporael
et al. have given them less of an opportunity to express the
importance they attach to it.
The selfishness-altruism debate: In defense
of agnosticism
Philip E. Tetlock
Institute of Personality Assessment and Research, University of California,
Berkeley, CA 94720
Caporael et al. launch a frontal assault on egoistic incentive
theory - a loose intellectual alliance of reinforcement theorists,
economists, sociobiologists, and political philosophers who
share a belief in the basic selfishness of human nature. Caporael
et al. claim that egoistic incentive theory rests on flawed evolu-
tionary premises and is hard pressed to explain potentially
disconfirmatory evidence without resorting to "just-so" stories.
The assault is partially successful - a substantial achievement,
given the well-entrenched historical status of the foe.
The proper theoretical response to the biological critique is to
concede that it is indeed possible to weave a number of plausible
evolutionary scenarios around our emergence as a species.
Caporael et al. may well be right that the small face-to-face
group (15 to 30 individuals) was more likely to have been the
primary locus of natural selection pressures than the solitary
individual. They may also be right that affective and cognitive
mechanisms supportive of group living are genetically linked
attributes that were highly conducive to the survival of early
hominids wandering the savanna plains of Africa. Empathy, a
predisposition to share, and punitiveness toward cheaters are
likely natural consequences of this group life-style. But they are
not the only possible consequences. It was probably no more
"adaptive for ancestral humans to identify automatically with an
in-group and to accept its goals as their own" (sect. 4, para. 6)
than it is now for modern humans. Fanatics - those most eager
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to leap to the defense of the group against predators or to lead
the attack against rival groups - often have life expectancies too
short to pass their DNA-encoded commitments onto the next
generation. I suspect that there is an Aristotelian golden mean
lurking here: Nature has probably smiled especially kindly on
those who recognize that their long-term self-interest hinges on
the viability of their group, but who also recognize that serious
conflicts can arise between individual and collective interests
and who appreciate the importance of knowing when to "defect"
and how to do so without incurring the wrath of the collectivity.
In short, human nature is complex and embodies many, often
conflicting motives; evolutionary arguments are necessarily
speculative; and agnosticism on the "selfishness" question prob-
ably remains the most prudent position.
Caporael et al. not only question the evolutionary hard core of
the selfishness research program, they also raise an intriguing
empirical challenge. In a fascinating series of public-goods
experiments, they claim to have falsified the hypothesis that
people will not contribute to group welfare in the absence of
egoistic incentives to do so. Subjects in these experiments were
strangers who made a single decision under conditions of ano-
nymity and in the absence of interaction either before or after
the experimental session. The basic design renders implausible
many of the classic egoistic incentives (e.g., reciprocity, coer-
cion) but not all of them. As the authors are well aware,
advocates of egoistic incentive theory have numerous potential
lines of theoretical defense. In various experiments, substantial
percentages of subjects may have cooperated out of a desire to
avoid guilt, to bolster their self-esteem, to help their team win,
or just to put themselves in a good mood. Indeed, there is
independent evidence that each of these motives promotes
prosocial behavior (Krebs & Miller 1985). There are also poten-
tial methodological defenses. For example, subjects may not
have believed the assurances of anonymity (why would the
experimenter bother to conduct a study in which it is impossible
to monitor what I've done?)
The key question is, of course, whether the results reported,
taken as a whole, force egoistic incentive theory to invoke such
an array of ad hoc hypotheses that, far from providing a par-
simonious integrative framework, the theory begins to look like
a rather tattered patchwork quilt. My view is that egoistic
incentive theory is indeed worse for the wear but can still be
rescued with a measure of dignity by forging new intellectual
alliances - in particular, with social identity and role theorists
who assume that people strive to create the most favorable
identities for themselves within the constraints of social situa-
tions (cf., Hogan 1982; Schlenker 1982). Homo econotnicus must
meet Homo sociologicus at least halfway. People are trying (not
always successfully) to maximize socially defined or constructed
utility functions. From this standpoint, independent variables
can shape the willingness to contribute to public goods in two
basic ways: (1) by affecting the identity implications of response
options (people do not want to appear selfish or foolish but do
want to appear loyal to the group, trustworthy, and generous);
(2) by affecting the importance of different identity objectives or
of different audiences (self vs. other, in-groups vs. out-group).
Manipulations such as anonymity, no-free-ride, opportunity for
group discussion, the minimum number of contributors, and
group membership status of potential beneficiaries must influ-
ence willingness to contribute through one or the other of these
mediational processes - a sweeping hypothesis that can only be
tested by painstakingly measuring the self and social identity
implications that participants and observers feel it is reasonable
to draw from different response options in the original experi-
mental situations (for examples, see the "interpersonal simula-
tions" by Alexander & Knight 1971; Tetlock 1980).
In closing, it is reasonable to ask whether the proposed
intellectual merger would negate most of what was provocative
and interesting about the original versions of egoistic incentive
theory. It is one thing to claim, pace Hobbes, that people are
selfish to the core and will cooperate only under threat of
centralized coercion; it is quite another to claim, pace Goffman,
that people are so thoroughly socialized that they will readily
make monetary sacrifices to avoid appearing to be the "wrong"
type of person, either in their own eyes or the eyes of others. We
can choose to call these two positions variants of egoistic incen-
tive theory, but they are really very different. From a meta-
theoretical point of view, the key question concerns where we
should draw boundaries around the powerful organizing meta-
phors - homo economicus, the actor, the scientist, the gene-
maximizer - that still give intellectual impetus and direction to
so much work in the behavioral and social sciences. As I have
argued from the controversies over the merits of cognitive
versus motivational explanations of social judgment (Tetlock &
Levi 1982) and intrapsychic versus impression management
explanations of interpersonal behavior (Tetlock & Manstead
1985), there is no nonarbitrary way to demarcate the explanato-
ry range of research programs organized around competing
metaphors. It is hard to tell the difference between a social-
identity-theory variant of the egoistic incentive research pro-
gram and the evolutionary-bases-of-group-altruism argument
advanced by Caporael et al. In the end there will probably be no
dramatic crucial experiment. The two positions may just gradu-
ally blur into each other. This theoretical convergence should,
moreover, be taken as an encouraging sign that, notwithstand-
ing the claims of the radical subjectivists, research programs
anchored in starkly different first premises can be responsive to
a common body of evidence.
Evolutionary psychologists need to
distinguish between the evolutionary
process, ancestral selection pressures, and
psychological mechanisms
John Tooby and Leda Cosmides
Department of Psychology, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305
Electronic mail: ledaCdpsych.stanford.edu
Although many of the experiments reviewed by Caporael et al.
are interesting, and we are sympathetic to some of the intuitions
that motivate the target article (e.g., that "selfishness" and "self-
interest" as phrases can sometimes be misleading as charac-
terizations of human psychological mechanisms), the authors'
misconstrual of much of modern evolutionary theory makes
their interpretation of their own work problematic. In particu-
lar, their categorization of modern evolutionary theory as an
"egoistic incentive" (El) theory misconstrues claims about the
evolutionary process itself as claims about the psychological
mechanisms that are the shaped product of the evolutionary
process. Because Caporael et al. are not alone in this confusion,
but rather hold misconceptions that persist both within and
outside of the evolutionary community, it is worth dwelling on
exactly where arguments about whether humans are "basically
selfish" or (the authors' alternative) "basically social" go wrong.
In approaching a given species' behavior from an adaptationist
perspective, evolutionary analysis requires three nested but
distinct levels. These are:
(1) Models of the evolutionary process (involving definitions
of fitness, selection, adaptation, genes, and the role of stochastic
factors, and general models of such topics as kin-directed
altruism, reciprocation, sexual recombination, and sexual
selection);
(2) An analysis of how these principles were manifested as a
species-specific array of selection pressures, refracted through
the specific ecological, social, genetic, phylogenetic, and infor-
mational circumstances experienced along a given species'
evolutionary lineage;
(3) a description of the species' innate adaptive specializa-
tions that evolved to solve the problems posed by the species-
specific array of ancestral selection pressures.
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The advances over the last three decades in the sophistication
and power of evolutionary theory have justifiably generated an
enormous amount of excitement, and although much still re-
mains to be done, this first level is the best developed of the
three (Dawkins 1976; 1982; Hamilton 1964; Maynard Smith
1982a; Williams 1966). The second level, the reconstruction of
the array of selection pressures encountered over hominid
evolution (in the human case), has made a limited amount of
progress (see discussion in Tooby & DeVore 1986). The third
level, the mapping of human psychological mechanisms as
adaptations, is in its infancy and depends strongly on the other
two for its success. The three levels fit together in a tightly
structured way, and all are necessary to address any behavioral
issue with confidence. The relative maturity of evolutionary
theory compared to the other two levels has led the overeager to
try to leap directly from evolutionary theory to psychology, in
the belief that evolutionary theory by itself constituted a theory
of psychology (Cosmides & Tooby 1987).
To understand exactly why one cannot leap from evolutionary
theory to psychological theory, consider a thought experiment
involving members of a hypothetical species of fig wasp whose
life history leads them to enter, and spend all of their adult lives,
encased in a single fig. Further assume that after recruiting a
single mate during their juvenile phase, each pair colonizes a
different fig. Adults would always interact only with their mates,
and would never encounter another conspecific. The evolved
mechanisms regulating altruism towards the mate would act as if
they "valued" the welfare of the mate as highly as the individual
they were in, because the death or disability of the mate would
be reproductive death for the wasp (see discussion in Alexander
1987 on marriage). Moreover, such mechanisms would not
evolve to dole out assistance differentiately depending on the
recipient, but would be indiscriminately altruistic, because the
only conspecific ever encountered by an adult was its mate, and
so indiscriminate aid was never an error. Finally, imagine
researchers who brought such wasps into the lab to investigate
whether wasps were "selfish" inclusive fitness maximizers or
whether the "selfish gene" theory was bankrupt. In raising such
wasps with others, and running experiments on them in various
social situations, they would discover that the wasps were, in
contradiction to "theory," perfectly altruistic towards non-
relatives (thus ruling out inclusive fitness explanations of al-
truism) and toward "strangers" (ruling out reciprocation or mate
cooperation as an explanation of altruism). Thus, a little hard-
headed empiricism would dispel all these "selfish gene" theo-
ries. Similarly, Caporael et al. experiment on humans by put-
ting them in situations where, for example, the "subjects were
strangers," "their choices were anonymous," "they made a
single decision," and "interaction among group members was
prevented before and after each session" - i.e., in evolutionarily
unprecedented situations, completely unlike anything humans
would have regularly encountered during their Pleistocene
evolution, and therefore situations to which their psychological
mechanisms are not adapted.
Clearly, without a theory of the selection pressures operating
in ancestral environments, evolutionary theory has little to say
about psychology, and equally, psychology without this neces-
sary intermediate cannot serve as a test for "selfish gene"
approaches (as Caporael et al. appear to believe). This interven-
ing level is necessary to make models of psychological mecha-
nisms relate to evolutionary theory and vice versa. When these
three levels are not kept clearly in mind, and models are not
evaluated in terms of the appropriate level of analysis, confusion
abounds. What Caporael et al. call "selfish gene" theories are
the best existing characterizations of how the process of natural
selection operates: to refute these theories, the authors would
have to propose some new theory of the process of natural
selection, or some overlooked element in present models of
fitness, and this is exactly what the authors do not do. Instead,
they misinterpret such theories as theories about motivation -
Commentary /Caporael et al.: Selfishness examined
something like: Under all circumstances, evolutionarily un-
precedented or not, a human cognitively represents inclusive
fitness, and "selfishly" has as a goal the desire to maximize it. In
all fairness, one must admit that some evolutionary researchers
treat evolutionary theory this way as well (i.e., they treat
humans as fitness strivers), although more often this is simply a
metaphorical conceptual shorthand, used to avoid cumbersome
constructions (as Dawkins [1976; 1982] takes great pains to make
clear). The requirement to find "individualistic payoff," that is,
enhanced genetic propagation, as the designed consequence for
any psychological adaptation is not a level 3 statement about
psychological goals. Rather, it is the expression of the central
requirement of the theory of natural selection (level 1): adapta-
tions exist, and have the form they do, because they enhanced
genetic propagation (fitness) in ancestral conditions. No matter
what psychological mechanism is proposed, it is incumbent on
the researcher to show how genes coding for it could have
spread through the population. Discovering how they accom-
plished this is not a luxury (let alone a metatheoretical prejudice
deriving from Western cultural beliefs), but is rather an ines-
capable logical necessity deriving from the structure of evolu-
tion by natural selection. Caporael et al. "s "sociality hypothesis"
is a vaguely expressed theory of level 2 (species-specific selec-
tion pressures), introduced to account for the in-group bias
phenomena they and others have encountered (a psychological
phenomenon, level 3). They incorrectly see their level 2 hy-
pothesis as exempting them somehow from showing how in-
group bias (a level 3 phenomenon) leads to "individualistic
payoffs," that is, enhanced fitness (the level 1 requirement) in
ancestral environments (the level 2 context). The logically re-
quired attempt by others to find level 1 and level 2 explanations
for group living (i.e., its fitness payoffs) is interpreted by the
authors to mean that other researchers are somehow ignorant of
the fact that humans evolved in social groups, and have exten-
sive psychological adaptations to social life.
This confusion of levels does conceal several virtues in the
target article: The authors are right that a direct mapping of
evolutionary theory as a motivational theory is inadequate, and
that not everyone recognizes this; their experiments add to our
knowledge of the variables that our psychological mechanisms
respond to in cooperation; in-group biasing is a phenomenon
that must be addressed and explained (we favor a coalitional
explanation in which small scale coalitional aggression was likely
to have played a prominent role; Alexander 1971; Tooby &
Cosmides 1988). Nonetheless, we find the claim that "it was
adaptive for ancestral humans to identify automatically with an
in-group and to accept its goals as their own" and that "human
nature is basically social rather than selfish" as no more plausible
a psychological characterization than the idea that humans
cognitively represent fitness and selfishly pursue it as a goal.
Human nature is not "basically social" or "basically selfish";
human nature is "basically" a collection of mechanisms designed
to achieve genetic propagation in our environment of evolution-
ary adaptedness in ways that are sometimes characterizable as
"selfish," sometimes as "altruistic."
Selfishness, sociobiology, and self-
identities: Dilemmas and Confusions
Ian Vine
Interdisciplinary Human Studies, University of Bradford, Bradford,
BD7 1DP, England
Electronic mail: i.vine@cyber2.central.bradford.ac.uk
The research programme of Caporael et al. certainly advances
our understanding of immediate causes of prosocial choices, in
intergroup as well as intragroup social dilemmas. But the au-
thors interpret their data as refuting a loosely formulated ego-
istic incentive (El) hypothesis and supporting a still more
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ambiguous sociality (SO) hypothesis - each appearing to span
evolutionary functional, as well as psychological, explanations of
human nature. Their theoretical framework appears marred by
confusing conceptual contrasts and elisions, by lapses in differ-
entiating levels of empirical and even philosophical analysis,
and by misrepresentations of others' claims. Because the main
target for attack seems to be sociobiological theories founded on
inclusive fitness concepts, I shall focus mostly on this part of
their analysis.
The most obvious conceptual infelicities appear at the outset,
with the category mistake in the SO hypothesis -that our nature
"is basically social rather than selfish." Sociability or gregari-
ousness should be contrasted with asociality or solitariness.
Truly selfish acts or motives refer primarily to lack of appropri-
ate concern for others' interests, and thus refer to social
contexts. Competitive interactions are also social, and even
individualism must normally be understood against the substan-
tial background of social interdependencies found in all so-
cieties. Such continuous dimensions as selfish/altruistic, com-
petitive/cooperative, and individualistic/collectivist are rough-
ly orthogonal to asociality/sociality. A tendency to equate these
dimensions, and to talk as if our nature must be either entirely
selfish or fully altruistic, creates numerous ambiguities. Such
dichotomous thinking may be useful in designing gaming ex-
periments, but it does not clarify which questions the tests are
resolving. If we take the SO hypothesis to be about prosociality,
then neither that hypothesis nor the El alternative is an em-
pirically plausible option (as conceded in section 4, para. 6) and
in note 2) -even if their vagueness masks this fact.
A readiness to take sociality itself as problematic presumably
accounts for the loose collection of points in section 3. Eschew-
ing the rigour of sociobiological models, which aim to consider
the fitness of specific categories of social traits, the evolutionary
account of hominid group-living sheds little light on which types
and levels of social complexity and integration could benefit
group members in which ways - and shape our own cognitive-
affective mechanisms. Sociobiologists' views are misreported
(e.g., Alexander 1979, p. 23-24) in the authors' determination
to discredit the theory that features of sociality evolve to the
degree that they serve individuals' fitness interests. Claiming
that Hamilton (1964), Trivers (1971), and Alexander (1987)
ignore our social primate origins, and "describe ancestors who
begin in isolation and evolve to a social state in order to achieve
the same egoistic goals" (sect. 3, para. 2) that they had before is a
most peculiar misrepresentation. It suggests that Caporael et al.
mistake for empirical claims the use of analytic fictions, simply
designed to expose the formal structure of adaptive cost-benefit
functions for varying modes of social life.
Uncharitable readings of what most sociobiologists insist
upon are also required to claim that they "mistake evolutionary
forces for the psychological mechanisms that result from them."
In retrospect, the use of terms like "selfish" and "altruistic" in
the original population-genetic models invited critics to make
such errors, without due reference to the quite explicit technical
meanings the terms had regarding resource transfers with fit-
ness implications. Dawkins (1976) is somewhat atypical in em-
phasizing "competitive" selection and differing "interests" at
the level of genes themselves, because he holds that a "gene's
eye" perspective is less vulnerable to error than thinking of
individuals or groups in working through the issues about fitness
relevant to evolutionary change. Yet, he asserts clearly that
human behavour is in no direct sense specified as motivationally
selfish by the genes that help construct us. It is not reformula-
tions of Darwin's insights about selection at the genetic level
that "have provided the ultimate justification" for "economic
man" and El notions. Some crude early applications of fitness
models to humans in genetic determinist ways, by Wilson
(1975), Barash (1979), and others, are a rather thin excuse for
caricaturing the models themselves. [See BBS multiple book
review of Lumsden & Wilson's Genes, Mind, and Culture BBS
5(1) 1982.] And here it is Caporael et al. who refer to concepts
like "self-interest" without properly elucidating their quite
different senses in varying analytic contexts. They are nominally
alert to the relative independence of distal and proximal expla-
nations of behaviour, but they do not reliably differentiate
between variants of the El or SO hypotheses at different levels.
In terms of conscious goals it is clear that prosocial acts can be
truly unselfish if motivated by sympathy or reasoned moral
concern. They can be functionally self-sacrificial, in an immedi-
ate material sense, even if recompense is anticipated or subjec-
tive satisfactions are thereby sought. Merely experiencing unex-
pected "positive psychological payoff' after acting cannot suffice
to show an "egoistic incentive" (as stated in sect. 1.3). Tricky
cases arise where functional benefits to oneself have contributed
to acquisition of a trait, but may be actively repressed from
consciousness while one is exhibiting it. Where self-sacrificial
traits reflect promptings that can be traced back to naturally
selected genes, or to cultural forces that also tend to serve our
"ultimate" and normally unconscious "genetic self-interest" (in
the extended sense of inclusive-fitness theory), the sense in
which we act "selfishly" in El terms is extremely attenuated. A
mother risking her life to protect the child she loves is surely
altruistic in moral terms, quite irrespective of having furthered
her unconscious fitness interests (Vine 1983). Although so-
ciobiology does not presuppose direct "genetic determinism"
for higher animals (e.g., Dunbar 1987), theorists like Alexander
(1987) hypothesize that our phenotypic traits are quite tightly
constrained to restrict prosocial acts to what does serve inclusive
fitness. But where our motives are those of a subjective self-
system, its plasticity and susceptibility to social demands and
manipulations (Crook 1980; Markovd 1987) suggest that the
voluntary overriding of fitness constraints is humanly possible. I
have proposed a model that accepts the social-identity theory of
Tajfel and Turner (cf., pp. 18-19), so that when in-group
identity encompasses others, we can assimilate their interests to
our own interests. Although some genetic biasing in favour of
our somatic self is likely to have evolved, we can learn to
transcend fitness constraints (Vine 1987). This model fits the
evidence that our nature is both self-interested and prosocially
oriented.
The remaining variant of the El hypothesis emerges in the
"revealed-preference" assumption - which no competent so-
ciobiologist should take to be absolute fact or evolutionary
necessity. Caporael et al. sometimes appear worried by the
philosophical egoism that they cannot in principle refute em-
pirically. The arguments against it are conceptual (e.g., Midgley
1978). It is easily confused with the "unconscious self-interest"
theory of sociobiologists like Alexander - and Caporael et al.
sometimes appear to do this. That view supposes the extreme
potency of natural selection to be empirically true. If so, then
what we find subjectively satisfying will indeed simply reflect
our own genetic interests - and no results from social-dilemma
games will refute that El hypothesis. But the • philosophical
variant essentially holds that every rational choice implicitly
anticipates satisfactions that by definition are the agent's own.
That makes El inevitable - but trivial. It should not fool us into
supposing that sacrifices that result in our feeling good are
coextensive with those with "feeling good" as their selfish goal.
How best to critique egoism?
Lise Wallach and Michael A. Wallach
Department of Psychology, Duke University, Durham, NC 27706
The target article by Caporael et al. is a welcome sign that
questioning is now occurring regarding the selfishness or ego-
ism assumption - an assumption pervasive and dominant
enough that its criticism has been a long time coming. It is
especially heartening to see that three of the authors raising
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questions have until only recently been El theorists them-
selves. And we particularly welcome the elaboration of evolu-
tionary mechanisms for the development of nonegoistic behav-
iors, because evolution is so often regarded as implying that
such behavior does not exist.
It is also important to emphasize the target article's point that
egoism cannot be tested by seeing whether egoistic incentives
"work." Such has been a longstanding practice in psychology.
For example, studies in the social-learning theory tradition
demonstrating that children's donation behavior can be in-
creased by having them observe models whose altruistic behav-
ior is rewarded are repeatedly cited as evidence that expected
persona] returns underlie children's altruism (Wallach & Wal-
lach 1983, pp. 183-85). As the target article rightly insists,
however, if one is to test the assumption of egoism, one must
determine, not whether prosocial behavior occurs in the pres-
ence of egoistic incentives, but whether it can occur in their
absence.
This is what the authors have attempted to do. Unfortunately,
however, in our opinion the experiments they report are not
successful in that aim. These experiments provide good evi-
dence that human beings do not act only on incentives "that
would be just as highly valued by an isolated nonsocial animal as
by a social one." (sect. 1.5, para. 2). It would be very difficult to
understand why people who cared nothing about others or
about social norms, who had no conscience, and whose self-
esteem had no connection with whether they met or failed to
meet their commitments, would cooperate in the social dilem-
mas described.
The experiments, however, do not seem to provide evidence
against the sufficiency of egoistic incentives as these incentives
are commonly understood, as they are implied to operate by
most psychological theories, or as the authors themselves treat
them throughout most of their article. According to Caporael et
al. - and they would find wide agreement here - a payoff is no
less egoistic for being internal rather than external, and to act in
such a way as to have a clear conscience or avoid guilt is to act on
an egoistic incentive. Guilt avoidance, however, appears a very
likely explanation of the cooperation in their experiments.
Caporael et al. s account seems to neglect the direct effects of
what goes on when discussion is allowed. It would be reasonable
for subjects, even from the most narrowly egoistic point of view,
to offer to, and elicit from, one another promises to cooperate.
What this would represent would be a kind of reciprocity of
promises. Each subject, after all, stands to gain if they all (or the
required ones) cooperate. This is indeed how people behave in
discussions in social-dilemma games, as has been shown in an
earlier article by Orbell, van de Kragt, and Dawes (1988)
themselves.
But once a joint commitment to cooperate has been made
during discussion, the meaning of actually deciding to contrib-
ute is very different from what it is without discussion. It seems
clear that after promising to contribute, failing to do so - even if
no one would know and there were never to be any further
interactions - would be a violation of trust. Except for psycho-
paths, a subject who agreed to cooperate and then defected
could hardly avoid feeling some guilt. The egoistic incentive of
guilt avoidance is thus sufficient to account for such a subject's
actually making the contribution.
Caporael et al. attempt to reject the possibility that con-
science accounts for the cooperation obtained with discussion by
arguing that if satisfying one's conscience is the incentive for
contribution, then individuals should be as likely to contribute
to strangers as to members of their own group. This, they show,
is not the case. Subjects did not contribute to other groups as to
their own, which the authors regard as supportive of in-group
biasing. Caporael et al., however, seem to be assuming that the
only possible bearing that discussion could have on the workings
of conscience would be to enhance the salience of its demands.
They are ignoring that discussion is also capable of creating
demands of conscience - which is what seems to happen when
promises are made. That subjects did not contribute to other
groups as they did to their own may well have had nothing to do
with in-group biasing but may simply be a reflection of the fact
that it is only among the members of the group in which
discussion occurred that promises could have been made. There
would be no violation of trust in not contributing to groups other
than one's own - one has made no commitments to these
groups.
Conscience, then, cannot be ruled out as an incentive for the
cooperation obtained under discussion conditions in any of the
experiments reported here. Rather, it seems extremely likely
that subjects who committed themselves to contribute during
discussion were later motivated to carry out their promise to
avoid feeling guilty. Cooperation in the absence of guilt avoid-
ance has not been shown in this research, and thus it does not
seem to provide evidence against the senses of egoism the
authors mean to eliminate. We agree with Caporael et al. that
El theories give only a limited picture of our natures. It may,
however, be very difficult, if not impossible, to exclude experi-
mentally the operation of all internal as well as external egoistic-
incentives. Perhaps social-psychological experiments, or at least
social-dilemma games, are not a fertile ground on which to
critique egoism. Improved understanding of evolution may be
more helpful.
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We begin with a discussion of certain misconceptions
about the experiments.
The Experiments. Although Rapoport has some kind
words to say about the experiments, we (unsurprisingly)
disagree with his interpretation that they constitute walk-
ing through an open door. Some people cooperate - (to
their own disadvantage - some of the time, as in contrib-
uting to public broadcasting. We all knew that. The
purpose of the experiments, however, was not to demon-
strate that fact, but to determine how cooperation rates
vary systematically as a function of social setting with
payoffs constant, anonymity of choice, and no iteration.
(While Rapoport is right that other single play experi-
ments have been reported in the literature, these studies
have not systematically varied social setting in the way
ours did; in fact, many were designed simply to show that
people do cooperate in such anonymous single play situa-
tions, or evaluate the propensity to cooperate as a func-
tion of payoffs or personality characteristics of the players
- e.g. "internationalism.")
Our procedure was to assign subjects to conditions as
randomly as possible. ("Randomization" is only an ideal
in actual experiments; with the actual complexities of
recruitment and scheduling, we can ensure only that we
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have not violated random assignment in some specifiable
way.) Thus, personality and (distant) kinship (which
would have to be assumed on the basis of phenotypic
similarity) were not relevant to the results. Nor were such
constant factors as the fact (pointed out by Dunbar) that
subjects made choices with money "given to them" rather
than "their own" (a distinction not recognized by tradi-
tional economic theory, but of crucial importance to
human subjects committees). Nor is it important that in
all conditions the experimenters knew what choice the
subjects made (as again pointed out by Dunbar, Houston
6 Hamilton, and Knauft). It is the difference between
conditions that is important.
The more plausible El alternative explanations pre-
sented by the commentators involve (1) keeping prom-
ises because the experimenters knew whether they had
been kept (Houston & Hamilton, Katz, Wallach & Wal-
lach), (2) "implicit" concern with reputation (Dunbar,
Houston & Hamilton, Krebs, Rachlin, Wallach & Wal-
lach) and (3) conscience, perhaps interacting with group
identity (Houston & Hamilton, Mansbridge, Sonuga-
Barke). None of these alternative explanations is con-
sistent with data.
Promises. As we pointed out in the target article, manip-
ulations other than discussion produce cooperation since
that cannot involve promising. Of particular importance
is the work of Brewer and Kramer (1986) and Kramer and
Brewer (1986), in which the level of payment based on the
same (collective identity) or different (individual identity)
lottery for converting points resulting from the choices to
money resulted in greater restraint or less restraint,
respectively, in the use of a collective resource (points
that could be exchanged for money).
In addition, promising cannot interact with the knowl-
edge of the experimenters in the experiments discussed
in the target article because the experimenters did not
know who promised to cooperate and who did not. More
important, however, are the experimental results of Or-
bell et al. (1988) mentioned by Wallach & Wallach. (We
present these findings here, in part, because Wallach &
Wallach's summary is misleading.) These experiments
involved a trinary choice. Subjects first met in discussion
groups of 14 and then were divided into two subgroups of
7 - at which point (with or without further discussion)
subjects anonymously decided to keep $5 for themselves,
to give $12 to other members of their subgroups ($2 to
each), or to give $21 to the members of the other sub-
group ($3 to each). These alternatives were known prior to
discussion in the 14-person groups. In contrast to the ear-
lier experiments, the experimenters monitored the dis-
cussions, and hence knew who promised and who did not.
In 13 of the 24 such groups all subjects promised to give
away the $21. In these universal promising groups, 84% of
the subjects gave away the money, while 58% did so in the
remaining 11 groups. That appears to support the impor-
tance of promising, perhaps interacting with knowing that
the experimenter knew about it. A crucially important
finding, however, was that there was no relationship
between promising and behavior in the groups in which
not everyone promised. First, the sample correlation
across groups between the number of people who prom-
ised to give away the $21 and the number who later did so
was only .09. Second, the correlation (phi value) at the
individual level between promising to give the money
away and actually doing so was .03; finally, the correlation
between each individual's choice whether or not to give
away the $21 and the number of others in the group who
promised to give it away was, again, .03. If either promis-
ing were binding (Krebs's self-esteem through promise
keeping, Lefebvre's processor of conscience), or were
binding because the experimenters knew which choice
was made (Houston & Hamilton), or were kept because we
have "sanctions perpetually hanging over our heads" for
keeping promises (Dunbar), promises should be every bit
as predictive of choice when not everyone else promised as
when everyone else did, but they were not. In fact, they
were totally nonpredictive.
We have two interpretations: Either promises merely
reflect group identity (see target article) and failure of
unanimity in promising indicates a failure to establish
such identity, or promises interact with unanimity.
Atiyah (1981) has argued that when two people are con-
sidering mutual promises, these are binding only in the
presence of reciprocity, and if our second interpretation
is correct, subjects in this experimental situation may be
treating the entire remainder of the group as a single
entity - one that fails to reciprocate in the absence of
unanimity. Either view is consistent with our interpreta-
tion of our previous experiments.
Many commentators raise the possibility of conscience
interacting with group identity: "Group based con-
science" (Houston & Hamilton, Mansbridge, Sonuga-
Barke). A "conscience" that does not transcend group
boundaries is suspect, however. Rudolf Hoess, for exam-
ple, the commandant at Auschwitz who systematically
murdered 2,900,000 people, claimed in his autobiogra-
phy (1959) that his actions were based on the Platonic
subjugation of his "softer emotions" to his rational belief
in behaving justly in the interests of his group - much as a
pilot who bombs civilian territory. People who wish to
term this type of rationale (rationalization, retrospective
conscious and unconscious distortion - probably all
three) to be "acting out of conscience" are free to do so, as
is Humpty-Dumpty. Most observers, however, would
not, using ordinary language, refer to conscience in
analyzing such statements as: "Wouldn't it be great if we
all kept our money and they all gave theirs to us." As
Stearns points out, the group identity "solution" to social
dilemmas easily creates social dilemmas between groups.
We agree; we even agree with Olson's (1982) analysis that
it is precisely "self-sacrificial loyalty" to subgroups that
can create dilemmas between them, leading to conse-
quences far worse than any that would occur through
individual selfish behavior. If so, we see little distinction
between group based conscience and simple group iden-
tity. Group based equity (Heyman) has the same defini-
tional problem.
Finally, we wish to argue that the importance of the
experiments lies in their empirical findings. The general
field has suffered from a failure to blend mathematical
models with empirical results (Findlay & Lumsden) -
due to the peculiar paucity of the latter. Frank's commen-
tary is an example of theorizing without findings, from our
perspective a bad example, unfortunately, since we ad-
mire his other work. Frank asks us to suppose that people
can correctly differentiate cooperators from defectors (at
least at an above chance level). If they could, all sorts of
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nice results would indeed follow. But where is the evi-
dence they can? In his book Frank (1988) cited Experi-
ment 1 in Dawes et al. (1977); in that experiment,
subjects were able to differentiate cooperators from de-
fectors at a level very slightly above chance (resulting
from the fact that some conditions elicited more coopera-
tion than others); the residual percentage was .03. Dawes
et al. unfortunately provided a "significance level" along
with this result, although they cautioned that it was post
hoc and small and should not be taken seriously in the
absence of replication. (Currently, Dawes advocates not
stating a significance level at all in such situations.)
Experiment 2, which is ignored in Frank's book, did
provide an opportunity to replicate the finding. In this
experiment, the residual correlation was .02. In Frank's
own experiments, reported in his book, he claims to find
an ability to differentiate after a half-hour's interaction. It
turns out, however, that people can do this only on the
basis of predicting that the other person will do what they
do, that is, cooperate after a pleasant interaction or defect
after an unpleasant one (Frank, personal communica-
tion). There is no evidence that people have any ability to
predict cooperation or defection when the prediction is a
nonconsensus one - a prediction that is absolutely crucial
to the theory of identifiability. Instead, Frank's hypoth-
esis is based on an analogy with the croaking of frogs
(1988). In contrast, Heyman's hypothesis that subjects
are concerned about (within-group) equity does have
empirical support, although we cannot agree that it ex-
plains redundant contributions, because in contexts
where subjects have greater certainty that their contribu-
tions would be redundant, they do not contribute, for
example, when they are not part of a "designated set" of
contributors (van de Kragt et al. 1983).
This importance of empirical findings is again empha-
sized in the speculations about perfectly successful defec-
tors, who only fake devotion to group goals. The question
in considering constraints imposed by evolutionary theo-
ry is not whether such people could be fitter than those
who automatically identify with group goals, but whether
such people exist. No commentator has presented evi-
dence that they do. As Simon (1983) points out, evolution
is a "hill climbing" activity, and the fact that various hills
exist (or rather could exist) does not imply that they have
been climbed. Believing that all conceivable hills must
have been climbed is the basic fallacy in arguing directly
from evolutionary theory to an egoistic incentive (El)
theory of human motivation.
Two major points. 1. The target article does not claim
that humans are "basically" prosocial or cooperative or
selfless. According to Stenseth, however, we claim that
homo sapiens "is basically a cooperative creature" and
according to Mansbridge we say that sociality is totally
unrelated to self-interest. (What we did say in the begin-
ning of our target article was that our "experimental"
manipulations were unrelated to self-interest, as will be
elaborated in the next section of this Response.) We were
not trying to "seal th« case for selflessness" (Kenrick). We
did not suggest a dichotomy of egoistic versus altruistic
motivations (HeyiBMi). We agree with To©by & Cos-
mides and with TetUck that - speaking loosely - people
have a "mixed bag" of motives (if we may be permitted to
paraphrase their arguments with a colloquialism). Yet
Resporwe/Caporael et al.: Selfishness examined
even such "basically" sympathetic commentators as
Vine, and as Tooby & Cosmides, seem to have made
what Brewer terms "the error of unidimensional think-
ing": Applying the law of the excluded middle not to
negation but to opposites, such as selfish versus prosocial.
Hence we can hardly be faulted for failing to show that
most people do not behave selfishly most of the time
(Stearns).
2. The target article did not dismiss Darwinian evolu-
tion or propose an alternative to inclusive fitness as an
explanatory variable for evolutionary history. What we
attempted to make clear in our article was that we both
accept standard evolutionary theory and argue that it
does not automatically provide an explanation for ob-
served behavior. Here, we go somewhat beyond the
doubt of Houston & Hamilton (that "behavior. . . can be
explained in terms of people's attempts to maximize their
inclusive fitness"), the pessimism of Gibbard ("about the
value of explaining contemporary human behavior in
terms of fitness maximization"), and the judgment of
Tooby & Cosmides that such an explanation ("a direct
mapping of evolutionary theory as a motivational theory")
is "inadequate." Instead, we propose that evolutionary
theory does not provide such explanations but rather
constrains them by casting doubt on any that would
apparently lead to a decrease in inclusive fitness. It was
precisely our acceptance of Darwinian evolution com-
bined with this conclusion, in fact, that led to our at-
tempts to integrate our research findings with an evolu-
tionary hypothesis of "sociality" (not "prosociality"),
which constrains unbridled self-interest.
What we maintain is that egoistic incentive (El) theory
is an "overeager" attempt "to leap directly from evolu-
tionary theory to psychology." (Tooby & Cosmides), and
the attempt is there. Despite the suggestion by several
commentators that really sophisticated sociobiologists
wouldn't make such a leap, we agree with Brewer and
Heyman about the "pervasiveness of individual self-
interest assumptions in the behavioral sciences." In tradi-
tional economic theory, for example, hedonistic ra-
tionality is so strong an assumption that it is generally
referred to as "rationality" per se. In social psychology, it
is found in "social exchange" theories, and in personality
psychology - as Oyama points out - as a criterion of
"mental health."
Motives. A large number of authors (Gilbert, Krebs,
Mansbridge, Oyama, Stearns, Shweder, Tooby & Cos-
mides, Vine, and perhaps Kenrick and Knauft) in-
terpreted us as proposing an evolutionary theory of
motives. (In contrast, Brewer, Gibbard, and Eldredge
explicitly read us correctly.) A careful reading of the
target article will show why we were so often interpreted
as presenting a motivational theory. We challenged El
theory on its own grounds. To do this, we had to use its
motivational language for the critique in section 1 and the
experiments in section 2. From section 3 to the end -
where we write as sociality theorists - there is only one
use of the term "motive," and that is to mention their
erroneous attribution to inanimate objects.
Our interest is with the mechanisms with which hu-
mans select information from the environment, cate-
gorize it, evaluate it, and act on it. Contra Sonuga-Barke,
not all ordinary language has useful referents in scientific
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discourse. The casual use of motive is unashamedly tele-
ological. In addition, the word connotes egoism indepen-
dently of any observations about how organisms actually
behave. The best example of this circularity is found in
Liebrand's analysis: A partitioning (conscious or uncon-
scious) of "social motive" into concern for own (ego) payoff
and concern for other's (alter) payoff is termed "egotistic"
because, after all, such partitioning occurs within the
actor. (Where else?) We agree with Oyama that when
words are used in this way "egoistic incentive" theory
becomes a "black hole." (We are less sympathetic to
Krebs's analogy with the "null hypothesis," since so many
people so often base a proclamation of positive findings on
a claim of refuting it!) The social sciences, however, have
a dreary history of using words in a tautological fashion -
e.g. "reinforcement," which was expanded to include
"self-reinforcement" (Skinner 1957) when no reinforce-
ment could be found elsewhere. Whereas Rapoport
suggests that the extension of the concept of "selfishness"
to "include any demonstrable source of motivation not
previously subsumed under the concept" should lead us
to "cede" its validity, we argue that granting such an
extension should lead us to abandon it.
A world view. Our remaining response to the commen-
taries will be based on the sociality hypothesis. This begins
with the understanding that the human mind/brain
evolved for being social (and for learning what that means
in our cultures), and not for doing science, philosophy, or
other sorts of critical reasoning and discourse (Caporael
1987). We expect and find cognitive limitations especially
under conditions of uncertainty (Dawes 1988). These
limitations contribute to and interact with various so-
ciocultural constructions, including folk psychological no-
tions of "human nature." Without the approach Rapoport
recommends (i.e., the analysis of social images and ide-
ology accompanied by rigorous experimentation), human
evolutionary psychology is bound to be a potpourri of
myths confused with facts. Cognitive limitations and the
ruses of culture may be overcome to some extent by
education, environmental feedback, or "collective ra-
tionality" (Campbell 1986a), the process of target article,
commentary, and response being an example of the last.
This view of human reasoning is quite different from
the traditional "objectivist view" described by Lakoff
(1987), in which thought is considered to be abstract,
disembodied, logical, and ahistorical. Taking an analogy
from Shweder, we believe that "setting over" the objec-
tivist view by recognizing human limitations at the outset
may be a better way of pursuing objectivity. We hope to
show by implication how our view functions differently
from the traditional view in critical discourse.
Levels of explanation. We were criticized by Dunbar,
Krebs, and Tooby & Cosmides for confusing proximate
and ultimate levels of explanation; Kenrick, Eldredge,
and Cibbard praised us for making the distinction.
Caraco appears to do both; Vine allows that we were
"nominally alert" to it. We are not the first authors in the
literature, including the pages of BBS, to be accused of
this deficiency. Walter (1989) complains that if Kitcher
(1987) only understood the distinction, Kitcher's objec-
tions to human sociobiology would vanish. The complaint
is so commonly the first one directed at critics that it
verges on cant. What is going on here? How is it that
competent specialists, evaluating the identical text (in the
case of our target article) come to such wildly opposing
interpretations?
We believe a number of factors account for this im-
passe. Before describing them, let us make clear that our
target article attempted to maintain the distinction be-
tween proximate and ultimate levels. In footnote 2, we
made clear that our interest was in species-typical "cog-
nitive machinery," and we hypothesized that it evolved
because it enhanced fitness in the environments in which
humans evolved. Caraco and Vine explicitly drew atten-
tion to this footnote. In section 1.4, we developed our
conceptual objections to conflating genetic selfishness
with individual selfishness. As Dunbar points out, human
sociobiologists unlike those who work on mammals,
perpetuate this "depressingly common" conflation. Not
only was our discussion a criticism of these human so-
ciobiologists, but we used the same research (by Cheney
et al. 1986) cited by Dunbar to make the identical point:
The simplistic view equating genetic and individual lev-
els of explanation is in error. Nevertheless, as we noted
earlier, we took the claims of sociobiologists as serious
hypotheses. The experiments show that even if our con-
ceptual objections to equating proximate and ultimate
levels carried no weight, equating the two is not em-
pirically tenable. In section 3, we claimed that mecha-
nisms for sociality evolved because they enhanced fit-
ness. We considered a description of cognitive evolution
(Rozin 1976) that further removes the equation between
genetic and individual mechanisms, and we also ex-
plained why we believe that fitness explains the origins of
psychological mechanisms, but not necessarily their func-
tions in novel domains of action. Is it impossible to adopt
an evolutionary approach and simultaneously criticize
sociobiology? If so, sociobiology is vacuous.
We believe that several factors contribute to such
communication at cross-purposes between human so-
ciobiologists (hereafter just sociobiologists) and their crit-
ics. Among these are (1) folk psychology, (2) distortions
evoked by the "selfish gene" metaphor, and (3) the use of
the proximate/ultimate distinction, specifically in human
sociobiology.
Folk psychology. We sometimes envy our colleagues in
the nonbehavioral sciences. For example, we may meet a
cell biologist on a plane and at best listen with attention to
stories about assaying methods about which we know
nothing. But how many people confess that they know
nothing about psychology, or that they are bad judges of
character, or that they find humans to be an enigmatic
species? Human sociobiologists often operate on their
intuitions of psychology, not with the empirical literature
on "their" species, humans.1 Almost universal are de-
scriptions of animal research linked by mere proximity on
the printed page to casual observations of human behav-
ior. Even where the animal literature is not invoked, the
human literature may still be overlooked (Caporael
1989a).
The dearth of psychological citations in the human
evolutionary literature raises a question. If authors are
not giving evolutionary explanations for scientific find-
ings, what are they explaining? The answer, we believe,
is their folk psychological constructions of casually ob-
served behavior.
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Gilbert has given a lucid account of what folk psychol-
ogy is. It includes the conceptual categories and forms of
explanation implicit in everyday thought and talk. A close
reading of her commentary also reveals the preferred
form of explanations in everyday talk - motives. We have
already explained why we reject everyday talk about
motives - they are circular and inherently egoistic. In
addition, although Gilbert does not mention it, when
everyday talk of motives is generalized from a situation to
a person, then from a person to a group, the result is a
blurring of discourse from motives to everyday talk about
traits. (Consider: "He was looking for a fight," and "He's
an aggressive person," "Men fight," and "Humans are an
aggressive species.") Traits are the conceptual categories
of folk psychology and motives are the forms of explana-
tion. Traits and motives are also the language of socio-
biology.
The problem is not that the human sciences need to
characterize folk psychology, as Gilbert recommends,
but that they need to keep the distinction between folk
psychology and scientific psychology in mind. Even now,
much of psychology, particularly social psychology, blurs
the distinction. Although the folk may have the luxury of
choosing their beliefs, prejudices, and intuitions over
research results, when scientists speak of their findings
they are already committed, at least in principle, to the
overthrow of naivete. Accumulating research data does
explain why folk psychology diverges from the "scientific
truth."
There is little reason to believe that folk psychology will
bear much resemblance to scientific psychology. Folk
psychology is derived partly from individual histories of
social relationships and partly from culturally shared
conceptual categories and forms of explanation. Nothing
in it suggests a valid account of underlying mechanisms.
To paraphrase Gilbert, however, sociality does take folk
psychology seriously. We view folk psychology as a means
of negotiating the social-symbolic environment (and if
worst comes to worst, sometimes the nonsocial environ-
ment; see below). Of course, folk psychology should not
be ignored entirely in scientific discourse but be treated
as a source of hypotheses, rather than as evidence for
their validity.
Anthropomorphizing the gene. The use of terms like
"altruistic" or "selfish" in some of the early population
genetics models, writes Vine, invited critics of so-
ciobiology to "mistake evolutionary forces for the psycho-
logical mechanisms that result from them" (quoting the
target article). Tooby & Cosmides assert that when some
theorists appear to treat evolutionary theory as moti-
vational theory, they are simply using a metaphorical
shorthand. We have already discussed the difficulty of
using folk psychological terms to describe human psy-
chology. The problems are magnified when we use them
to describe genes.
We recognize that serious difficulties are bound to arise
when we humans have to describe processes that are
beyond our sensory ken - geologic time, DNA interac-
tions, cognitive processes for which we have no introspec-
tive access. There are also problems in dealing with
supervenient properties (e.g. fitness or probability; So-
ber 1984) that are not themselves physical. Human minds
need some way to bring such ideas down to human scale.
More problems are found to arise when the desire to
understand is greater than the understanding. Circum-
stances exist that invite anthropomorphism as a default
metaphor. Note that evolutionary processes are not
brought into the realm of human ken by comparing them
to a computer or a molecular process. Like the Australian
aborigines described by Knauft, "selfish gene" theorists
"socialize" evolutionary processes.
Tetlock is right that the demarcation of the explanatory
range of research programs organized around competing
metaphors is arbitrary. Some metaphors are better than
others for structuring our thinking, however. Take the
metaphor "argument is war" (Lakoff & Johnson 1980).
We win and lose arguments by strategic attacks on weak
positions that were thought to be invincible by their
defenders. The concept, the language, and the activity of
argument is structured by the metaphor of war. But do
evolutionists really want the concept, language, and pro-
cesses of natural selection structured by the metaphor of
persons? Even so widely used and innocent a construc-
tion as "natural selection favors" draws attention away
from natural selection as a process that probabilistically
eliminates variants rather than picking them out for spe-
cial attention. If we focused on the culling aspects, theo-
rists would not be so eager to assume that every charac-
teristic is an adaptation (cf. Tooby & DeVore 1986, who
make this argument).
Personification of genes is no more neutral concep-
tually than the "argument is war" image. Anthropomor-
phic metaphors provide a very specific way of thinking
about nonhuman entities, in "terms that we understand
on the basis of our own motivations, goals, actions, and
characteristics" (Lakoff & Johnson 1980, p. 34, emphasis
added). Such metaphors direct how we think and behave
toward a particular nonhuman entity by picking out the
human attribute in it that we want to highlight. The
problem with the selfish gene metaphor is that it struc-
tures the way we think about mind and behavior in
restrictive ways. Anthropomorphizing the gene invites
the very form-function error Brewer warns against in her
commentary.
Our rejection of anthropomorphized gene theories
("selfish gene" theories) is most emphatically not a rejec-
tion of natural selection - as Caraco interpreted it. His
objection is that we do not make a distinction between
"ultimate-level 'selfishness'" and the mechanisms that
result from selective processes. We do, but we view
selfishness as a characteristic of humans, not of "ultimate
levels," genes, or natural selection. His misinterpreta-
tion, we suggest, may be related to anthropomorphizing
the gene.
Ultimate/proximate revisited. For many human so-
ciobiologists the "ultimate cause" of behavior is re-
productive success: The "proximate causes" are every-
thing else - from habitat conditions through ontogeny,
physiological systems, conscious subjective states, and
unconscious cognitive states (e.g., Symons 1979). Under-
standing the ultimate cause, inclusive fitness maximiza-
tion, is the key to unlocking the secrets of human nature
(Alexander 1979). The operation of ultimate cause is
described by natural selection and such subtheories as kin
selection and reciprocity. Proximate causes are merely
"tools or servants" in the service of natural selection
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(Barash 1977). These sociobiologists claim that their in-
terests are in the ultimate cause of behavior, not the
proximate causes. We have two objections to the so-
ciobiological blurring of ultimate and proximate causes.
First, echoing Kitcher (1985, pp. 281-82): If natural
selection does not shed light on the proximate mecha-
nisms of human psychology, then what does it illuminate?
Second, lacking a bridge between models and proximate
mechanisms, to apply population-genetic models to
human behavior is to use them as de facto psychological
theories. But they aren't. We view population-genetic
models as models of the alterations of gene frequencies in
a population given such parameters as selection coeffi-
cients and allelic frequency. These models do not de-
scribe, nor are they reducible to, psychological mecha-
nisms. The inappropriate transition between gene
frequency alterations and mechanisms is most apparent
in Dunbar s commentary when he asserts that the correct
question to ask concerns "why humans are still social" (his
emphasis). As opposed to what? The "logically more
primitive state of solitary existence" Dunbar describes?
Even if Alexanders (1979) "extrinsic causative factors" for
group living were removed, humans would still group;
they (we) are unable to develop and function in isolation.
Obligate interdependency is an outcome of our species
history, not cost-benefit calculations in the present on the
advantages for being social or solitary.
It is one thing for evolutionists to take cooperation or
selfishness as a supervenient property of organisms; it is
quite another to assume that a motive or cognitive mecha-
nism exists that resembles the property. We take Findlay
& Lumsden s model to be a model in the former sense.
They assume that learning can be an effective means of
spreading non-EI behavior throughout a population, and
they track the resulting changes in gene frequency. In
principle, the model describes any species in which
learning from conspecifics is important.
The model Findlay & Lumsden propose may justify
our position to some sociobiological critics, but it does not
make predictions about the mechanisms resulting in
prosocial behavior, nor does it suggest interesting direc-
tions for empirical study. Especially in the human case,
the relationship between the model and what it actually
represents is unclear. For example, is "cultural learning"
to be equated with social learning? If so, then the "al-
truistic" property in the model cannot be general across
organisms, because most animal social learning is limited
to direct observation whereas humans can also learn
symbolically.
More important, the group selection model Findlay &
Lumsden propose is very different from the scenario we
proposed. In particular, we hypothesize that phe-
notypically selfish individuals have lower fitness in the
group relative to nonselfish individuals (because of con-
straints on group size), and that within-group selection,
rather than between-group selection, is the primary locus
of selection (because interdependent individuals exploit
the habitat). The difference between the two approaches
can be appreciated by taking Findlay & Lumsden's model
literally as an explanation for heroic (or fanatic qua
Tetlock) self-sacrificial altruism. Under the model, such
behavior might be explained as an outcome of an "al-
truistic impulse." We view it as a relatively rare "error"
that occurs when distinctions between ones own and
others' outcomes are completely lost in certain stressful
conditions. We venture to suggest that fewer men or
women have sacrificed their lives for their country than
for their comrades. While we appreciate the praise of
Findlay & Lumsden, we maintain that the utility, in more
than a very general sense, of population genetics models
for research on human evolution has yet to be estab-
lished. We would like to see more explicitly social models
that incorporate social structure and ecological param-
eters. Foley and Lee (1989) have made a step in this
direction.
Human evolutionary research. It is argued by Tooby &
Cosmides that "an adaptationist perspective" requires
three levels of analysis. In general, we agree with their
description - it was, after all, the strategy we used. We
argued that given the conditions of hominid evolution, we
would expect adaptations for sociality (i.e. mechanisms to
support the development and maintenance of group
membership) to enhance fitness in ancestral populations.
In the context of the target article, ingroup bias is clearly
proposed as one such adaptation. Nevertheless, Tooby &
Cosmides erroneously assert that we see the sociality
hypothesis as somehow exempting us from showing how
ingroup bias leads to enhanced fitness in ancestral en-
vironments. Their misperception may be related to dif-
ferences in approaching the past. Tooby & Cosmides
accurately portray their perspective as adaptationist.
They rely on a backward projection from modern meta-
phors and behavior to infer the characteristics of ancestral
environments (cf. Tooby & DeVore 1986). From this line
of reasoning, what people do now must have had adaptive
advantages in the past - a "hindsight analytic frame-
work" (Foley 1984a). In contrast, we believe that evolu-
tionary psychology requires greater attention to pal-
eoanthropological research than is paid by sociobiological
research.
We do argue that precisely because the ingroup bias
enhanced fitness in ancestral environments we need not
claim that it enhances fitness under current environ-
ments. Hence, we may sound like sociobiologists (Ken-
rick), but to the extent that they posit a direct link
between inclusive fitness maximization and contempo-
rary human behavior (Alexander 1979; 1987; Barash 1977;
Smith 1987), we do not qualify (as is evident from some of
the commentary). As we claimed in the target article,
mechanisms adapted for one function can be extended or
captured (Dunbar) by another functional system. Not
only can this functional system be psychological; it can
also be cultural: hence, we speak of mechanisms being
engaged in cultural contexts. Many mechanisms have
multiple functional contexts, but only some contexts
suggest the nature of the adaptive fit. Identifying evolved
mechanisms involves such indirect approaches as the
location of "mismatches" or "anachronisms" (Krebs) in
modern life. Demonstrating the disjunction between
adaptation and cultural engagement was a singular virtue
in Cosmides s (1985) own research, in which she showed
that an arguably adaptive mechanism responsive to rule-
breaking in ancestral social domains functioned poorly in
abstract domains where subjects would have to follow the
rule of modus tollens.
An "evolutionary prediction" that corresponds with
predictions based on casual observation, folk psychology,
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revealed preference analysis, economic factors, and
structural conditions is the weakest possible explanation
for behavior. These are all factors that have to be treated
as potential threats to validity in evolutionary psychology
(Caporael 1989b). Both scenarios and experiments are
subject to such confounding factors.
Scenarios. Evolutionary reconstructions are a necessary
evil for evolutionary psychology - at the present time, at
least. A scenario provides the raw material for formulat-
ing hypotheses about psychological mechanisms, but it is
subject to a number of distorting influences. First, it is
very difficult to interpret fossil remains and artifacts.
Before inferences about behavior can even be drawn from
the existing data, it has to be established that a particular
assembly was not created by natural processes (Binford
1983). Other problems arise from using animal models for
hominid behavior.
Second, the ideological factors Rapoport describes
influence the construction of evolutionary scenarios.
Some researchers and theorists are increasingly aware of
the mythic properties in their scenarios (Isaac 1983;
Landau 1984), but if anything, scenarios have become
more embroiled in ideological positions rather than less.
Even a cursory look at models for the evolution of homi-
nid social behavior suggests that scenarios have been
"captured" by current ideological conflicts (cf. Foley &
Lee 1989, Table 1, or summaries in Richards 1987; Tooby
& DeVore 1986). Hypotheses about the social structure
characteristic of early hominids range from monogamous
pair-bonds to polygynous harems to female-offspring
groups to male kin territorial groups. Most of these
scenarios deal with relationships of dependency and au-
tonomy between males and females - the same issues that
mark many current social debates, from abortion to equal
pay. There is a need to develop reasonable constraints on
theorizing (Foley & Lee 1989).
Third, scenarios are especially subject to cognitive
limitations that are collectively known, appropriately, as
the "scenario effect" (Dawes 1988) or the simulation
heuristic (Kahneman & Tversky 1982). The greater the
ease in constructing a story and the more detail that can
be added to it, the more likely that people will believe the
story to be true. In contrast, rational analysis quickly
reveals that greater detail makes scenarios less likely to be
true; the probability of combination of components can-
not be greater than the probability of the least likely
component, and equal only if the probability of all other
components is 1.00. Tooby & Cosmides identify the
scenario in the sociality hypothesis as "vague"; it was
intentionally constructed to be conservative.
We disagree, however, with Tetlock's implication that
all evolutionary scenarios are equal. Some scenarios are
worse than others. The best that evolutionary researchers
are likely to be able to do is to set constraints on the
constituents of a possible scenario. One set of constraints
requires the analysis of social images, ideologies (Rapo-
port), and metaphors (Tetlock) that potentially distort the
scenario. We envision this analysis to be no different from
the process of attempting to control (or explain away)
confounding variables in an experiment. Another re-
quires sensitivity to research on cognitive limitations,
another confounding variable. A third, of course, is that
we consider the species' history, morphology, and ecolo-
gy. We expect that incorporating the results of psycholog-
ical research will also help constrain scenarios (Caporael
1989b).
The target article was written prior to the appearance of
the articles of Foley (1989) and Foley and Lee (1989),
otherwise we would not have called attention to Foley's
(1984; 1987) definition of hominid community. Our rea-
son for believing that the ecological definition of commu-
nity should include conspecifics is that, in some cases
(particularly humans and their immediate ancestors),
conspecific relationships are as great a source of selective
pressure as interspecific relationships (or even greater).
In arguing that sociality becomes its own driving force,
however, we are not claiming that encephalization occurs
only to solve social problems but that solving the prob-
lems presented in the ecological community has become
a social problem for humans, and perhaps for a few other
species. That is, other individuals mediate selection pres-
sures in the habitat and at the same time become an
independent source of selection pressures on individuals.
We do not believe that preexisting sociality will give rise
to the "intense sociality" characteristic of humans in the
absence of appropriate ecological conditions. Thus, not
only do we agree with Foley's comment that our approach
can be integrated within an ecological framework, we
believe such an integration is essential for evolutionary
psychology.
The relevance of the experimental approach. We are
asked by Teigen whether paradigmatic conflicts at the
metatheoretical level can be settled by appeal to experi-
mental results. Probably not. Our purpose was to point to
an alternative paradigm; researchers do not have to ac-
cept El as the only explanatory framework. Still, Tooby &
Cosmides's imaginative fig wasp story notwithstanding,
we think there is a great deal to be said for "a little
hardheaded empiricism."
Krebs, Houston & Hamilton, and Tooby & Cosmides
object to experiments in "evolutionarily unprecedented
environments" such as ours, where subjects are strangers
making single anonymous choices. It is quite true that the
focus on "stranger psychology" is a deficiency in psycho-
logical experiments (Caporael 1987a), but this is hardly an
indictment of the experimental approach for evolutionary
studies. A variety of factors can account for observed
behavior, and these need to be eliminated before we can
resort to an evolutionary account. It is precisely because
there is no reason to assume that cognitive/affective
mechanisms evolved to function in situations like a psy-
chology laboratory that the laboratory is a suitable situa-
tion for studying evolved mechanisms. Such factors as
those noted by Knauft as empirical caveats can be ran-
domized (as they were in these studies) across conditions.
Intervening variables can be controlled, and alternative
explanations can be eliminated. The laboratory is one
means of creating a "mismatch" between a proposed
adaptation and a context that will illuminate the nature of
the mechanism. If the behavior occurs even in the wrong
context, or is distorted in some other fashion in the
context, the claim for an evolved mechanism is strength-
ened. As is the case with scenarios, experiments are a
means of developing constraints on theorizing.
We applaud Knauft's call for a broadly collaborative
effort and better articulation with theories of human
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evolutionary development, ethnographic evidence, and
paleoanthropological data. As he points out, the sociality
hypothesis does have various incarnations in the an-
thropological literature. These certainly merit a compre-
hensive review and critique, much along the lines of
Kuper's (1988) trenchant review of the invention of primi-
tive society. Where the sociality hypothesis differs from
the ethnographic and paleoanthropological work is in its
emphasis on human psychology as an adaptation to group
living, as we suggested in the target article. Psychology
experiments on purported outcomes of human evolution
can be devised to test some aspects of theories in these
fields.
In general, the constraints we urge on both scenarios
and experiments are to limit the ultra-Darwinism de-
scribed by Eldredge. As is clear from Eldredge's commen-
tary, however, such constraints also allow evolutionists to
broaden their scope in interpretating organisms' activities.
In the case of humans (and perhaps some other species), we
would add information-gathering activities. We are uncer-
tain how such activities would fit into the hierarchically
structured systems described by Eldredge, but we believe
they are important to the functionalist perspective.
Mechanisms. A number of commentators either elabo-
rated on the ingroup bias mechanism we proposed or
offered alternative explanations, many of which were
grounded in self-interest as a mechanism. The commen-
taries by Brewer, Mansbridge, and Teigen pointed to
self-conception in scientific psychology. Scientific psy-
chology increasingly recognizes that the locus of self can
shift with group identification (cf. Turner 1987; Vine
1987). Brewer identifies the shifts as a cognitive extension
of self-interest, which suggests a notion of "self that
departs from the traditional individualistic conception.
Teigen makes the same departure, but from another
direction: He recommends assuming that human actions
are invariably determined by ingroup considerations with
a "group" of one person being the limiting case. We agree
with Brewer that clique-selfishness may be the most
intractable form of selfishness. It may not be useful to
make sharp divisions between individualistic and collec-
tive behavior (Teigen): The determination of "selfish"
becomes relative in cases of clique selfishness/altruism
(e.g. the fanatic/hero who sacrifices himself for the
group).
Tetlock proposes that El theory can be rescued by
forging new intellectual alliances with social identity and
role theorists. The egoistic incentive here at issue is
positive social identity. We believe two notions are em-
bedded in Tetlock's description of social identity theory.
One is related to people's goals (a marriage between
incentives and the individual subjective self-system re-
ferred to by Vine). The other is a notion of social identity
that has more to do with identity as simply an outcome of
fairly automatic cognitive processes involved in classify-
ing and evaluating the "stimulus stream" to which hu-
mans are exposed. The former can be married to El
theory (if it will take it) in the justificational sense Shwed-
er discusses. The latter suggests not only goals, but the
epistemological framework we have adopted for this Re-
sponse. This is the major difference between the social
identity theoretic variant of the El research program and
the sociality argument we advanced.
It is not clear to us exactly how far Brewer's charac-
terization will take us vis-a-vis other mechanisms. For
example, empathy was suggested by Kenrick, Krebs, and
Rapoport as a mechanism mediating helping behavior.
On one hand, both ingroup bias and empathy may be
considered as cognitive extensions of the self; on the
other, ingroup bias may be a cognitive extension of self-
interest, and empathy may be an identification with
others' suffering in instances where the suffering can be
personalized. For example, a familiar story is told about
two enemy soldiers suddenly surprising each other. Un-
der ordinary conditions, one should kill the other; yet he
does not because the soldier on the opposing side takes
some quick action - perhaps flashing a picture of his wife
and children - that makes their common predicament
salient.
All these commentaries suggest that research on the
evolution and description of self would be well worth-
while.
Conclusion. In reading between the lines, Oyama
presupposes that we are seeking a motivational theory
and grounding it in biology. Our interests are in the
cognitive mechanisms from which social motives are
constructed through development, experience, and
learning in particular cultural milieus. This is the "bi-
level" approach we advocate. Although we tried (unsuc-
cessfully) to stay away from terms such as "innate tenden-
cy," we do not want to continue an opposition between
biology and culture. The issues Oyama raises are indeed
worth thinking about. Our "between the line" agenda,
such as it is, is a struggle against the extraordinary poverty
of explanatory means for discourse on moral life. Elim-
inating the inherently egoistic incentive language may
force us to find new means of authenticating moral life.
We hope that the kind of wit Oyama displays in her final
note will have a place in a richer discourse on morality.
We are grateful to the commentators who, like Oyama,
risked being redundant to save us from ourselves. (If it is
any comfort, we rarely found the errors pointed out to us
redundant.)
NOTE
1. Some sociobiologists do cite anthropological literature
(e.g., Alexander 1979; 1987; Chagnon & Irons 1979), but that
work is not integrated with the psychological literature 0ahoda
1982).
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